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The process of democratisation in post-conflict Cambodia has been problematic. 
Almost two decades after the UN-led intervention in 1993, democracy in 
Cambodia remains shallow, as evidenced by various studies. Three main factors 
are hindering democratisation: the country’s recent violent history, the Khmer 
political order and the unfinished tasks of the UN-led intervention. 
Experiences of other countries illustrate that it is very difficult to consolidate 
democracy in post-conflict societies due to internal strife, weak state institutions, 
historical political transitions and lack of political legitimacy. Hence, this 
dissertation argues that decentralisation may make the consolidation of democracy 
in post-conflict society possible. If carefully implemented, decentralisation could 
consolidate democracy in Cambodia, especially at the local level. 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the quality of democratic 
decentralisation reform in Cambodia. The focus is ultimately justified by the 
frequent arguments that democratic decentralisation is vital in deepening 
democracy in a post-conflict context. The main research problem is: what is the 
quality of democratic decentralisation reform in post-conflict Cambodia? 
Democratic decentralisation in Cambodia is analysed through the empirical 
investigation of three concepts: responsiveness, accountability and devolution of 
power of the elected commune councils. 
Findings suggest that there has been an improvement in the quality of local 
governance with the democratic decentralisation reform. Democratic 
decentralisation reform has influenced democratisation and reconstruction of post-
conflict Cambodia, including creating political space and reinventing local 
democratic institutions, reconnecting the central and local government, building 
political legitimacy, serving as democratic education for local leaders, changing 
political culture and leading to other reforms.   
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PART 1 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the quality of democratic decentralisation 
reform in post-conflict Cambodia. The focus is ultimately justified by the frequent 
arguments that democratic decentralisation is vital in deepening local democracy in 
a post-conflict context. The main research problem is: what is the quality of 
democratic decentralisation reform in post-conflict Cambodia? It is moreover 
likely that there is an impact of democratic decentralisation on overall democracy 
(Lederach 1997; Manor 2011; Grindle 2007/2011; Öjendal 2005; Crook & Manor 
1998; Cheema 2011; UN-DESA 2007; Öjendal & Lilja 2009). The thesis consists 
of two main parts. Part 1 covers chapters I, II and III.  
Chapter I begins by defining the research problem and explaining the 
processes of democratic decentralisation in a post-conflict society. Secondly, the 
historical and political context, the political orders, the process of the UN-led 
intervention and the assumed contemporary “democratic deficit” are explained. 
Thirdly, the justification of democratic decentralisation is elaborated theoretically. 
Fourthly, the research methods and methodology are described. 
Chapter II discusses the process of democratic decentralisation in a post-
conflict society like Cambodia. I begin by explaining the conceptualisation of 
Cambodian democracy in the realm of political orders in South-east Asia. The 
chapter discusses the importance of democratic decentralisation and reviews the 
general context of the role of decentralisation in deepening democracy.  
Chapter III gives a broad background of Cambodian dynamics in political 
orders and reform processes. This chapter seeks to understand the political context 
between Cambodian political orders and contemporary democratic consolidation. 
This chapter attempts to uncover the role of decentralisation in the on going 
democratisation efforts in Cambodia by relying on the contextual evolution of 
Cambodian society. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
The post-conflict era in Cambodia has been marked by more or less substantial 
attempts at democratisation (Öjendal & Lilja 2009; Peou 2007; Lizee 2000; Doyle 
1998). After twenty years of the UN-led intervention, democracy in Cambodia has 
generally been seen to be deviating towards some kind of hybrid regime, which 
contains a number of democratic institutions but nevertheless largely operates 
outside democratic norms, values and procedures (Öjendal & Lilja 2009; Un 2004; 
Hughes 2003). Literature on decentralisation has indicated that if decentralisation 
is well crafted, it will consolidate democracy (Ribot 2011; Manor 2011; UN DESA 
2007; Grindle 2011; Öjendal & Lilja 2009). The aim of this thesis is to investigate 
the quality of democratic decentralisation reform in post-conflict Cambodia. The 
focus is ultimately justified by the frequent arguments that democratic 
decentralisation is vital in deepening local democracy in a post-conflict context. 
Thus, the main research problem is: what is the quality of democratic 
decentralisation reform in post-conflict Cambodia? To operationalise, based on 
available theoretical literature, this thesis will empirically investigate the quality of 
responsiveness, accountability and devolution of power of the democratic 
decentralisation in post-conflict Cambodia.  
After the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Cambodia, like other war-
torn countries in the “Third World”, initiated a period of so-called reconstruction 
(Öjendal & Lilja 2009). Scholars often treat these Third World regimes as 
incomplete or transitional forms of democracy, and the international community 
has put a great deal of effort into attempts to reconstruct so-called “failed, 
collapsed, and weak states” (Levitsky & Way 2002; Rotberg 2004; Menocal & 
Kilpatrick 2005; Ottaway 2002; Lyons 2004). However, those newly emerging 
societies often find themselves pulled disconcertingly into what has been called “a 
maelstrom of anomie” (Rotberg 2004: 1) made up of continuing civil wars or 
internal conflicts; rampant poverty and corruption (Ottaway 2002; Rotberg 2004); 
lack of confidence and trust by citizens in their rulers; inability of rulers to achieve 
consensus; and continuing polarisation of social and political institutions and 
structures (Levitsky & Way 2002; Diamond 2002; Yannis 2002).  
In 44 percent of all post-conflict situations, it is said war resumes in the first 
five years after the violence has stopped (World Bank 2004: 8) and about 50 
percent of post-conflict countries revert to war in the first decade of peace (Collier 
et al. 2003: 7; Junne & Verkoren 2005). Some authors emphasise that democracy 
in post-conflict societies has survived but still faces considerable uncertainty and is 
unconsolidated, stuck in transition or being “defective”. They have also been 
described as “collapsed states” (Croissant 2004: 157; Ottaway 2002; Rotberg 2004; 
Menocal & Kilpatrick 2005; Yannis 2002). It is also typically claimed that those 
societies are still suffering from the lack of an administrative culture based on the 
principles of the rule of law, lack of power sharing and of civil control of the 
military and lack of stable political institutions, as well as from corruption, weak 
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law enforcement, serious deficits in horizontal and downward accountability and in 
settling political conflicts by peaceful means. In addition, weak states are unable to 
provide adequate amounts of political goods and have weak functioning of state 
institutions, deteriorated physical infrastructure, poor functioning of services such 
as health care and education, fallen or falling economic indicators and sometimes 
high levels of corruption (Yannis 2002; Croissant 2004). Hence, weak states 
usually “honour rule of law precepts in the breach and are ruled by despots, elected 
or not” (Rotberg: 2004: 4).  
In general, external intervention has met with only partial success—“the 
patients have been kept alive but not necessarily been dismissed from the hospital” 
(Ottaway 2002: 1002). Rebuilding institutions in collapsed states means organising 
government departments and public agencies to discharge their functions both 
efficiently and democratically. States that have just emerged from conflict are 
constructed on the basis of power and force (Ottaway 2002) and do not nurture 
democracy successfully without difficulty (Carothers 2002). It is an uphill battle to 
establish democracy in post-conflict societies because of weak state institutions, 
deep distrust in politics and leadership (Öjendal & Lilja 2009). 
The question is how democratisation can be consolidated in transitional 
countries. Some suggest that before any deep reconstruction can commence in war-
torn or post-war societies, a viable political system needs to be crafted via 
establishing democratic political institutions in order to create political stability, 
legitimacy, accountability and responsiveness (Braathen & Hellevik 2006; 
Luckham et al. 2000; Öjendal 2003; Öjendal & Lilja 2009). The political and 
institutional choices made during periods of transition can be as crucial as 
elections. Decisions about institutional structures have in many cases been central 
elements of democratic enhancement (Luckham et al. 2000) while wrong decisions 
by political elites may easily spur conflict. According to Cousens & Kumar (2001), 
the most central and pressing need in the context of post-conflict reconstruction is 
to re-establish a legitimate political system that includes a legitimate government. 
Hence, in a post-conflict context, elections are meant to defuse conflicts and 
allow the establishment of a legitimate popularly supported and unifying 
government. Elections naturally form an important part of such an endeavour. 
However, the consequences of elections conducted during the rapid insertion of 
democratisation in post-conflict societies are sometimes contradictory. 
Authoritarian leaders may for example use illegal means such as intimidation, 
fraud and vote buying to win the elections, and elections are sometimes used by the 
previous power holders to regain power, and such leaders have only limited 
political legitimacy. As Robert Rotberg describes:  
Elections are always essential to the launching of post-conflict democracies, 
but they can also exacerbate competition, polarize already fractured 
societies, institutionalize existing imbalances of power, and retard as well as 
advance the transition from war and failure to resuscitation and good 
governance (Rotberg 2004: 39-40). 
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While elections are a double-edged tool, there is a consensus that one of the 
credible catalysts for democratisation is to strengthen local institutions, for 
example via decentralisation reforms (Manor 1999; Öjendal 2005; Antlov & 
Wetterberg 2011). If implemented properly, decentralisation would enable the 
government to provide political goods, political education and policy response to 
its citizens, as well as to provide an avenue for the citizens to make public opinions 
heard (Cheema 2011; Manor 2011; cf. Smith 1985). Various theoretical and 
empirical works discuss the importance of democratic decentralisation and its 
effects on local democracy, for example its ability to improve government 
responsiveness, accountability and transparency, increase people’s participation 
and devolve power from central government to elected local governments (e.g. 
Manor 2011; Ribot 2011; Grindle 2011; Lederach 1997; Crook & Sverrison 2001; 
Crook & Manor 1998; Kulipossa 2004; Johnson 2001; Manor 2007). However, the 
correlation between decentralisation and democracy is not given and depends on 
the cultural, social, historical, economic and political context (Antlov & Wetterber 
2011). We will have reason to return to this issue below. In general, the 
consolidation of democracy via decentralisation reform, including local elections 
and participatory methods, would have a positive impact on political legitimacy 
and bring political power down to regular people and out to local arenas (cf. 
Öjendal & Lilja 2009; Manor 2008; Cheema 2011; Öjendal 2005).  
While decentralisation has its merits, there are researchers who identify more 
profound obstacles to democratisation. The pessimism could be boiled down to 
Cambodia’s context, political orders and historical interruptions making it almost 
impossible to nurture and introduce democracy. Firstly, some have suggested that 
the country lacks full-fledged intermediary and professional institutions connecting 
citizens with higher authorities, and that this has left the way open for the 
unfettered exercise of dictatorial power (Thion 1994; Bit 1991; Hughes 2003; Peou 
2000; Roberts 2008; Un 2004). Democracy in contemporary Cambodia has 
generally been seen to be deviating towards some kind of hybrid regime, which 
contains a number of democratic institutions (e.g. regular elections) but 
nevertheless largely operates outside democratic norms, values and procedures 
(Öjendal & Lilja 2009; Kim & Öjendal 2009; Lilja & Öjendal 2009; Un 2004; 
CDRI 2006; Hughes 2003).  
Secondly, in the pessimistic view (Blunt &Turner 2005; cf. Turner 2002) it 
is not possible to enhance democracy in Cambodia by decentralisation reform 
because of complex political orders, which make the government unwilling to 
respond to citizens’ needs, lead to weak leadership capacity and enable the elite to 
capture the reform. These diverse positions reflect an aspect in which this thesis 
operates: on one hand, the efforts to democratise through means of decentralisation 
and on the other hand the Cambodian political context and other factors hampering 
such efforts. I am sceptical toward this view and find it premature and one, which 
needs to be assessed by empirical investigation, which is the subject of this thesis.  
Thus far, we can conclude that consolidating democracy in post-conflict 
societies is challenging, especially due to internal strife, lack of regime legitimacy, 
inadequate amounts of political goods and the weak functioning of state institutions 
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in delivering services to the most needy. In fact, efforts to insert democracy by the 
UN-led intervention in 1993 faced many political crises emerging in 1994, 1997, 
1998 and 2003. Below, I will elucidate the three primary factors that are making 
the introduction of democratic decentralisation controversial and complicated, as 
well as central for “local democratisation” in post-conflict reconstruction of 
Cambodia. The three factors are: Cambodia’s historical political transitions, 
Cambodian political orders and the nature of the UN-led intervention. 
Cambodia’s historical political transitions 
As David Chandler put it, “history does not repeat itself, but sometimes it 
can be said to rhyme. There are some interesting, incomplete parallels 
between Cambodian society in the late 1960s and early 1970s on the one 
hand and Cambodian society today” (Chandler 2006: 6). 
This section will provide the historical background to the difficulties 
inherent in promoting democratic decentralisation in Cambodia. Obviously, the 
historical account of Cambodia is complex and needs to be divided into different 
political phases. The following briefly illustrates the patterns of contemporary 
Cambodian history by providing an account of each political regime, examining 
socio-political and economic factors. The intent is neither to reveal the chronology 
of Cambodian history nor to probe in-depth historical material derived from 
archival research; rather it is to discuss the key dynamics of political transitions in 
each political regime.  
Cambodia came under French colonial control in 1863 and began to 
gradually break away from it during the Second World War. After various 
difficulties, the country was granted complete independence in 1953 and was then 
under the leadership of the ex-king Norodom Sihanouk, a respected figure in both 
national and international political spheres (Ebihara 1968: 49). Under the 
leadership of King Sihanouk, there were some infrastructure, social and economic 
achievements for the country, which were largely dependent on Sihanouk and his 
energy and capacity to “put in motion” (Osborne 1994). After gaining 
independence from France, the country earned a reputation of neutrality 
(maintaining a balance between the East and the West during the Cold War). The 
advantage of this peaceful policy of independence was that it allowed the regime to 
put greater effort into promoting political stability (Chandler 2000).  
By the late 1960s, Cambodia was affected by the expansion of the Vietnam 
War. After the coup d’état by General Lon Nol in March 1970, many parts of the 
country were destroyed by US bombing, and the civil war with the communist 
Khmer Rouge (Red Cambodians) began. On 17 April 1975, Cambodia had just 
emerged from five years of invasion, bombardment and civil war, when its capital, 
Phnom Penh, fell to the Khmer Rouge. The entire population of Phnom Penh and 
other cities was immediately forced to evacuate to rural areas. Socio-economic and 
administrative structures were taken over by Khmer Rouge cadres or Angkar (“the 
organisation”). Approximately 1.7 to 2 million intellectuals, urban people, ethnic 
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minority people, monks and peasants died through execution, starvation, disease 
and forced labour between April 1975 and January 1979 (Chandler 1996). 
On 25 December 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia and ousted the 
Khmer Rouge regime, a new government was established and the state renamed the 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Although the country was extricated 
from Khmer Rouge control, Cambodia’s economic and social situation remained in 
a deplorable condition (Gottesman 2004). Fighting between the PRK regime and 
the Khmer Rouge continued in the north-west of the country. People—especially 
the majority of those who had been relocated—had to start their lives again literally 
from scratch. Development was slow because of the economic sanctions imposed 
by the West to protest against the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion and because 
of the continuing civil war between the government and resistance groups along the 
Thai border. 
The government rebuilt schools in most provinces throughout the 1980s, and 
by the end of the decade some universities were reopened. Roads and hospitals 
were constructed in the non-fighting areas in the southern part of the country 
(Gottesman 2004; Mysliwiec 1988: 2-40; Thion 1993). In September 1989, as a 
result of the decline of the Soviet Union and the end of its financial support to 
Vietnam, Vietnamese troops were withdrawn and the name of the country was 
changed to the State of Cambodia (SOC). A free-market economic system was 
adopted, Buddhism was reinstated as the official religion, international 
organisations were permitted to work in the country, and people were allowed to 
own private property (see Mabbett & Chandler 1995; Gottesman 2004).  
In 1991, a peace agreement signed in Paris ended the civil war between the 
SOC, the remnants of the Khmer Rouge and two other small non-communist 
groups allied with them. A United Nations peacekeeping mission—called the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)—was deployed to 
organise elections and oversee the transition to democracy. After the “UNTAC 
elections” in 1993, a coalition government was formed and the country was 
renamed the Kingdom of Cambodia. Since 1993, Cambodia has experienced the 
early stages of economic recovery, renewed foreign investment, and accelerated 
international assistance.  
This historical context reveals that Cambodia has been affected by two 
primary features: firstly, the country has experienced many different political 
regimes and parties (with differing and competitive theories and ideology) over a 
short period of time. Secondly, each political regime has not been transformed by 
democratic power but has instead been overthrown quickly and violently, leaving 
the new regime without a legacy of legitimacy. Hence, the regime’s position has 
remained in question and loyalties to the old regime have remained alive. In fact, in 
the pre-1993 era, Cambodia lacked experience of competitive politics; hence the 
transformation from authoritarian rule to democracy is likely to remain a slow 
process. The following section will briefly describe the nature of Cambodian 
political orders. 
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Cambodian political orders 
“Cambodian” political order as a concept is criticised for its tendency to reify 
present-day culture and imbue it with primordial gravitas. In fact, Cambodian 
political order has been dramatically changing over the last thirty years. For 
instance, Martin (1994) has argued that Cambodian society was irreparably 
shattered by the civil war, has slowly returned to something resembling the pre-war 
patterns or is being gradually recreated, though in new forms as a result of people’s 
everyday actions (Ebihara 1993; Ann 2008; Ledgerwood 1998; Ledgerwood & 
Vijghen 2002). Scholars have been sceptical about the potential outcomes of 
democratic reforms, given the conservative and apparently reform-resistant context 
(Un 2004; Turner 2002; Blunt & Turner 2005; Un & Ledgerwood 2003; Turner 
2002). This section aims to understand the Cambodian political order (assessing 
forces of change and continuity) in relation to the introduction of democratic 
decentralisation reform since 2002. 
The political systems of South-east Asia are typically influenced by 
individual performances intertwined with traditional and cultural norms, values, 
beliefs and attitudes (see Hanks 1962; Scott 1972). Furthermore, the political order 
of South-east Asia is typically shaped by pre-modern institutions and patron-client 
relations, nepotism and cronyism, including multi-level relations between and 
among family, clan and village social structures. Meanwhile, for many, the nation-
state is a psychologically distant unit, which for much of the citizenry symbolises 
exploitation, alien rule and oppression (Scott 1977; Neher 1981; Pye 1985). 
Another relevant aspect of the political order of South-east Asia concerns 
legitimacy. According to Alagappa (1995), one of the critical concerns of South-
east Asia’s leaders is to achieve political legitimacy or the “right to rule”. 
In Cambodian society, the idea of power, from ancient times till now, is 
related to the divine or supernatural status of Devaraja (God-king), which the 
leaders use to establish legitimacy by divine loyalty, emphasising form over 
substance and ritual over accountability. According to Mehmet, this cultural 
context places a huge social distance between the ruled and ruler, elevates the 
patron-client relationship to the divine order and ends up sheltering injustice and 
exploitation (Mehmet 1997: 676). Personal status can be improved by virtuous 
actions such as sponsoring temples and community development. The relationship 
between leaders and followers is based on patronage connections. This relationship 
shapes the perceptions of people about power, politics and economics. 
Some historical patterns from ancient times also endure in the social and 
political systems of contemporary Cambodia. Vickery has described the pre-
Angkorian (5th-9th centuries) polity as divided into rulers with ritual functions who 
also controlled the economy, and the ordinary population, who were ruled and 
organised as labourers. Society was organised in three strata—chiefs/kings, 
aristocracy/officials and commoners. Cambodian society did not have a social caste 
system like India’s, but was socially divided into senior and junior classes, with the 
senior in control of prestige goods and the junior obliged to supply products of 
consumption and utility to the seniors, who redistributed a portion to the juniors 
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(Vickery 1998: 272; Mehmet 1997; Chandler 2000). In ancient Cambodia, senior 
and junior classes were linked by political, economic and social life and may have 
been based on distinct lineages. In this political-economic relationship, the junior 
was the client and the senior was the patron, and they were mutually dependent.  
Some writers on Cambodian socio-political transitions (e.g. Martin 1994; 
Chandler 1996; Ovesen et al. 1996; Collins 1998; Roberts 2006; Ebihara 1968) 
have observed that the exertion of Cambodian power is embedded in hierarchies, 
patriarchal dominance, state versus people disparity and a general absence of trust. 
This remains the case in the political leadership style in contemporary Cambodia. 
A study by Sorpong Peou asserts that “…[the] current government has 
consolidated its power by seeking to institutionalise its political control” (Peou 
2001: 40). Cambodia may thus emerge as and remain an illiberal democracy in the 
future, with elections held on a regular basis mainly to legitimise the ruling parties 
(Peou 2001: 40). These political issues and subsequent scepticism have led to 
widespread pessimism regarding the future of Cambodian democracy (Hughes 
2003; Curtis 1998; Peou 1997; Blunt & Turner 2005).  
The patron-client relationship is central to understanding the Cambodian 
political order. The patron-client relationship is historically a significant 
phenomenon common not only in Cambodia, but also in most parts of Asia 
(Ledgerwood 2002). In a patron-client relationship, the exchanges between patron 
and client are imbalanced, and it is the patron who is in a relatively better position 
in terms of power, wealth and status (Scott 1972). Personalised power has been 
present throughout history and remains manifest in contemporary Cambodia. 
During the Sangkum Reastr Niyum, the political scene was dominated by Prince 
Sihanouk himself, whose popular support and respect were derived from the 
concept of “royal authority” (Ledgerwood 1994: 10). This “royal authority” 
allowed him to enjoy personalised and absolute power to rule and to eliminate his 
rivals (Chandler 1991; 1996). General Lon Nol, as Chandler recalls, “saw himself 
at the pinnacle of Cambodian society” during the Cambodian Republic era 
(Chandler 1991: 5). Later, the country was flipped upside down for almost four 
years during the Khmer Rouge regime, and common patterns of social hierarchy 
and interpersonal relationships, including patronage, were changing or enduring 
according to the political regime (Ann 2008). After the Khmer Rouge period, the 
governing system and centralised political control gradually emerged again under 
the tight control of the Vietnamese government. The personalised power of 
commune and village leaders was strengthened when these leaders were instilled 
with two important responsibilities: to fight the Khmer Rouge and to be loyal to the 
communist party (Slocomb 2004/2006). So far, the patron-client relationship has 
persisted in Cambodian society throughout many political regimes. It was crushed 
by the KR but re-emerged during the PRK in the 1980s (Gottesman 2004). 
Power relations between state officials and citizens are generally 
characterised by “steep power differential, which prohibits the ability of citizens to 
claim rights and freedom in the face of official highhandedness” (Hughes 2003: 
30). Most Cambodians view contact with representatives of the state (at any level) 
as threatening (i.e. they should be avoided if possible). Power is not shared; it is 
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accumulated and protected. Cambodian rulers build their political systems based on 
long familiar aspects of traditional political order and personal patronage networks 
(John 2005; Marston 1997). The central symbolism of Cambodian political order 
revolves around the idea of power, which is understood as a zero-sum game, or the 
securing of compliance. Power is accumulated by force or strength (komlaing). 
Power in Cambodian society rests with the high officials, not with its offices or 
institutions, so that power is personalised and serves the purpose of the leaders 
rather than the public (Roberts 2006). Cambodian political life imitates a 
hierarchical, absolutist and patronage form, which creates weak state institutions 
where the channel of power has to go through and be instructed by political parties.  
As outlined in this section, the socio-cultural conditions in Cambodia, like 
those of most countries in mainland South-east Asia, are conducive to the 
formation of patronage networks, based on hierarchical and personalised power. 
Thus far, we have seen two factors (historical transitions and political orders) that 
have provided obstacles to the development of democracy in Cambodia. The final 
factor is described in the following section and runs counter to the previous two: 
the inception of democracy through the UN-led intervention in the early 1990s 
(transitional phase of democratisation). 
Inception of democracy: the UN-led intervention and its unfinished 
tasks 
The path of transforming Cambodia’s civil war to peace and a process of 
democratisation began in the early 1990s as a result of the ending of the Cold War 
and the United Nations intervention, headed by the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). It was one of the first and by far most extensive 
examples of a post-Cold War mission by the UN (Lizee 2003; Roberts 2002). The 
major purposes of UNTAC were to maintain, preserve and defend the sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity, inviolability and national unity of Cambodia; 
and to restore and maintain peace, promote national reconciliation and ensure the 
exercise of the right to self-determination of the Cambodian people through free 
and fair elections (Heder & Ledgerwood 1996; Peou 2000). With two billion US 
dollars spent on the mission, UNTAC deployed 480 unarmed military observers 
and 16.000 armed infantry and engineering troops from dozens of countries, with a 
total of 22.000 UN personnel. The purposes were very ambitious, particularly to 
organise the elections. 
As noted above, Cambodia is a nation with no power-sharing traditions. 
Hence, attempts to establish a ceasefire, disarmament and demobilisation and 
power sharing were difficult for UNTAC. Four main groups were fighting during 
the civil war from the 1980s until the early 1990s, and they all acted with full 
ambition. They were: (a) the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP, the ruling party, 
which was backed by the Vietnamese government and had military strength), (b) 
the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, known as the Khmer Rouge (militarily 
strong), (c) FUNCINPEC (the royalist party) and (d) KPNLF or Son Sann’s party 
(headed by the former prime minister from the early 1970s). This was the main 
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confrontation in the Cambodian political arena, where each of the factions justified 
its pursuit of power less with the needs of its followers or its plans for the future 
than with its past claims to legitimacy and the past crimes of others (Ashley 1998).  
After the 1991 peace agreement was signed, it was still difficult for UNTAC 
to implement its mission because the two strongest military factions (CPP and KR) 
remained in conflict with each other. Both parties agreed to the UN accord under 
strong international pressure and in the hope that they would be able to twist the 
ambiguities to their advantage (Ashley 1998; Peou 2000). With the deep 
underlying conflict between the Khmer Rouge and the CPP, six months before the 
elections scheduled for May 1993 the KR grew increasingly sceptical of the 
process of peace with the other three parties, especially the CPP. Hence, the KR 
broke the agreement to take part in the elections and to follow the ceasefire. It 
refused to disarm, ceased cooperation with UNTAC and eventually threatened to 
launch an attack on UNTAC and the CPP to disrupt the electoral process. The 
Khmer Rouge’s withdrawal from the peace process and the implied threat to 
national security weakened UNTAC to the extent that it was unable to disarm and 
demobilise troops from the CPP, which controlled the largest military force among 
the four factions. The CPP controlled the bureaucracy in most parts of the country, 
including the police, judiciary and other state institutions. With all of these 
institutions in its control, the CPP systematically used them to support its electoral 
campaign, which implied unfairness and led to violence against the opposition 
parties (Findlay 1995; Heder & Ledgerwood 1996).  
Despite UNTAC’s inability to disarm the parties and to enforce a ceasefire, 
and despite the threat of military attack from the KR, elections were held as 
scheduled on 23 May 1993. In spite of the absence of electoral democracy for 
many decades, more than 20 political parties ran in the election and, surprisingly, 
more than 90 percent of the eligible voters turned out for the election (4.6 million 
people). Seats in parliament were divided between four main political parties: 
FUNCINPEC received 58 seats (45.47 present) in the assembly; CPP 51 seats 
(38.23 present); Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party 10 seats (3.81 present); a little 
known party, Molinaka, 1 seat (1.37 percent), and other parties, which received 
insufficient votes to win seats, 11.12 percent. Although the election was recognised 
as free and fair, UNTAC was unable to bring peace to the country. The success of 
the election was immediately overshadowed by the dangerous politicking and 
manoeuvring that ensued between the various political factions (Findlay 1995). 
Indeed, the political situation deteriorated. In the wake of elections, many problems 
occurred, including complicated power sharing arrangements between the two 
major parties, inability to establish legitimate state institutions and the country’s 
poverty and desperate economic situation.  
The transition of power to the winner, FUNCINPEC, based on the election 
results, was fiercely rejected by the CPP, which had the most troops and control 
over state institutions. The CPP accused UNTAC of bias and fraud, which they 
said had deprived the party of victory. As part of the refusal to accept the results of 
the elections, some leaders in the CPP threatened to launch a military coup and 
form a territorial secession east of the Mekong River. The country was divided 
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between many factional groups: the KR, which still possessed military strength, the 
CPP, which still controlled most of the country, and FUNCINPEC, which expected 
to obtain electoral power. To solve this stalemate, the formation of a grand 
coalition government, with 50:50 power-sharing between FUNCINPEC and the 
CPP, was necessary according to UNTAC. The head of FUNCINPEC, Prince 
Norodom Ranariddh, and the head of the CPP, Hun Sen, were co-prime-ministers, 
and three other important ministries shared co-ministers: the Ministry of Defence, 
the Ministry of the Interior and the Council of Ministers.  
The marriage of the two parties in a coalition government did not last long. 
From 1995, the relationship between them increasingly soured. State institutions 
became weaker while the two political parties became stronger. Instead of 
establishing a united state power, the power sharing of the CPP and FUNCINPEC 
resulted in two separate party-states with two parallel structures of authority. 
Money was channelled through the patronage-clientelism of the political party 
system to enrich each party. As a result of the political and economic competition 
between the CPP and FUNCINPEC, in July 1997 the CPP used its strong military 
and grassroots networks to reactivate its power, launching a coup d’étatand 
expelling FUNCINPEC from the coalition government. In short, the UNTAC 
mission failed to establish a mechanism for achieving democracy and economic 
development (Heder & Ledgerwood 1996).  
Although subsequent elections were held in 1998, 2003 and 2008, 
democratic development in Cambodia has faced various problems related to the 
post-conflict situation, such as lack of regime legitimacy and of political stability. 
As outlined above, Cambodia has had major impediments to overcome in terms of 
its violent recent history, the Cambodian political orders and the unfinished tasks 
of the UN-led intervention.1 Cambodia is still searching for the means to promote 
democracy. Sustainable or successful democratisation is likely to take decades and 
needs to be accompanied by, inter alia, a strengthening of state capacity, 
institutional development, participatory and civic engagement with the state, local 
democratisation and promotion of power from below (Öjendal & Kim 2011; 
Lederach 1997; Ledgerwood 2002; Ottaway 2002; Öjendal 2005; Paris 2004). In 
the following, the thesis will discuss the background of democratic decentralisation 
in Cambodia and the justification of research. 
Decentralisation: the Cambodian context 
The historical backdrop that has brought Cambodian decentralisation into existence 
has been linked to both external coercion and internal factors. External support, 
which can be traced back to the UN-organised national elections in 1993, has given 
rise to the current decentralisation reform. The notion of decentralisation was 
developed via the CARERE2/Seila initiatives, which had been in operation since 
1996 (Rudengren & Öjendal 2002; Biddulph 2003), working with technical and 
                                                
1 Öjendal and Kim (2010) have argued that the process of democratisation in Cambodia faces 
structural limitations to sustainability (such as lack of institutions, low education level and deep 
poverty). 
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financial support from the donor community with a focus on the local level. As for 
the internal factors, the political decentralisation initiative emerged from the initial 
reform strategy set by the government in 1999. The process was propelled by 
several historical circumstances. The Cambodian government has been exposed to 
decades of communism and political despotism. The most significant social issue is 
poverty, which harms a majority of its citizens. The patronage political factor has 
been embedded among the most trusted cronies of the leading political party, and 
power-holders continue to dominate state resources and ruin the state social and 
economic system. Having identified these issues, both the Cambodian government 
and the donor agencies, based on experiences of decentralisation from other 
countries, saw decentralisation as a viable solution. 
More precisely, the Law on Commune/Sangkat Administrative Management 
and the Commune Election Law were promulgated in March 2001. The election of 
commune/Sangkat councils in February 2002 formalised the start of 
decentralisation. There are at least four major intentions in the Cambodian 
government’s launching of decentralisation: i) to strengthen the degree of local 
participation in local affairs; ii) to increase local ownership of local development, 
iii) to change the attitudes between the local state and the people and iv) to 
strengthen democracy (Prum 2005; cf. Öjendal 2005). However, the 
implementation of decentralisation faces a number of challenges in Cambodia that 
need to be explored. For instance, local governments are known to be ignored or 
bypassed (by NGOs and line agencies of the government); donor support is usually 
channelled through the central government apparatus and is not certain to reach the 
poor in their localities; political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation are not 
yet integrated components of local governance; and elected local governments are 
not yet fully able to access local resources through taxation (Prum 2005).  
Different studies on the implementation of decentralisation reform in 
Cambodia have anticipated that responsiveness, accountability and devolution of 
power are the prevailing factors (Manor 2008; Chheat et al. 2011; Öjendal & Kim 
2011; Rusten et al. 2004; USAID/Pact 2008; COMFREL 2007; Tariq & Lamont 
2010; Kim & Öjendal 2009). Studying the on going process of decentralisation in 
Cambodia, it is vital to understand elected commune councils’ and voters’ 
perceptions of the role of decentralisation (i.e. responsiveness, accountability and 
devolution of power). Let us further explain how they are understood in the 
decentralised governance system.  
Introduction to decentralisation concepts: responsiveness, 
accountability and devolution of power 
As mentioned above, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the quality of 
democratic decentralisation reform in post-conflict Cambodia. The focus is 
ultimately justified by the frequent arguments that democratic decentralisation is 
vital in deepening local democracy in a post-conflict context. The main research 
problem is: what is the quality of democratic decentralisation reform in post-
conflict Cambodia? 
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Consolidation of democracy in societies emerging from decades of 
widespread violence, totalitarianism, civil war, rampant poverty and weak state 
institutions, and with no historical experience of liberal politics, is not a simple 
process (Hughes 2009). The gap and relation between state and society are marked 
by corruption, rent seeking and vote buying (Un 2004). Serge Thion observes that 
Cambodian society lacks fully-fledged intermediary structures or institutions 
between peasants and the higher authorities, which leaves the way open to the 
exercise of centralised power (Thion 1994). Hence it requires considerable effort 
and time to re-invent political institutions, in particular at the local level, to mediate 
the gap between central and local levels, legitimate new leadership, change the 
attitude of leaders and deliver political and economic goods to citizens (Öjendal & 
Lilja 2009; Öjendal 2005). Ledgerwood & Vijghen (2002) argue that patronage and 
kinship ties are still at the core of Cambodian social institutions in rural 
communities. In short, scholars seem to agree that there is an exploitative, top-
down and patron-client between state and society in Cambodia, which makes 
democratic decentralisation through the elected commune councils so interesting. 
They may be the first ever attempt to build intermediary structures in Cambodian 
society, hence bridging the gap between state and society, and doing this in a 
democratic manner.  
Democratic decentralisation seems to fit the situation of post-conflict 
Cambodia after a “big bang” insertion of democracy in 1993 and would help 
overcome all the obstacles discussed above (Öjendal 2005; Kim & Öjendal 2009). 
The democratic decentralisation reform in Cambodia, including local elections and 
participatory methods, may have appeared irrelevant in “high politics”, but its 
progressive political values impact on the majority of people. Democratic 
decentralisation reform has already contributed to a certain degree of enhanced 
political legitimacy and brought politics down to regular people and out to the local 
arena (cf. Öjendal & Kim 2006; Prum 2005; COMFREL 2007; Öjendal & Kim 
2011; Mansfield & MacLeod 2004). It is assumed in this work that formal 
democratic decentralisation is defined through its ability to deal with the local 
political and social order and by the extent to which it is locally understood. Hence, 
a basic understanding of local perceptions is paramount. 
Experiences from other countries have indicated that decentralisation 
became one of the most widespread, yet comprehensive, political reforms pursued 
globally in the 1990s (Crook & Manor 1998; Öjendal 2005; Manor 2011). The 
international community and a number of scholars have identified decentralisation 
as the tool to consolidate democracy or to make the democratic process more 
sustainable (Lederach 1997; UNDP 2007; UN DESA 2007; Ribot 2003; Crook & 
Manor 1998; Grindle 2007; Manor 2011; Devas & Grant 2003; Heller 2001; Crook 
& Sverrison 2001; Oxhorn et al. 2004; Manor 2007; Khrishna 2003; Kothari 1996). 
Decentralisation is typically used by the state in post-conflict societies as a strategy 
to restructure the centre-periphery or central-local relations, and to introduce 
democratic (legitimate) institutions in peace making and conflict management 
processes (Öjendal 2005; Braathen & Hellevik 2006; cf. Öjendal & Lilja 2009). 
The objectives of decentralisation generally include transferring decision making 
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power, allocating the power and implementation functions of the central or 
provincial states to local government and using limited resources more effectively. 
One of the reasons for endorsing decentralisation is that policy makers found it 
difficult to formulate and implement strategies from the centre, so they sought new 
ways to elicit greater participation, self-reliance, democratic decision making, 
responsive government and accountability of public officials to citizens (Manor 
2008; Johnson 2001; Rondinelli et al. 1983; Smith 1985; Manor 2011; Cheema 
2011). Decentralisation has become part of the current development discourse with 
the basic argument that it brings political decision making closer to the people, 
which in turn enhances the power of ordinary people over their own fate (Ribot 
2011; cf. Öjendal 2005; Kothari 1996).  
Democratic decentralisation is a comprehensive process, and there are many 
core concepts to take into consideration, such as accountability, political 
representation, transparency, participation, responsiveness, devolution of power or 
shifting power to local governments, civic engagement, central and local relations 
(Manor 2011; Grindle 2011; Eaton 2001; Heller 2001; Kulipossa 2004; Johnson 
2001; Smith 1985). Obviously we need to focus on some aspects in order to 
acquire some in-depth knowledge. Smith’s seminal work on decentralisation 
illustrated that there are three interrelated values that decentralisation can 
contribute for strengthening democracy, namely “political education, training in 
leadership, and political stability” (Smith 1985: 20).  
James Manor is probably one of the most influential scholars in this field of 
research, providing analytical frameworks and identifying key issues in democratic 
decentralisation. After assessing the development of democratic decentralisation in 
Cambodia, Manor found that three things are essential for democratic 
decentralisation to work well: i) substantial resources (especially financial and 
human) must be provided to elected bodies at lower levels to make them able to be 
more responsive to voters; ii) strong accountability mechanisms must exist to 
ensure both the accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives and 
accountability to voters; and iii) the elected representatives must be invested with 
substantial powers (Manor 2008; cf. Manor 2011).  
Accountability is a critical factor for democratic decentralisation because it 
would enhance opportunities for citizens to demand public attention, use the vote 
effectively to reward and punish officials who do or do not deliver on promises 
(Grindle 2011). Merilee Grindle also suggests that accountability refers to being 
answerable for actions (Grindle 2011). Jesse Ribot argues that for building 
effective local democracy, elected local authorities need to have sufficient and 
meaningful discretionary powers to enable them to represent their populations. 
Without discretionary power in the hands of representative local authorities, there 
is no representation and there is no local democracy (Ribot 2011: 1).   
In order to answer the research question through analysing the quality of 
democratic decentralisation reform in post-conflict Cambodia and given the 
common understanding and empirical data of democratic decentralisation (as 
discussed by Manor 2008/2011; Öjendal & Kim 2011; Grindle 2011; Ribot 2011, 
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Smith 1985), this thesis uses these three core concepts of decentralisation for the 
empirical analysis. Responsiveness: how has responsiveness been established under 
democratic decentralisation? Accountability: what are the perceptions of 
accountability mechanisms under the democratic decentralisation reform? 
Devolution of power: how has devolution of power been working under democratic 
decentralisation reform? A detailed operationalisation of the key concepts is 
discussed in chapter II. 
Responsiveness 
The cornerstone of responsiveness is the authorities’ ability to fulfil their own 
promises (rather than inflating expectations of constituents) (Smith 1985). Local 
government responsiveness requires initiative and responsibility for the policy 
implementation to be conducive to the needs of citizens. The idea is that elected 
local councils respond quickly to implement projects according to what they have 
promised during the election campaign and that voters more easily can check on 
their performance (Manor 1999: 57; cf. Manor 2008).  
Concerning responsiveness, the aim of this thesis is to explore the role of 
elected commune councils in responding to voters’ needs. The thesis will gauge the 
output of responsiveness in terms of speed, quantity and quality performance of 
commune councils (CCs) in response to the demands of electorates.  
Accountability 
Accountability is one of the most important elements of democratic 
decentralisation (Blair 2000; Grindle 2011; Ribot 2011; Manor 2011). 
Accountability refers to being answerable for policies and actions or answering for 
the use of authority (cf. Moncrieffe 2001; Grindle 2011). Accountability 
mechanisms work within government to set limits on the arbitrary exercise of 
power, to check and balance the separation of powers and to constrain the activities 
of politicians (Grindle 2011). In short, it is important to know to what extent local 
institutions and individuals to whom power is allocated are accountable to the rest 
of the administration and to local communities. Accountability can be enhanced if 
local representatives are more accessible to citizens, but policies must be followed 
and local representatives must also be accountable to regulations (Kulipossa 2004).  
Devolution of power 
Within decentralisation, the devolution of power is one of the most critical aspects 
(Manor 1999/2008). Power in a reform of democratic decentralisation resides in the 
electoral accountability of local institutions such as elected councils, and is thought 
to be equally distributed within the representative political institution. Therefore, 
decentralisation is seen as a process in which power is delegated to elected bodies 
and, most importantly, in the manner in which elected councils are allowed to 
exercise power within their mandate. 
One of the critical roles of decentralisation is building effective local 
democracy by furnishing elected local authorities with sufficient and meaningful 
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discretionary powers to enable them to represent their populations, but local 
authorities do not necessarily hold the powers that would enable them to respond to 
local needs and aspirations (Ribot 2011). The devolution of power within the 
decentralisation process will be used for the empirical analysis of the elected 
commune councils. 
Research methods 
This thesis explores an ethnological understanding of the democratic institutional 
reform of democratic decentralisation in Cambodia. Rather than studying 
decentralisation in general, as justified above, the thesis focuses on three particular 
aspects: responsiveness, accountability and devolution of power. This study 
employs both qualitative and quantitative methods. Theoretical concepts are used 
as tools in analysis. Because democratic decentralisation in Cambodia is are 
relatively new process, and the amount of previous research is limited, the key 
focus of this research is an exploratory and descriptive picture based on an in-depth 
interview and understanding about the role of commune councils in Cambodia and, 
hence, in the local society’s democratisation. However, the qualitative approach 
will be accompanied by quantitative questionnaires, aiming to pinpoint response 
frequencies of the three concepts. The division of labour between qualitative and 
quantitative research is that the quantitative survey—based on previous experience 
and on an early round of exploratory field research in line with the abdicative 
approach (the combination between inductive and deductive approach) (Lesson & 
Solberg 2000)—serves to frame the overall issues, whereas the qualitative field 
research aims to problematize and deepen the understanding of the linkages of the 
three concepts of democratic decentralisation as pinpointed in the quantitative 
dimension. 
When conducting research in Cambodia, there is a lack of systematic 
survey data in particular on decentralisation reform. This constraint is 
unavoidable given that the country was in a state of civil war for almost thirty 
years, and academic research, particularly by Cambodian researchers, has been 
very limited. Therefore, most studies—also this one—have somewhat of an 
“exploratory” character. Typically studies are conducted based on demands from 
donors or NGOs in order to influence policy and operational activities. I was 
initially engaged in anthropological work and have been working for many years 
with applied research. Hence the data that this thesis is based on are mostly 
qualitative and were accumulated during several lengthy stays in some 
communes (in Battambang, Kampot, Kratie, Siem Reap, Takeo, Kompong Cham, 
Kompong Speu and other provinces). Moreover, much contextual data was also 
generated in the course of my previous work over many years as a senior research 
fellow in Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), especially on 
commune councils since 2002. 
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Quantitative dimension 
There was no baseline prior to the introduction of decentralisation reform in 2002 
(cf. Öjendal & Kim 2011). Therefore, this thesis is a point of departure for research 
on democratic decentralisation in Cambodia. In addition to presenting quantitative 
data from my own surveys and informal interviews, I have also drawn on survey 
data from other sources. Throughout the four empirical chapters, the data are 
analysed and compared in order to crosscheck response frequency and to pinpoint 
the arguments for the qualitative study. 
The survey questions were formulated based on lengthy reviews of policy 
documents, research publications and NGO reports related to the reform in 
Cambodia (Rusten et al. 2004; cf. Blunt & Turner 2005; cf. Luco 2003; Slocomb 
2004; Öjendal & Kim 2006; cf. Vickery 1998), field observations (in my work with 
CDRI on the reform) and pretesting. The survey questions were pre-formulated to 
elicit the perceptions of CCs and voters on the reform. 
The questionnaire-based survey is a significant tool in this thesis. The 
selection is based on a sampling frame and takes account of possible sampling 
errors. Generally speaking, the greater the bias inherent in the sampled population 
distribution, the larger the sample size must be before the normal distribution is an 
adequate approximation of the sampling distribution. According to the sampling 
distribution formula, for data to be adequately representative, the sample size 
should be at least 30 in each category (McClave & Sincich 2003: 225). In each 
commune, 7 percent of the total households were chosen for the survey. Research 
assistants were needed for the questionnaire survey. The respondents were villagers 
(men and women), commune councillors, government bureaucrats and political 
activists (because decentralisation is a politically controversial issue). Two 
important aspects of conducting the quantitative survey are that the questionnaire 
was pretested in pilot studies, and research assistants were thoroughly trained. The 
survey was conducted in close cooperation with CDRI, which is well accustomed 
to surveys of this kind.  
My own survey was conducted in 2006 (the final year of the first mandate of 
commune councils). This survey covered five provinces in different geographical 
zones of the country. Seventy-four CCs from ten communes and 583 citizens of 
voting age from five communes were interviewed. The survey covered a randomly 
selected 7 percent of the total household heads in each commune. Respondents 
were categorised in age groups, with almost equal numbers of male and female 
respondents. 
In order to check and compare the accuracy of my survey, another larger 
survey (from a different study) will also be used, which was pursued one year 
before and with a much larger sample of respondents. The survey aimed at 
capturing both the views of the citizens and the opinions of the commune 
councillors themselves. There were a total of 1416 voter-age citizens and 708 
commune councillors surveyed through a nationally representative proportionate 
sampling (Kim & Henke/CAS 2005).  
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Respondents were primarily given pre-formulated answers but on occasion 
given the opportunity to elaborate their own words which sometimes been picked 
up and coded into the pre-formulated alternatives or at the time have been used as 
qualitative assessment in the particular questions. The questions for CCs in my 
survey were typically: how is the current democratic decentralisation different 
from the previous system of commune authority? What are the factors that make 
CCs able to respond to the demands of electorates? Do you have enough 
knowledge to understand the feelings of people in your commune in order to be 
able to respond to their demands? What is the most effective mechanism to 
disseminate information to the villagers? How do you rate the level of the CC’s 
responsiveness to people’s demands in terms of speed, quality and quantity? 
Have you ever heard the word “accountability”, and if so, what does it mean? For 
what type of activities do you think you can mobilise most villagers to 
participate? How is one accountable to people? From your own perspective, 
currently who is the direct boss of CCs? From your personal view, what does the 
word “power” mean? Do CCs have enough power according to what is stated in 
the laws? 
The questions for the quantitative surveys for CCs and voters were 
categorised based on the three concepts of responsiveness, accountability and 
devolution of power. The questions for voters in my survey were typically: After 
the commune election, has commune leadership changed? Do you think that the 
CC primarily represents your village? Do you think the CC would assist you if 
you went to it? Do the commune councillors ever come to your village? Do you 
think that the CC is knowledgeable about the situation in your village? Who 
benefits most from development activities of the CC? How much of the 
commune development plan is made into reality? Have you been invited to attend 
the meeting at the commune? Have you ever voiced a demand to the CC? How 
do you rate the responsiveness of the CC in terms of speed, quality and quantity? 
Have you ever heard the word “accountability”? Are villagers encouraged to 
have opinions on the activities of the CC? What measure would you take to 
influence decisions of the CC? Are people afraid to voice their opinions? How do 
you receive information from the CC? Do you know the amount of funding in the 
commune for development this year? From your observation, who in this village 
has power? What does the word “power” mean? 
Qualitative dimension 
Research methods that produce qualitative data are scattered among diverse 
disciplines, such as historical, anthropological, political science and development 
approaches. Part 2 (chapter IV-VII) empirically elicits the perceptions of local 
leaders and voters. The in-depth interviews were carried out in the five communes 
with commune councillors, village chiefs, older educated people, civil society 
actors, small business owners and villagers.  
The qualitative parts of the research consist of both unstructured 
observations and semi-structured interviews. Research assistants were not required 
for unstructured and semi-structured interviews, but I noted as much of the 
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surrounding details as possible, which would be subsequently rearranged into 
analytical notes. The informants were commune councillors, district officials, 
villagers (with different social status, wealth, education, age and gender), 
government bureaucrats and staff of NGOs, political activists and others who could 
provide background information. Social factors are as important as the analytical 
tools in understanding the nature of CCs’ responsiveness, accountability and 
devolution of power. One commune out of the five was selected in which an in-
depth interview was carried out by staying in the commune for a period of time in 
order to gain better understanding of the process of decentralisation and the 
political orders of commune leadership (see the description in the introduction to 
the field below).  
For the qualitative interviews, more than 50 informants (commune 
councillors and voters) were interviewed. The main topics of the discussion were 
the overall implementation of decentralisation compared to previous local 
leadership systems, the engagement between CCs and villagers, performances of 
CCs, service delivery, decision making, the role of political parties, voices and 
choices. 
While the quantitative survey was being conducted, I was able to be with 
the team observing and eliciting information that emerged from the quantitative 
face-to-face interviews. Accompanying the survey team allowed me to gain a 
specific understanding of certain aspects that the quantitative survey could not 
illustrate. My observations provided in-depth information from which the 
qualitative interviews could depart. After the quantitative survey and data entry 
were completed, I started to analyse the data. The preliminary survey findings 
have helped my generic understanding of the decentralisation process. However, 
the quantitative results needed further in-depth explanation, which led me to 
conduct in-depth case studies in all five communes, trying to crosscheck 
information with the quantitative data. The quotations in the ensuing chapters are 
taken from the qualitative information and are not an exact replication of what 
the informants said—the sentences have been slightly edited for readability. 
Introduction to the field 
Given time and resource constraints, but with the desire to gain insight into the 
communities, in addition to numerous briefer stays, I decided to stay in a commune 
in Battambang province for six weeks. The purpose of my stay was to conduct 
short-term observations of participation to gain insights or ‘ethnographic 
understanding’. Of the numerous data collection methods available, this 
participatory observation enabled me to gain a deeper understanding of CC 
leadership style and the interaction between voters and CCs, and provided other 
information which a short visit or direct interviews could not do. I was not a 
stranger to the commune. In fact, I had been back and forth to the commune since 
early 2001 for various local government research projects on behalf of CDRI. 
Since my primary purpose in participatory observation was to gain a deep 
understanding of the leadership activities of CCs, I decided to stay at the commune 
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chief’s house in order to observe closely the way that the commune chief worked. 
This aspect of the fieldwork was done from early May till mid-June 2007.  
Every day at 6.00 am, with a rented motorbike from a villager, I would head 
off to a wax market (flea market) in the commune to have breakfast—a distance of 
about 1km from the commune chief’s house where I was staying. Normally, the 
table I sat at was shared by a few village chiefs, the head of the water user 
association (a community-based organisation managing water use in the 
commune), achar (old, respected laypersons), commune councillors and other 
villagers. Breakfast of Chinese noodle soup and a cup of black coffee cost less than 
USD1. It was early in the rainy season, when farmers start to prepare their land and 
plough their fields. Over breakfast people talked about their farmland, problems in 
their villages, water and political news. By 7.15 am, breakfast was over, and people 
left for their own destinations. I normally headed to the commune office, to talk to 
different councillors and observe the activities of the CC during the day. Almost 
every morning, there were a few people waiting to meet the commune chief to 
inform him about issues of domestic violence, security, schooling situations and 
irrigation, or to require him to sign, authorise and process various administrative 
paperwork. By 8.00 am, the daily administrative work in the commune office was 
sorted out, and the commune chief, deputies, CC members and the clerk met briefly 
to share information and discuss the issues to be resolved that day. After this 
morning briefing, some councillors might just sit and chat, but some might head 
out to do their assigned tasks such as attending village meetings or meeting 
government officials and NGOs in different villages. By 9.00 or 9.30 am, the 
commune office became quieter as people returned home, except for those who 
might need to attend a meeting or had other business to deal with. I usually left the 
commune office at around 9.00 am to go to the houses of CC members, village 
chiefs or key informants such as school teachers, old respected people and heads of 
CBOs. I returned to the commune chief’s house at around 10.30 am. It was usually 
quiet, except for a few women cooking, but I took the opportunity to jot down 
notes and sometimes transcribe my tapes. Over lunch, I talked a great deal with the 
commune chief, discussing various issues that he was involved in. At about 1.30 
pm I would go to meet different key informants just to chat and observe. After 
dinner at around 7.00 pm, with electricity supplied by a generator running till 10.00 
pm, I was able to type notes into my laptop computer. 
Unit of analysis 
There are many administrative levels in Cambodia—central, provincial, district and 
commune. This study focuses on the commune and the elected commune councils. 
The justification for this is quite straightforward, since the decentralisation reform 
concentrates on the commune councils, which are elected directly by citizens. 
Among local authorities in the commune councils and villages, 85 percent of the 
leaders are men, which is clearly gender biased. However, among the voters who 
are the respondents for this study, I try to balance between female and male (since 
most of the household heads are men, we tried to balance by interviewing female 
members in the families). 
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Timeframe 
The time period focused on in this study is the five years from 2002 to 2007, the 
first mandate of commune councils. The study is exploratory because it covers the 
same five communes and the same informants since early 2002. In order to obtain a 
good understanding of the implementation of decentralisation, the study 
occasionally uses some of the empirical data after 2007, during the second mandate 
of the commune councils.  
Site selection 
Before describing data collection, I would like to explain in a few words the 
rationale of site selection. Out of 1,621 communes, why are these five communes 
analysed? In general, the selection aims at obtaining a wide range of political 
situations and circumstances. There are several reasons for this selection: different 
geographical spread; social and economic situations; exposure to NGOs and 
development experiences; political representation in commune councils with 
multiparty and monolithic party systems; and demography. However, in selecting 
five communes in five provinces, the attempt is not to produce comparative case 
studies, but rather to conduct a thematic study of the relative impacts of localised 
decentralisation processes. And based on the choice of communes, I try to gain as 
experiences as varied as possible to reflect the diverse aspects of decentralisation. 
All the selection criteria above aim at understanding the context, the complexity 
and process of decentralisation in terms of responsiveness, accountability and 
devolution of power.  
Rapport with villagers and local government officials was well established, 
since I have worked in those provinces for more than 10 years. The five communes 
were selected as the focus for the 2002 CDRI studies on decentralisation Rusten et 
al. (2004) Kim & Öjendal (2007), Öjendal & Kim (2006), Pak et al. (2007). 
Previous data from the five communes have been used for various publications on 
decentralisation in Cambodia, including: The Challenge of Decentralisation in 
Cambodia (Rusten et al. 2004), In Search of Agency in Rural Cambodia (Öjendal 
& Kim 2006), and Where Decentralisation Meets Democracy: Can Civil Society 
Enhance Accountability from Local Governments in Cambodia? (Kim & Öjendal 
2007). The cumulative experience of decentralisation research in these five 
communes inspired me to consider them as appropriate fieldwork sites for this 
thesis where I can build a good rapport via interviewing the same informants to 
observe changes over time, particularly the role of decentralisation in promoting 
democracy in Cambodia.  
The communes selected are abbreviated anonymously as follows:  
KD, Ch district, Kompong Speu province, which is located about 50 km 
southwest of Phnom Penh, has almost no trading activities, is arid land with limited 
natural resources and has limited exposure to NGOs and development activities. 
The province is one of the poorest in the country. 
PT, KT district, Kampot province, which is located along the coastal fishing 
area and Bokor National Park. The commune is rich in natural resources, maritime 
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fishing and forest products. There is busy trade with Vietnam across the province 
border. This is the only commune in the country that has four political parties 
represented on its council. It is therefore important for research on mono versus 
multiparty communes. 
DA, KT district, Kratie province, which is situated in the north-east of the 
country, surrounded by both forest and water resources such as streams from the 
Mekong, which have potential for fishing. There are some minority ethnic groups 
within this commune as well, and some trading activities. The commune was made 
accessible only a few years ago and has, therefore, little economic development 
and few NGO programmes.  
WT, SK district, Battambang province, which is in the north-west of the 
country and was for many years the frontline of the civil war. The province, 
however, is located on a trade route from Thailand and has potential in natural 
resources such as fertile land. Many NGOs have concentrated their development 
efforts in the area, so it is familiar with development aid and NGOs (it is an old 
Seila province). 
PB, BK district, Siem Reap province, which is semi-urban, located just 10 
km east of Siem Reap town, near the famous tourist destination of Angkor. This 
commune is special because it is a mono-party commune. It has many problems of 
land conflicts and has experienced rapid urbanisation and encroachment by the 
growing city. 
Analysis 
Here, the data are derived from both primary and secondary sources; the primary 
data coming from direct field interviews, and the secondary data being based 
upon a systematic review of materials on decentralisation and democratisation in 
Cambodia, as well as experiences from other regions. The available data consist 
of government legal framework texts and reports by different NGOs. The field 
notes are analysed using inductive ethnographic interview information to explore 
the nature of decentralisation in promoting democracy in the country. 
Unstructured interview information is used to formulate questionnaires and 
establish guides for the semi-structured interviews. Triangulation is used to test 
the validity of data.  
The interview data were compared with relevant documents. If doubts arose, 
the researcher revisited interviewees in order to verify information. The researcher 
had already conducted interviews in the five communes on several occasions, so it 
was critical to cross-check with previous field information. Relevant theories of 
decentralisation and democratisation from Cambodia and other regions served as 
the guiding principles for analysis in this research. For quantitative data analysis, it 
is appropriate to use the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences to check 
frequencies to back up the qualitative interview information. 
The analysis of the three emerging concepts of decentralisation in 
Cambodia—responsiveness, accountability and devolution of power—sheds light 
on the research question and understanding of the experience of decentralisation 
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and its role in enhancing democracy in Cambodia. The information was gathered 
through a qualitative and quantitative baseline survey, conducted in 2006-2007, 
eliciting the CCs’ and voters’ perceptions of the democratic decentralisation reform 
that they had experienced. 
Research Ethics 
Most of the informants were aware that the researcher was working with a research 
institute in Cambodia and that most of the information was used by the government 
and donors. All possible measures were taken to ensure the confidentiality and 
integrity of respondents. Regarding sensitive information such as funding from 
political parties, internal party policies that commune councils are implementing 
and nepotism and corruption, it is very risky to disclose the names of informants 
and political parties. I, therefore, avoid specifying the names of individual 
informants and try to use the information without violating the principle of 
anonymity.  
Research aids 
I tried not to use a tape recorder because the research is politically sensitive. 
However, I needed a tape recorder in case I wanted to record interviews, where 
allowed, as a backup to field notes. A camera was needed to get a visual record of 
the performance and the participation of people in local politics. A laptop computer 
was needed for multiple purposes. For fieldwork, I need to be updated on the 
security situation because some places in rural Cambodia are still not safe due to 
banditry, malaria and other dangers.  
Limitations 
There are many crucial aspects in decentralisation, such as accountability, 
responsiveness, devolution of power, checks and balances, people’s participation, 
civil society relations, empowerment, local elections etc. All of these concepts 
are very important, but some of them are beyond the scope of this study. This 
study focuses on only three aspects of the on going process of decentralisation in 
Cambodia: responsiveness, accountability and the devolution of power. Due to 
the possible overlap between the three concepts and their intertwined 
relationship, it is difficult to avoid occasional repetition. This study therefore 
considers the analysis of the three concepts interchangeably. The study focuses 
only on Cambodia, and at the local level, meaning at the elected commune 
councils and below.  
As regards the data collection, there are advantages and disadvantages in 
conducting research in my own country (it is implicit that I am embedded in the 
culture). The advantages are that I have already established good rapport with all 
five communes. In particular, I have good relations with all key informants, speak 
the language and can in a flexible way accommodate security issues and other 
challenges that might occur. The disadvantage is that I might take many things for 
granted because assumptions might be difficult to avoid. By way of resolving this 
25 
disadvantage, I have consulted other researchers (non-Cambodians) who likewise 
are working on decentralisation, and I am keenly aware that I need to remain alert 
to these weak points. Let me describe myself. I am a middle-aged man, born and 
raised in a middle class family in the capital city, Phnom Penh. For my education, I 
spent most of my early school years in Phnom Penh. To a certain extent, I am 
acquainted with Western education because I spent many years under a scholarship 
for a graduate programme in the US and Europe. To a certain extent, the villagers 
may then perceive me as an outsider.  
Organisation of the thesis 
Chapter I, “Introduction”, includes a brief historical background of Cambodia, 
research problems, study objectives and research methods.  
Chapter II, “Theoretical and conceptual perspective”, discusses the overall 
literature and theories on decentralisation related to responsiveness, accountability 
and devolution of power. The focus is on the role of decentralisation in deepening 
democracy, and why responsiveness, accountability and power are key concepts of 
decentralisation.  
Chapter III, “Context of Cambodian dynamics”, reviews historical 
backdrops of commune councils in Cambodian history from the 1960s to the 
1980s. The contemporary democratic reform in Cambodia is included in this 
chapter; in particular Cambodia’s political economy and political orders are 
reviewed.  
Chapter IV, “General emerging factors of decentralisation”, presents some 
key emerging aspects of decentralisation after the first local election mandate of 
2002-2007. The primary focus of this chapter is the perceptions of commune 
councillors and voters on the decentralisation process in Cambodia. 
Chapter V, “Findings of responsiveness”, examines the ability of commune 
councils to respond to the demands of people, the degree of response and the 
mechanisms that are being used in terms of quality, speed and quantity. It attempts 
to cross-check with villagers on the physical infrastructure built by commune 
councils over the previous four years and to elicit people’s perceptions of the 
performance of councils. It looks at councillors’ perceptions, at working 
procedures among different political party members and at the effectiveness of 
councils. The research focuses on the participation of both better-off and poor 
people, information dissemination/accessibility of information on resources and the 
expenditure of councils.  
Chapter VI, “Findings of accountability”, discusses the mechanisms used by 
CCs to be accountable to the public, political parties and state bureaucrats, and the 
extent to which a commune council is able to be accountable to the public. This is 
based on observations of the performance of CCs on projects and analysis of how 
CCs could create mechanisms for managing budgets that would be perceived as 
transparent. The research also focuses on people’s views of the Cambodian term 
for accountability, kanak neiyakpheap.  
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Chapter VII, “Findings of devolution of power”, cross-checks the power of 
CCs to make decisions that existing laws allow. Secondly, it focuses on power 
relations within-commune councils, their political parties and citizens. Thirdly, the 
focus is the way CCs exercise power, CCs’ attitudes towards political orders and 
behaviour changes from top-down traditional authoritarian style towards the 
democratic way. In this chapter elite capture in both the political and development 
arenas is considered. 
Chapter VIII, “Conclusion”, discusses the empirical findings and 
decentralisation’s impact on the deepening of democracy in post-conflict 
Cambodia. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
This chapter outlines three key areas in the literature. Firstly, it discusses the 
concept of democracy and political orders of South-east Asia. In order to gain 
insights and understanding of democracy in a post-conflict setting, it is crucial to 
unveil factors within the political orders of South-east Asia that contradict or 
uphold the potential for deepening democracy. Secondly, the contextualisation of 
democratic decentralisation highlights different concepts of democratic 
decentralisation that are argued to be empirically relevant in Cambodian 
decentralisation. Finally, the operationalisation of decentralisation is reviewed by 
explaining how the three concepts of responsiveness, accountability and devolution 
of power will be made conducive to empirical study.  
Democracy and political orders of South-east Asia 
This section discusses various aspects of democracy and political orders of South-
east Asia that are critical as a context to the current democratisation in the region 
(Vatikiotis 1996; Pye 1985). An understanding of the differences between 
democracy and the political orders of South-east Asia would facilitate an 
understanding of Cambodian democratisation in particular on local democracy, 
which is more entrenched with political orders (Ledgerwood 2002; Mabbett & 
Chandler 1995; Bit 1991). 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the quality of democratic 
decentralisation reform in post-conflict Cambodia; therefore the aim of this section 
is to review the theoretical contents of democracy. It will discuss and frame 
different definitions and concepts of democracy that could provide the analytical 
and operational means for understanding the development of democratic 
decentralisation in Cambodia. Democracy has been central to Western political 
theory since the time of ancient Greece. One of the problems of post-Cold War 
democratic development has been the fusion of authoritarianism and democracy. 
Some of these combinations are variously called: “hybrid regime”, “semi or 
pseudo-democracy”, “virtual democracy”, “electoral democracy”, “illiberal 
democracy”, “weak democracy”, “façade democracy” (Levitsky & Way 2002; 
Diamond 1999). The ranges of various forms of liberal democracy in authoritarian 
regimes are critical in analysing democratisation in Cambodia. 
In a consolidated democracy, democracy is “the only game in town”. 
According to Huntington, the essence and quality of democratic government occur 
when decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections, 
when leaders do not exercise total power but share power with other groups in 
society, when stable and effective government institutions are present and when 
government is responsive and accountable to its citizens (Huntington: 1991). The 
quality of democracy depends on a range of factors, such as political consensus and 
legitimacy, popular participation and leaders sharing a vision of public interest in 
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the society, as well as political stability and effectiveness of political institutions 
(Huntington 1996). The absence of the above criteria leads to political instability 
and inability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires (Huntington 
1996: 24). Democracy is not just about ballots and votes, but also about public 
deliberation and reasoning and could be called “government by discussion” (Sen 
2006: 53). In the broader context, the universal values of democracy also depend 
on the levels of freedom, pluralism, justice, accountability and responsiveness of 
government (Diamond & Plattner 2001; Diamond 1999; Sen 2006). Larry 
Diamond defines democratic consolidation as “a behavioural and attitudinal 
embrace of democratic principles and methods by both elites and mass” (Diamond 
1999: 20). He further details the meaning of consolidation of democracy: 
Consolidation of democracy depends on the legitimacy of the government 
which links to three key dimensions: firstly, democracy must be deepened 
and made more authentic. Democracy is significantly more likely to become 
consolidated if it is liberal. Secondly, the political institutions of democracy 
must become more coherent, capable, and autonomous, so that all major 
political players are willing to commit to and be bound by their rules and 
norms. Thirdly, institutionalisation: that democracy effectively addresses 
society’s most pressing problems and, perhaps more importantly, provides 
the liberty, accountability, and responsiveness that citizens uniquely expect 
from democracy and the order that they expect from any government 
(Diamond 1999: 20).  
The discussion related to post-conflict reconstruction seems to be focused on 
enforced democratisation, as argued by Diamond: 
At the bottom, I believe consolidation of democracy is most usefully construed 
as the process of achieving broad and deep legitimization, such that all 
significant political actors, at both elite and mass levels, believe that the 
democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better 
than any other realistic alternative they can imagine (Diamond 1999: 65). 
Liberal conceptions on democracy circle around the notion that the most 
powerful collective decision makers are being selected through fair, honest and 
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete. The quality of democracy 
depends on the level of freedom, pluralism, justice and accountability (Diamond & 
Plattner 2001; Huntington 1991). For George Sorensen, democracy is a political 
mechanism of selecting political leaders. He defines democracy a: “that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
votes” (Sorensen 1998). According to Zakaria, democracy is characterised by the 
selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people, and they govern 
as “the will of the people” (Zakaria 2004: 13). Elections are the essence of 
democracy, but democracy may be inefficient unless other public virtues such as 
law enforcement, strong public institutions and popular participation are present. 
For Amartya Sen, democracy is public discussion and political participation 
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through dialogue (Sen 2006). Selecting representatives via fair and periodic 
elections is thus crucial for democratic development, and in Cambodia democracy 
is being pursued through various elections at national and local levels. 
Robert Dahl’s formulation of “polyarchy” comprises choice, participation 
and contestation of the government’s conduct. For Dahl: 
…a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as the political 
equals…or democracy for a political system one of the characteristics of 
which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to 
all its citizens (Dahl 1971: 1–2).  
The essence of this definition is that in order for a government to continue 
over a period of time, it should be accountable to the citizens and responsive to 
their preferences. Politicians are not above ordinary folk. 
According to Dahl, the crucial beliefs of democracy comprise at least five 
integral factors. Firstly, legitimacy of polyarchy is embedded in the principle that 
each person in a political community is entitled to have his/her interests given 
equal consideration by the leaders. Secondly, authority is about attitudes towards 
citizens or relationships between the government and the governed. Thirdly, 
effectiveness is the people’s perception, related to expectations about government 
effectiveness. Effectiveness concerns the political order of a country. Fourthly, 
trust is crucial for democracy, referring to the extent to which members of a 
political community have trust and confidence in their fellow political actors. 
Finally, cooperation relates to people’s capabilities to engage freely and easily in 
cooperative actions (Dahl 1971). 
Samuel Huntington terms the meaning of democracy as a form of 
government, sources of authority for government, purposes served by government 
and procedures for constituting government. He further elaborates the contents of 
“true democracy” as:  
…effective citizens’ control over policy, responsible government, honesty 
and openness in politics, informed and rational deliberation, equal 
participation and power, and various other civic virtues…in democracy 
elected decision makers do not exercise total power. They share power with 
other groups in society (Huntington 1991: 9–10). 
He further distinguishes the differences between democracy and 
dictatorship as: 
... less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies 
consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and 
those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities (Huntington 
1996: 1). 
Thus far, we have seen that the meanings of democracy are revolving around 
fair, honest, responsive and accountable government. Other central dimensions of 
democracy are taken to be people’s participation in decision making, power 
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sharing, effective political institutions, popular participation, regime legitimacy, 
horizontal and downward accountability, and effective state institutions; these are 
seen as critical for democracy to prosper (Diamond & Plattner 2001; Huntington 
1991; Sorensen 1998; Huntington 1996; Dahl 1971; Zakaria 2004; Sen 2006). Are 
the concepts of democracy running parallel with or counter to South-east Asian 
political orders? Are the traits integrated in Cambodian democracy? A cursory 
observation indicates that democracy has major difficulty in being consolidated 
virtually anywhere in South-east Asia (the Philippines excepted). Thus, it is 
obvious that Cambodia is wrestling with contradictions similar to those of other 
South-east Asian countries (cf. Vatikiotis 1996). Below, let us look at the political 
orders of South-east Asia in relation to democracy. 
Historically, the debate on democratisation in the South-east Asian political 
order has centred on two main claims (Neher 1981). Firstly, democracy is not 
compatible with or sometimes operates counter to Asian political orders. Secondly, 
democracy in South-east Asia is progressing, but parallel with local traditions and 
beliefs—with little interaction between the two spheres. In South-east Asia, 
democracy is often understood as a slogan rather than a working principle 
(Vatikiotis 1996). Democracy in South-east Asia remains complicated by the 
survival of traditional norms with regard to leadership; democracy is treated as a 
means to an end, rather than an end in itself (Vatikiotis 1996).  
In the 1990s, various writers on the South-east Asian socio-political system 
argued that many Asian countries have functioning systems, but they differ in 
important ways from democratic polities with free and fair elections and where the 
private lives of citizens are generally free from governmental surveillance (Neher 
& Marlay 1995). Asian political orders are vertical. That is, individuals typically 
interact with others only after they have determined who is superior and who 
inferior (Neher & Marlay 1995). Asian cultures stress power, authority, status or 
hierarchy, reciprocity/bonds, gratitude and personalism (Neher 1981). These values 
shape political development and serve as glue holding society together and as a 
web facilitating communication; they enforce group ties by specifying reciprocal 
obligations in all interactions (Alagappa 1995; Hanks 1962).  
Kinship ties are particularly important in the idiom of social organisation in 
the region and its history. In his articulation of South-east Asian history, culture 
and region, O.W. Wolters (1982) explains: 
Men of prowess would depend on their being attributed with an abnormal 
amount of personal and innate soul stuff, which explained and distinguished 
their performance from that of others in their generation and especially 
among their own kinsmen…those who had the highest expectations when 
they were attracted into a leader’s personal entourage, whether as relatives 
or dependents, were those who believed that they, too, were capable of 
achievement (Wolters 1982: 6-8). 
“Men of prowess” also bring with them the possibility of mobilising 
extended kinship ties within and outside a settlement or network of settlements. 
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These characteristics also reflect the public life of the leaders. Leaders and 
followers alike need to validate their status by continuous achievement.  
Leadership organisation in the region was also associated with the concept of 
devaraja, the Hindu cult (king of the gods), practised in particular during the 
Cambodian empire of the Angkor era (Wolters 1982; Scott 1977; Coedés 1964). 
Devaraja was seen as magical power for political authority. In South-east Asia the 
king was not proclaimed to be merely an intermediary between man and divine 
beings; he claimed to be an incarnation of a Buddhisatva or a Hindu deity (Neher 
1981). This reflects the principle of absolutism and hierarchy during the process of 
Indianisation in South-east Asia and remains an essential aspect of politics to this 
day. The influence of devaraja remains intact in the contemporary political system 
in Cambodia, in which leaders act analogously as patrons or as possessing a unique 
power (superiority) from their clients (Coedés 1964; Wolters 1982; cf. Vatikiotis 
1996; Thion 1993). This relationship between patron and clients creates strongly 
intertwined interpersonal obligations.  
Another Hindu influence on the political leadership of South-east Asia 
engages the concept of mandala (circles of kings; a Sanskrit term used in Indian 
manuals of government). This “represented a particular and often unstable political 
situation in a vaguely definable geographical area without fixed boundaries and 
where smaller centres tended to look in all directions for security” (Wolters 1982: 
17). Wolters explained: 
Mandala would expand and contract in concertina-like fashion. Each one 
contained several tributary rulers, some of whom would repudiate their 
vassal status when the opportunity arose and try to build up their own 
networks of vassals. Only the Mandala overlord has the prerogative of 
receiving tribute-bearing envoys; he himself would dispatch officials who 
represented his superior status (Wolters 1982: 17). 
Wolters termed South-east Asian political systems mandala or polities as an 
alternative to “states”. His explanation of the relations within and nature of South-
east Asian states is as follows:  
What gave distinctive shape to public life within Southeast Asia itself was a 
cultural emphasis on “person” and “achievement” rather than on 
“group” and “hereditary” status. Society had to be continuously 
monitored to spot potential leaders in a particular generation, and this 
outlook encourages the habit of “present-mindedness”. Government was 
not a matter of elaborate institutions but of a relaxed unbureaucratic style 
of public life, where importance was attached to management and 
ceremony and where personal qualities of leadership and example played 
the major role. I like the expression “relaxed” because it absolves one 
from having to beg the question of what is strong or weak 
government…one reason is the tradition that rulers and ruled depended on 
each other; the ruled could migrate if government suddenly became more 
severe (Wolters 1994: 6). 
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The passage above reveals that the construction of sectarian modes of Hindu 
devotionalism contributed in two ways to the development of South-east Asian 
notions of political authority: firstly, political authority is linked with the 
perception of the overlord’s superior prowess that the leader was the patron, and, 
secondly, power is exercised in an absolutist way. Wolters observed the South-east 
Asian political system in the 1950s and 1960s. The combination of cultural and 
traditional norms remains intact in contemporary Cambodia. 
In Asian Power and Politics, a seminal work, Lucian Pye illustrates that 
Asian politics revolves around three main concepts: power, authority and 
legitimacy (Pye 1985; Alagappa 1995; Anderson 1998). Although Pye recognises 
that power is a universal concept, at different times and in different places there 
have been quite different understandings of the concept. In the Asian context, 
power is typically viewed as: important for status, personalised, a style of political 
action, [a sign of] wisdom and education and a feature of personality, birth, wealth 
and security. Power is personalised and not institutionalised in constitutionally 
defined offices. Most often leaders capture institutions and change them for their 
own purposes (Pye 1985). Power is, however, not the only concept explaining the 
political development of Southeast Asia.  
Authority refers to the institutionalisation of the normative order. It is 
essentially the institutional code within which the use of power as a medium is 
organised and legitimised (Parsons 1986; Pye 1985; Weber 1947). The concept of 
authority is associated with the Buddhist concept of karma or destiny, which is the 
sum of a soul’s good and bad actions in all past lives. Right action in one’s life 
leads to a higher station in the next life (Hanks 1962; Keyes 1984; Neher & Marlay 
1995). The leaders or those who are fortunate to hold higher status are presumed to 
have been virtuous in their previous existences. Since power justifies itself, those 
who are low ranking are presumed to deserve their status. The notion of authority 
is imbued with the concept of the devaraja cult whose political authority is based 
on good karma from a previous life—justifying absolute power and the difference 
between rulers and ruled. 
Legitimacy, according to a study by Muthiah Alagappa, “Political 
Legitimacy in Southeast Asia”, is the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its 
authority to issue commands (Alagappa 1995). Political legitimacy is the belief by 
the governed/ruled in the rulers’ moral right to issue commands and the people’s 
corresponding obligation to obey such commands. Both rulers and the ruled need 
to have a virtuous relationship, characterised by respect, morality and faith (Weber 
1947; Alagappa 1995). The quality of legitimacy depends on shared norms and 
values, conformity with established rules for acquiring power, proper and effective 
use of power and the consent of the governed.  
Patron-clientelism is still the core of Cambodian social organisation 
(Ledgerwood & Vijghen 2002; Marston 1997). The concept of patron-client 
relations has been elaborated and somewhat modified by Eisenstadt & Roniger 
(1984), who regard it as associated with two factors to create an interpersonal 
relationship and trust. The core analytical characteristics of patron-client relations 
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are, according to them: an exchange of different types of resources, economic and 
political such as loyalty and protection. A reciprocal, long-term relationship, 
involving unconditional personal obligations, is always arranged in the package 
deal. Agreement between patron and clients is not contractual or fully legal but is 
informally binding; the relationship is vertical, and there is an unequal relationship 
between patron and client (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984: 48–49). James Scott’s work 
on Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia illustrates that the 
patron-client relationship in South-east Asia rest on dyadic contracts, informal and 
vertical relations, personal networks and action-sets. Vertical and power relation 
linkages represent an important structural principle of South-east Asian politics 
(Scott 1999: 92). Scott describes the patron-client relation as an exchange 
relationship between roles, which may be defined as: 
A special case of dyadic ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in 
which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own 
influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a 
person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering 
general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron 
(Scott 1999: 92). 
Normally, the patron-client relationship is embedded both in the day-to-day 
lives of people and in institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties in 
South-east Asia, which somewhat undermines the formal structure of authority 
(Neher 1981; Scott 1999). Although the dynamics of personal alliance networks are 
as crucial in the day-to-day realities of national institutions as in local politics, the 
main difference is simply that such networks are more elaborately disguised by 
formal facades in modern institutions (Scott 1999). Neher and Marlay have 
explained that patron-client ties are formed from the point of view of the inferior 
for sheer survival. As they put it:  
Powerful people in all walks of life, “patrons” who control scarce 
resources, accumulate as many follower “clients” as possible. The primary 
pattern of social exchange in Southeast Asia is between un-equals. And 
although these transactions are between a superior and a subordinate, 
dealings are personal, face-to-face, reciprocal, and mutually beneficial. 
Patron-client ties are the very foundation of society and politics all over 
Asia (Nether & Marlay 1995: 15). 
Patron-client relations and personal alliances, in this context, accomplish 
what impersonal laws and institutions are supposed to do in the West. This is 
evident in Cambodian society, where politics is reliant on leaders and there is great 
respect for authority and hierarchy.  
Up till now, I have outlined the doctrines of democracy and South-east Asian 
political orders which are seen to a large extent to be mutually contradictory and 
running parallel with each other. South-east Asian political systems “have some 
influences from various external forces, but did not displace the indigenous culture, 
rather added to it in ways that make Southeast Asian political culture unique” 
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(Neher 1981: 12). Democratic system in South-east Asia could accurately be 
termed “semi-democratic” or “Asian-style democracy”, which is vertical and 
typically features patron-clientelism, loyalty, order, obedience, absolutism, 
hierarchy and personalised power (Scott 1977; Kinsbury 2001; Neher & Marlay 
1995). By arguing like this, I do not mean that democracy in the West and 
elsewhere is free from patron-clientelism. 
In sum, the political order of South-east Asia (as discussed by Scott 1977; 
Neher 1981; Geertz 1973; Wolters 1994; Anderson 1998; Keyes 1984; Alagappa 
1995; Pye 1985; Vatikiotis 1996) has historically revolved around personalised 
power, patronage and a vertical system of power. These dimensions contradict the 
general principles of democracy, and in order to understand Asian-style 
democracy, historical, cultural, social and political factors must be carefully 
considered. However, the bulk of the literature is old, and the social dynamic of 
South-east Asia has changed dramatically through globalisation, the nature of 
democracy and international interventions. Democracy is now embodied and co-
exists with elements of local values and political order, creating “hybrid systems” 
(Neher 1981; Lilja & Öjendal 2009; CDRI 2006; Un 2005). The concept of 
hybridism has emerged from recent international research that has called attention 
to the difficulties of “transition” to democracy and good governance, in particular 
in post-conflict contexts (Paris 2004; Ottaway 2003; Carothers 2002). It is argued 
that democratic institutions can be established in post-conflict societies (Sorenson 
1990; Luckham 2004). Democracy in South-east Asia is interacting and co-existing 
with other elements such as patronage politics, rent seeking and politico-religious 
cults. This thesis recognises a full range of the co-existence “hybrid” of democracy 
and the extent to which democratic decentralisation reform can address the process 
of democratisation in Cambodia. Initial results of democratic decentralisation in 
Cambodia have been envisaged as rearranging power structures, improving regime 
legitimacy and reinventing local institutions to be more responsive and accountable 
(cf. Manor 2008; Öjendal & Lilja 2009; Öjendal & Kim 2011).  
Contextualising decentralisation 
The purpose of this section is to review the characteristics and the definitions of 
decentralisation, the reasons for the state’s adoption of decentralisation and its 
impacts on democratic development, which is the main interest of this thesis. 
Obviously much has been written about decentralisation and its role in promoting 
democracy, post-conflict society reconstruction, governance reforms and poverty 
alleviation (Braathen & Hellevik 2006; UNDP 2007; Ribot 2003; Cheema 2011; 
Manor 2011; UN DESA 2007; Öjendal & Kim 2011). To reflect the relevance to 
this thesis of the role of decentralisation in enhancing democracy in post-conflict 
Cambodia, this section will do two things: firstly, review and discuss 
decentralisation and its role in fostering democracy; and secondly, operationalise 
decentralisation. This section will guide us to an operationalisation aspect of 
decentralisation, which will be used in the empirical chapters. 
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Decentralisation is emerging as one of the strongest development trends in 
the new millennium (Braathen & Hellevik 2006; Öjendal 2005), being branded a 
“quiet revolution” (Campbell 2003). Since the 1980s, it has received enthusiastic 
support, especially among governments in the South, international development 
agencies and academic circles (Aziz & Arnold 1996; Crook & Manor 1998; 
Öjendal 2005). Decentralisation has also become an element of the rebuilding of 
legitimate political authority in post-conflict societies (Öjendal & Lilja 2009).  
According to UNDP (2007), decentralised governance is not a panacea, but 
is one of the key institutions for nurturing democratic practices around the world. 
Decentralised local institutions with careful planning and effective implementation 
can lead to significantly responsive public institutions and appropriate 
accountability mechanisms, minimise the abuse of power and elite capture by 
leaders, improve central-local relations and build people’s confidence in the 
authorities (UNDP 2007; UN DESA 2007). Braathen and Hellevik’s work on the 
role of decentralisation, with reference to the wider debate on the introduction of 
democracy and arrangements of power sharing and autonomy, envisaged that 
decentralisation is used by the state (in post-conflict societies) as a strategy to 
restructure the centre-periphery or central-local relations, and that decentralisation 
will introduce democratic institutions in peace-making and conflict management 
(Braathen & Hellevik 2006).  
The literature suggests that there are at least three arguments why centralised 
and autocratic governments should enact decentralisation: firstly, central 
governments have little capacity and resources to respond to local demands; 
secondly, corruption among middle and upper level politicians and lower level 
governments; and finally, the leaders are distant and not supported broadly and 
have lost the people’s trust in the state (Manor 1999: 23; cf. Cheema 2011). There 
are also various other reasons for the adoption of decentralisation by governments, 
particularly in developing countries: advancing multiparty political systems, 
deepening democratisation, transforming from a command to a market economy 
and improving service delivery to large populations (Litvack et al. 1998; Manor 
1999). Some writers have argued that another aim of decentralisation is to attain 
allocative efficiency in the face of different local preferences for public goods, and 
some argue that it improves political participation and democracy (Kulipossa: 
2004; Johnson 2001). The building of effective local democracy via 
decentralisation requires furnishing elected local authorities with sufficient and 
meaningful discretionary powers to enable them to respond to local needs (Ribot 
2011). Without meaningful discretionary powers, there is no local democracy; 
“neither power without downward accountability nor accountability without 
powers can be labelled democratic” (Ribot 2011: 2). 
Decentralisation is typically seen as political power being transferred 
towards the local arena. Decentralisation efforts are becoming the ultimate goal: 
The devolution of power, responsibility and sometimes resources on to 
democratically elected councils at local or intermediate levels appealed to 
very different sets of people who often disagreed on other issues … some 
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autocratic regimes in Asia and Africa saw it as a substitute for 
democratisation at the national level, as a safe way to acquire much-needed 
legitimacy and grassroots support. Democratic politicians... regarded it as a 
way to make government more responsive to local needs... (Crook & Manor 
1998: 1). 
Smith’s thorough work Decentralisation: The territorial dimension of the 
state has identified different critical concepts of decentralisation that can be 
regarded as a necessary condition for political, economic and social development. 
He describes decentralisation as involving 
... the delegation of power to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy, whether 
the hierarchy is one of governments within a state or offices within a large-
scale organization. It is concerned with the extent to which power and 
authority are dispersed through the geographical hierarchy of the state, and 
the institutions and processes through which such dispersals 
occur…Economically, decentralisation is said to improve the efficiency with 
which demands for locally provided services are expressed. Socially, [it] 
contributes to realization of individual values and collective welfare. 
Politically, decentralisation is to strengthen accountability, political skills, 
and national integration—it brings government closer to people (Smith 
1985: 1–5). 
Some authors give a thematic explanation of decentralisation (Ribot 2002; 
Crook & Sverrison 2001; Manor 1999; Larson & Ribot 2005). Larson and Ribot 
describe it thus: 
…administrative decentralisation or administrative services—transfers of 
power to local administrative bodies—aims to help line ministries…to read 
the preferences of local populations and to better mobilize local resources 
and labour. Political or democratic decentralisation integrates local 
populations into decision-making through better representation by creating 
empowering representative local governments. It is premised on new local 
institutions: being of and accountable to local populations and having a 
secure and autonomous domain of powers to make and implement 
meaningful decisions (Larson & Ribot 2005: 3). 
Dennis Rondinelli et al. have extended the content of decentralisation into 
four main elements: deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation.  
Deconcentration is ceding administrative authority and responsibility to 
lower levels within the central ministries. Delegation transfers managerial 
responsibility for specifically defined functions to organizations that are 
outside the regular bureaucratic structure and that are only indirectly 
controlled by the central government. Devolution is the creation or 
strengthening—financially or legally—of sub-national units of government, 
the activities of which are substantially outside the direct control of the 
central government. Under devolution, local units of government are 
autonomous and independent, and their legal status makes them separate or 
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distinct from the central government. If devolution works well it will 
establish reciprocal and mutual benefit relationships between central and 
local government. Privatization the transfers of responsibility of the parallel 
organisations such as national industrial, and trade associations, 
professional groups, religious organization, political parties to issue the 
license and regulate their members which [was] previously controlled by the 
government (Rondinelli et al.1983: 19–28). 
Decentralisation literature typically features intense debate about either 
opening up or “deepening” democracy. It is argued that decentralisation enhances 
democracy through the education of the public in democratic and participatory 
practices (cf. Smith 1985). Political leaders should also be trained in democratic 
leadership through provision of information about democratic leadership. 
Participation by people could enhance political stability and decrease the risk of 
violent outbreaks due to discontent; and representation and accountability should 
increase their accessibility and improve service delivery (Smith 1985). If the poor, 
women and other marginalised groups have direct influence, equitable policies may 
emerge, and responsiveness might improve as a result of local authorities 
possessing local knowledge, allowing them to act more swiftly and be more precise 
in their activities (Smith 1985). The belief in the role of decentralisation in 
promoting democracy is prevalent, as James Manor points out: 
Advocates of pluralist, competitive politics have regarded decentralisation 
as a device for deepening democracy or for prying closed systems open, to 
give interest groups space in which to organize, compete and otherwise asset 
themselves. Some politicians in central governments see it as a means of off-
loading expensive tasks onto others lower down (Manor 1999: 1), 
Democratic decentralisation can take varied forms, in particular emphasising 
the interaction between leaders and citizens. Democratic decentralisation would 
allow people to express their congruence and share information that local 
authorities should seek regarding community needs and ways of addressing them, 
and likewise, people could inquire into the conduct of authorities. To bring 
democracy into a system is to draw community leaders and voluntary associations 
into consultations and decisions about development—before the authorities act 
(Manor 1999).  
The combination of decentralisation and local democracy makes policies 
more responsive to the needs of citizens (Legowo 2003). In this regard, local 
decision makers should be responsive and accountable to citizens. Accountability 
between elected councils and their citizens is crucial in allowing stakeholders to 
have insight into local government operations and to assess which sectors of 
society are benefiting from the decisions and actions of the authorities (Smith 
1985; Legowo 2003; Grindle 2011). However, in some countries democratic 
decentralisation has worked well despite the lack of a vibrant civil society, of high 
literacy rates or human development, of prior land reform, of prior experience of 
democracy and of a strong middle class (Manor 2008). 
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To conclude, so far we have discussed the contents of democracy (in 
particular what it means in South-east Asia), the contents of political orders of 
South-east Asia and the meanings of decentralisation. There seems to be a 
mismatch and contradiction between political orders of South-east Asia and 
principles of democracy; hence democracy in South-east Asia is, as discussed 
above, hybrid. As the literature shows, democracy and decentralisation (democratic 
decentralisation) share similar approaches, for instance accountability, 
responsiveness, power, participation etc. The bulk of the literature above illustrates 
that the quality of democratic decentralisation is vital for the post-conflict 
reconstruction of the country; this needs to be studied empirically. Below the thesis 
will explain the operationalisation of the study of democratic decentralisation, 
which also will move the thesis towards its empirical and analytical core. 
Operationalisation of decentralisation 
As discussed in Chapter I, there are many important concepts linked to 
decentralisation: representation, popular participation, voice, choice, civic 
engagement, accountability, responsiveness, central and local relations and 
devolution of power (Manor 2011/2008, Smith 1985; Heller 2011; Kulipossa 2004; 
Ribot 2011; Grindle 2011; Johnson 2001; Eaton 2001). In line with Manor 
(2011/2008), Grindle (2011), Smith (1985), Ribot (2011), this thesis will use three 
main concepts of decentralisation in the empirical investigation: responsiveness, 
accountability and devolution of power.  
Different studies on decentralisation reform in Cambodia have envisaged 
that there are critical concepts emerging out of the decentralisation reform, such as 
responsiveness, accountability and devolution of power, that require further 
investigation in order to understand the impact of the decentralisation reform 
(MacAndrew 2004; Rusten et al. 2004; Öjendal & Kim 2006; COMFREL 2007; 
Mansfield & MacLeod 2004; Kim & Öjendal 2007; Pak et al. 2007; CDRI 2006; 
TAF/CAS 2005; NCDD 2010).  
Why are these three concepts of decentralisation chosen for the empirical 
investigation of decentralisation reform in Cambodia? The justification is based on 
James Manor’s recent assessment that democratic decentralisation works well 
when it has three essential interrelated factors. Firstly, substantial resources, 
financial and human resources in particular, must be provided to elected bodies at 
lower levels to make government institutions and actors more responsive to the 
needs of voters, especially in terms of material output, allowing local authorities to 
respond to local needs. Secondly, strong accountability mechanisms must exist to 
ensure both the accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives and the 
accountability of those representatives to voters. Thirdly, substantial power must be 
provided to elected councillors. If any one of these three essentials is absent, the 
decentralised system will not be democratic or it will fail (Manor 2008/2011; 
Grindle 2011; cf. Smith 1985; Ribot 2011).  
Another reason for selecting the three concepts of decentralisation chosen 
for this study is that they are closely linked with Cambodian social and cultural 
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orders (Hughes & Öjendal 2006; Thion 1993; Roberts 2006; Mabbett & Chandler 
1995; Chandler 2000; Ledgerwood & Vijghen 2002; Luco 2002; Martin 1994; 
Mehmet 1997). In order to establish a structure for the empirical research, the 
chapter will explain the theoretical underpinnings of the three concepts: 
responsiveness, accountability and devolution of power. 
Responsiveness 
A number of studies on decentralisation indicate that responsiveness is one of the 
determining factors for the success of decentralisation (cf. Larson & Ribot 2005; 
Smith 1985; Manor 1999; Manor 2008; Kulipossa 2004; Faguet 2004; Manor 
2011; Crook & Manor 1998). Responsiveness implies the ability of local 
government to provide what people demand through democratic processes. In 
successful instances of decentralisation, responsiveness is linked to citizens 
‘diverse choices and demands; citizens’ electoral preferences are aggregated in 
government policy, and elected officials are able to translate policy and promises 
into outcomes (Smith 1985; Manor 2011). To make local governments responsive 
to citizens, political leaders need to develop skills and be clear about the distinction 
between private and public domains (e.g. political parties and CCs). Elected leaders 
should also be aware of the nature of local needs and have sufficient financial 
resources and decision-making powers (Kulipossa 2004). However, if demand 
exceeds resources, it is impossible for local government to respond promptly. The 
work of Faguet (2004) and Johnson (2001) suggests that to make elected 
government responsive, sufficient human, financial and technical resources are 
needed. Responsiveness can thus be understood as the ability to deliver within the 
given limitations of local governments. The functions of decentralisation, as 
outlined above, are for local authorities to be responsive to people’s needs in terms 
of political and economic goods such as services and material outputs and, to the 
extent possible, to realise people’s demands (cf. Smith 1985; Manor 1999; Crook 
& Manor 1998). 
Responses are needed depending on what locally defined needs are, how 
they are best met from the individual’s point of view and how interests are affected 
by the demands which collective actions make on private resources. These 
mechanisms of responsiveness create space for citizens to air their demands, and 
for local leaders to explain policy. To cover the full range of responsiveness, five 
criteria are suggested (Yishai 1984). First is the output in terms of speed, quantity 
and quality of responses from government institutions to citizens. Secondly, access 
indicates the extent to which authorities are willing to listen to demands from 
electorates. Thirdly, agenda refers to the placement of an issue raised by citizens 
on the political agenda. Fourthly, policy implies that legislation is adopted in 
congruence with demands. Fifthly, impact is attained when grievances are 
alleviated and problems are resolved. Although these five criteria seem to be useful 
in understanding the contents of responsiveness in general (according to empirical 
data the output of responsiveness seems to be relevant for the decentralisation 
reform in Cambodia), they are more relevant for the national policy process than 
for local government responsiveness.  
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To realise the demands from constituencies, elected representatives 
(commune councillors or CCs) should possess local knowledge and have sufficient 
financial resources. In a country that has been in a state of severe poverty, 
responsiveness from elected representatives to the needs of voters is of utmost 
importance, especially in terms of material outputs (Rusten et al. 2004; NCDD 
2010). Failing to realise the demands from voters might ruin the relationship 
between elected representatives and citizens and the participation of people in local 
politics because people have high expectations during election campaigns, waiting 
for the promises from CCs to materialise.  
It is difficult to measure the responsiveness of CCs to voters. According to 
Manor (1999, 2008) and Yishai (1984), responsiveness can be measured by using 
the outputs (could be services and realising the demands of citizens) in terms of 
speed, quality and quantity. As Manor notes, decentralisation tends to improve all 
three aspects: 
Firstly, the speed of responses usually increases because elected councils at 
lower levels have enough independent power to react quickly to problems 
and pleas that arise from ordinary people. Secondly, the quantity of 
responsiveness also increases because those councils tend to stress many 
small projects rather than the much smaller number of large projects which 
higher-level authorities favour. Thirdly, the quality of responses improves if 
we measure quality according to the degree to which responses from 
government conform to the preferences of ordinary people (Manor 2008: 6). 
According to the above literature, responsiveness is the ability to provide 
what people demand, for example material outputs and local services. It is thus a 
matter of being answerable to local interests, which requires knowledge about local 
conditions. 
The degree of responsiveness in the Cambodian context depends on how 
demands are presented to CCs. To encourage responsiveness, demands should be 
coherent with the development plan formulated by the commune councils and not 
exceed the available funds of CCs (Kim & Öjendal 2009). CCs and voters have 
differing perceptions of responsiveness. According to some empirical research on 
decentralisation in Cambodia, there are many obstacles to CCs being responsive to 
voters, such as lack of funding, voters’ limited understanding of the 
decentralisation system, CCs’ limited capacity and technical expertise and the by 
passing of CCs by some NGOs (Rusten et al. 2004; Horng et al. 2007; Kim & 
Öjendal 2007; NCDD 2010; Ninh & Henke 2005). All the aspects of 
responsiveness outlined above will be examined empirically in Chapter V. 
How has responsiveness been established under democratic decentralisation 
reform? The empirical study of responsiveness will focus on the ability of the 
elected local government to realise demands from the constituencies. How are 
demands articulated to CCs? What are people’s perceptions of local government 
responsiveness? Based on the emerging empirical information regarding 
responsiveness, two key aspects to be researched are as follows: 
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• The purpose of the first aspect is to assess commune councillors’ 
perceptions of responsiveness in terms of: (a) ability of CCs to 
understand the local situation, (b) the nature of demands from voters, (c) 
outputs (speed, quantity and quality) and (d) the challenges to 
responsiveness and mechanisms used by CCs deal with the 
responsiveness issues. Each of these aspects will be explained by 
presenting the survey data, followed by in-depth interviews. 
• The second aspect seeks to explore voters’ perceptions of the 
responsiveness of commune councils in terms of: (a) views of voters on 
CCs’ responsiveness in terms of general performance and ability to 
understand the local situation, (b) the nature of demands from voters and 
(c) outputs of responsiveness (speed, quantity and quality). What services 
are CCs able to provide to meet people’s need? Each of these aspects will 
be explained by presenting the survey data, followed by in-depth 
interviews.  
Accountability 
Accountability is one of the most important elements for decentralisation to 
function well (Krishna 2003; Grindle 2011; Blair 2000; Manor 2011; Ribot 2011). 
The theoretical literature distinguishes two types of accountability: horizontal, 
between different state agencies powers (e.g. legislative and judicial review of 
executive action), and vertical, between the state and the public/civil society (e.g. 
via elections). Periodic elections provide a crucial, but not sufficient, means of 
ensuring government accountability (Manor 2008; Grindle 2011; Johnson 2001; 
Smith 1985; Manor 1999; Devas & Grant 2003).  
Various factors could make accountability work, including exchanges of 
information, justification of the role and responsibility of leaders, punishment and 
compensation. Vertical accountability is here seen as a relationship between 
elected councils and state bureaucrats or political parties. However, accountability 
is not an outcome but rather a democratic process of building trust between local 
governments and electorates (Fox 2000: 5; Blair 2000; Heller 2001; Kulipossa 
2004). Within decentralisation, if accountability is enhanced, perhaps local 
government officials could earn legitimacy and improve the stability of the 
democratic system, which is dependent on electorates believing that the 
government and public officials are operating in the public interest (Moncrieffe 
2001). Another important element that reflects accountability is elected 
representation (Agrawal & Ribot 1999; Blair 2000; Schmitter 2004). People need 
to understand that the power of election in a democratic regime allows them to oust 
at the next election elected local leaders who have behaved badly. Vertical 
accountability is to be achieved as a relation between local government and the 
people. Here it is taken to mean the relationship between elected CCs and voters. 
Accountability is key to establishing and maintaining reciprocity between 
representatives and citizens, providing the answerability of authorities to the 
people. It implies an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions between 
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rulers and citizens, made all the more complicated by the fact that a varied and 
competitive set of representatives is typically interposed between the two 
(Schmitter 2004; Diamond & Morlido 2004). Accountability is a relationship 
between: 
…two set of persons, the former agrees to keep the latter informed, 
explanation for decision made, meanwhile the latter are subjected to the 
command of the former, must required information, explain obedience or 
disobedience to the commands thereof, and accept the consequences for 
things done or left undone (Schmitter 2004: 47).  
Solid channels of accountability would make it very difficult for local 
leaders to hide behind distance and inaccessibility, thereby improving the ability of 
local leaders to represent their citizens and deliver services. Some argue that 
accountability requires an effective voice from citizens and is better enforced when 
each of the partners has a clear sense of who is responsible (Krishna 2003; Grindle 
2011; Heller 2001). Accountability is key to establishing and maintaining 
reciprocity between representatives and citizens and the answerability of 
authorities to the people.  
What, then, is meant by “accountability” in the Cambodian context? Is there 
a common understanding of the term among policy makers, donor agencies, civil 
society and citizens? The term remains unclear and confined to the rhetoric of 
high-level strategy. Despite the significance of the term, some recent studies 
focusing on good governance and decentralisation indicate that there are many 
variations and differences in understanding the term (Horng et al. 2007; Rusten et 
al. 2004, Öjendal & Kim 2006). How does accountability work in a patronage-
based and hybrid democratic state like Cambodia? Contextualisation makes the 
idea of accountability even more complicated. This is so because with political 
factors, patronage and rent-seeking networks significantly penetrating the formal 
state democratic institutions, the accountability relationships among actors, both 
internal and external, are multiplied and distorted, and the incentives and 
institutional arrangements are imparted more complicated and less obvious 
dynamics (Hughes & Un 2007; Hughes & Devas 2008). This requires that, in order 
to study accountability in a neo-patrimonial country like Cambodia, one first 
understand both the concept of accountability and certain basic characteristics of 
patronage, and then attempt to observe the interaction between the two. Here we 
are in seeking to understand the relations between elected commune councils and 
electors, which dictate a critical approach to the above definition and analysis. The 
“Strategic Framework for Decentralisation and Deconcentration Reforms of the 
Royal Government of Cambodia” states: 
The Royal Government will develop management systems of 
provincial/municipal, district/Khan and commune/Sangkat levels based on 
the principles of democratic participation. This system will operate with 
transparency and accountability in order to promote local development 
and delivery of public services to meet the needs of citizens and contribute 
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to poverty reduction within the respective territories (RGC Strategic 
Framework for Decentralisation and Deconcentration 2005: 4). 
Based on the government’s promise, enhancing accountability and 
alleviating poverty would be compatible with improving political legitimacy. The 
implementation of accountability and the quality of its functioning affect how well 
it is received by citizens. Empirical research indicates that accountability of 
commune councils to constituencies, civil society groups, political parties and 
government bureaucrats is still unclear (NCDD 2010; Öjendal & Kim 2006; Pak et 
al. 2007; Rusten et al. 2004, Blunt & Turner 2005; Burke & Nil 2004; MacAndrew 
2004; Mansfield & MacLeod 2004; Hughes & Kim 2004). In Cambodia, 
accountability channels are not working at a level that would be “expected in a 
functioning democracy” (Hughes 2003: 41–45). In general, it is accepted that there 
is little working accountability in Cambodia (Burke & Nil 2004: 6, Rusten et al. 
2004). MacAndrew’s work on the relationship between civil society and commune 
councils in Cambodia indicates that decentralisation works best when a strong civil 
society demands good governance and accountability from local government, but 
his findings are that commune councils do not have a clear appreciation and 
understanding of this issue (Kim & Öjendal 2007; MacAndrew 2004: 9; Öjendal& 
Kim 2006). 
Another problem is upward accountability to the political parties and a lack 
of general accountability to constituents. Various assessments of accountability 
reveal that upward accountability remains an obstacle to decentralisation that needs 
to be thoroughly researched. The current system of provincial and district 
governance has no strong system of checks and balances or of downward 
accountability. There is a lack of involvement of those concerned in major 
decisions and monitoring at both commune and provincial levels. Transparency 
and the exchange of information with citizens are generally weak, and citizens are 
unaware of their rights and obligations. Most decisions are taken at the centre, a 
fact that sometimes creates bottlenecks, lack of information about the real situation 
and lack of local ownership (cf. Hughes & Devas 2008).  
With the above concerns, accountability is here taken to be the ability of 
elected CCs to answer to voters for the use of their authority. Therefore, there is a 
need for research that scrutinises accountability empirically, that provides insights 
into what “accountability” is understood to mean in Cambodian, that looks at the 
CCs’ and voters’ perceptions of different factors to improve accountability between 
CCs and voters and that focuses on the contractual bond between CCs and voters. 
All of these general factors will be examined empirically in Chapter VI.  
“Accountability” refers to the ability to answer to constituencies for the use 
of authority. The focus of this point is to look at the accountability mechanisms 
used by CCs to be accountable to electorates. 
Hence, in Chapter VI the thesis explores the empirical findings of the nature 
of downward accountability between elected commune councillors and voters. 
Accountability will be examined in relations of the formal and informal 
institutions: what are the perceptions of accountability mechanisms under the 
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democratic decentralisation reform? In the Cambodian case, accountability is 
difficult to communicate in training and research, since the word does not exist 
historically. The chapter is based on three main dimensions: 
• The vocabulary of accountability: Since the concept of accountability is 
new among Cambodians, it is valuable for this thesis to explain the 
vernacular meanings of the term and how the word is perceived or 
understood by the public (CCs and voters).  
• CCs’ perceptions of accountability: This section will examine how 
accountability is implemented and viewed by CC members in their day-
to-day activities in terms of the mechanisms of accountability and sources 
of funding. 
• Voters’ perceptions of accountability. This section will explore voters’ 
perceptions of different aspects of accountability and mechanisms or 
activities that voters use to engage with CCs. 
Devolution of power 
It is not possible to deal with democratic decentralisation without discussing the 
concepts of power and mandate. The thesis will utilise the concept of devolution of 
power within decentralisation to investigate the formal mandate of local authorities 
in the decentralisation reform in Cambodia (devolution of power to the elected 
CCs). 
The issue of “power” within decentralisation frequently relates to power 
sharing, power devolution, power delegation, power to generate revenues, power 
based on the laws devolved from the central government and balance of power 
between central and local government institutions (Campos & Hellman: 2005; 
Smith 1985; Legowo 2003; Ribot 2011; Rondinelli et al.1983; Manor: 1999; 
Kulipossa 2004; Crook & Manor 1998). However, power is not easy to understand 
because it is a relational term, requiring in-depth articulation of social, cultural and 
historical political transitions. Power can, furthermore, be understood from formal 
and informal, institutional and individual, outsider and insider perspectives. 
A vast literature on decentralisation engages with the concept of devolution 
of power to elected representatives (Campos & Hellman 2005; Ribot 2011; Smith 
1985; Legowo 2003; Rondinelli et al. 1983; Manor 1999; Larson & Ribot 2005; 
Aziz & Arnold 1996; Crook & Manor 1998; Kulipossa 2004). Devolution of power 
is the backbone of decentralisation. It occurs in two spatial patterns. Firstly, 
political authority is delegated when power is devolved through legislative 
enactment to an area government or allocated between national and area 
governments by political institutions that create constitutional meaning. Secondly, 
bureaucratic authority is a delegation of responsibilities from the headquarters of 
an organisation to the field, i.e. to the elected representatives at the local levels 
(Smith 1985: 9). As Smith argues, the crucial role of devolution of power in 
decentralisation is that:  
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Decentralisation involves the delegation of power to lower levels in a 
territorial hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is one of governments within a 
state or offices within a large-scale organization. It is concerned with the 
extent to which power and authority are dispersed through the geographical 
hierarchy of the state, and the institutions and processes through which such 
dispersals occur (Smith 1985: 4–5). 
The thesis argues that devolution of power is a key aspect of 
decentralisation. 
Similarly, Rondinelli et al. describe the devolution of power thus: 
Devolution is the creation or strengthening—financially or legally—of sub-
national units of government, the activities of which are substantially outside 
the direct control of the central government. Under devolution, local units of 
government are autonomous and independent, and their legal status makes 
them separate or distinct from the central government. If devolution works 
well it will establish reciprocal and mutual benefit relationships between 
central and local government (Rondinelli et al. 1983: 19–28). 
As outlined (cf. Rondinelli et al. 1983; Smith 1985), decentralisation works 
beyond the central government and would improve the effective function of local 
governments. This devolution of power should be in the form of power to generate 
local revenues, to deliver local services and to act according to the law.  
Devolution of power to elected councillors is a crucial part of democratic 
decentralisation. Provision of power to elected councillors is therefore crucial. The 
most important issue is not how elected councils obtain funds, but that they have 
substantial funds and significant discretionary powers over their use (Larson & 
Ribot 2005; Aziz & Arnold 1996). If they lack these powers, it will hinder the 
progress of democratic decentralisation. 
Power in Cambodian society is intertwined with informal systems such as 
cultural and traditional norms, which are likely to affect any effort to promote 
liberal democracy. While exercising their power, elected commune councillors are 
expected to be responsive and accountable to electors, as stipulated in the laws. 
However, it is unclear how much effort to be responsive and accountable is 
actually pursued in the day-to-day activities of the commune councils (Kim & 
Öjendal 2007). Due to a lack of decision-making and power distribution from the 
central government, it is difficult for CCs to establish trust between the people and 
local authorities. Though the government does not discuss power directly, it does 
refer to some relevant aspects of power in relation to decentralisation: 
The legal framework for local revenue mobilization, especially at the 
commune level, is missing. This issue results in the commune councils 
having no power to collect local revenues to be responsive and 
accountable to constituents. There is little power devolved from the 
provincial levels to commune councils especially on security and decision-
making to allow commune councils to safeguard their own natural 
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resources. There is the lack of chiefs and councillors’ understanding of 
their new democratic roles, a lack of cooperation in the councils, and weak 
links to the citizens (RGC Strategic Framework for Decentralisation and 
Deconcentration 2005: 6–16). 
In relation to the Cambodian decentralisation reform, crucial power issues 
concern the degree to which power is devolved from central government to the 
elected commune councils, including the power to generate local revenues and to 
safeguard natural resources. Also important is the degree to which power resides in 
individuals and patronage groups, which may undermine CCs’ responsiveness and 
ability to deliver services to the people. With the emergence of the above 
discussion, it is deemed that in the Cambodian context there is a need for empirical 
research, including on the use of the concept of power in the decentralisation 
reform.  
For Cambodia, with little experience of decentralisation, the sort of power 
most immediately devolved to CCs is the power to act as stipulated in the laws, for 
example by generating local revenues, protecting natural resources and ensuring 
service delivery. Devolution of power in this study refers to the mandate and 
capacity of elected CCs to act according to the law. This thesis will consider the 
devolution of power from the central government to the commune councils in order 
to understand the formal mandate of the elected commune councils. What is the 
mandate and capacity of CCs to act? To what extent is power based on the laws 
and regulations actually delegated to CCs?  
This thesis will explore the devolution of power within the decentralisation 
reform in Cambodia, focusing on two main issues: firstly, understanding the 
devolution of power from a political order point of view. Within this, a 
contextualisation of the concept of power is critical through considering, for 
example, the vocabulary of power and authority, voters’ and CCs’ perceptions of 
power and power structures, i.e. who the power holders in the communities are. 
Secondly, do CCs have sufficient power to act according to the laws? Is power 
devolved to CCs based on the laws? And to what extent is power ostensibly given 
to CCs actually applied? Answering these questions, the thesis will conduct a 
mapping of power with CCs. These questions will be investigated in the 
empirically based Chapter VII. 
The “devolution of power to elected CCs” is an empowerment of local self-
government pursued in order to reach a number of collective ends. Devolution of 
power here is one aspect of decentralisation (mandated power given to the CCs). 
For the empirical work, the thesis will look at the devolution of power within the 
implementation of the decentralisation reform in Cambodia. How has devolution 
of power been working under democratic decentralisation reform? Who actually 
possesses power in the local political arena? To what extent can CCs exercise 
power based on the laws? Does power rest with individuals or institutions (or 
both)? 
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Hence, Chapter VII examines factors influencing the exercise of the 
devolution of power in the elected commune councils. It is divided into two 
sections.  
• Firstly it will explore the vocabulary of power in Cambodia among local 
leaders (CC members) and voters. How is the term power understood 
empirically? This section of the chapter will examine the CC members’ 
and voters’ perceptions of power: how do CCs and voters perceive power 
in the context of the Cambodian political order? This section will 
examine the tenets of power, the relationship between formal and 
traditional power, how power is exercised and with whom power rests.  
• Secondly, this chapter will examine the nature of the devolution of power 
in the context of decentralisation reform in Cambodia. We will seek to 
understand CCs’ perceptions of the devolution of power that they are 
pursuing. This section also seeks to understand voters’ perceptions of the 
nature of the power exercised by the CCs and the situation of power in 
commune councils. Each section of the chapter will begin empirically by 
laying out the survey data, which will be followed by in-depth 
anthropological style inquiry. 
Concluding remarks 
After discussing a set of concepts of democracy, political orders of Southeast Asia, 
and the impact of decentralisation in consolidating democracy, a few main findings 
can be summarised. Firstly, there is a contradiction between theoretical ideas of 
liberal democracy and the prevailing political order in Southeast Asia. This 
contradiction makes difficult any rapid insertion of democracy. Secondly, 
decentralisation and the establishment of local democracy have in the literature 
been seen as a way to deepen and consolidate democracy. It is, however, not a 
panacea, and its success depends on its design and its implementation, which seems 
to be worthy of study. Thirdly, decentralisation is a multifaceted process that needs 
to be understood empirically. Drawing on dominant strands of the literature, I have 
chosen to study responsiveness, accountability and devolution of power. These key 
mechanisms of decentralisation will be explained in the empirical chapters IV, V, 
VI and VII. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF CAMBODIAN DYNAMICS 
 
In this country there is a hierarchy of ministers, generals, astronomers, and 
other functionaries; beneath these come all sorts of small employees. When 
functionaries go out in public, their insignia and the number of their 
attendants are regulated according to rank. The highest dignitaries use 
palanquins with golden shafts and four parasols with handles of gold. 
Further down the line comes to those permitted only a silver-handled 
parasol, and there are others who use a palanquin with silver shafts (Chou 
Ta-Kuan, The Customs of Cambodia 1992: 9 [original text from the 14 
centuries]). 
 
Drawing on Chapters I and II, this chapter further discusses the contextual 
background of Cambodian dynamics and the evolution of decentralisation reform 
in Cambodia. The function of this chapter is to provide further details on 
Cambodian political orders, on the history of Cambodian administration and 
communes and on the contemporary decentralisation reform. Some of these aspects 
have been briefly explained in Chapters I and II, but will here be deepened. The 
first section will illustrate the different aspects of popular Cambodian political 
orders. The second section will focus on the historical background of Cambodian 
administration, particularly at the commune level, to which democracy and 
decentralisation are devolved in this process. The third section will discuss 
decentralisation and other administrative reforms, which will be critical for the 
empirical chapters. 
Popular Cambodian political perceptions 
In order to deepen understanding of contemporary democratic development in 
Cambodia, this section discusses the social fabric of Cambodian peasant society. It 
describes the role of kinship and age, social structures, Buddhism, characteristics of 
local institutions and power structures (patron-clientelism) in Cambodian rural 
society. Why are these social fabrics of Cambodian peasant society vitally 
“relevant” for the on going democratic decentralisation? Studies on local 
democracy in Cambodia have envisaged that there are close interactions and 
contradictions of the Cambodian social fabric (kinship ties, age, social structures, 
Buddhism, local institutions, power structures etc) and democratic decentralisation 
(Öjendal & Kim 2006; Hughes & Öjendal 2006; Ann 2008). Therefore, it is 
worthwhile for this thesis to discuss all of the factors of the Cambodian social 
fabric. 
Anthropologists, historians, sociologists and political scientists have 
described Cambodian society, in particular rural society, as unusually deeply 
embedded within basic social and political orders, making alternation and 
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introduction of new traits volatile (Marston 1997; Thion 1994; Luco 2002; Martin 
1990;Ebihara 1968; Ledgerwood 2002; Kim 2001; Chandler 2000; Ledgerwood 
2002; Mehmet 1997; Un 2004; Collins 1998; Keyes 1994; Bit 1991; Ovesen et al. 
1996). It is assumed in this work that formal decentralisation is defined through its 
ability to deal with the local political and social order and the extent to which it 
will be locally understood. Hence a basic understanding of local perceptions is 
paramount. This will follow below.  
Kinship and age 
In rural Cambodia, kinship ties remain intact and are the dominant factor for local 
leadership (Ebihara 1968; Ebihara et al. 1994; Ledgerwood 2002; Kim 2001). 
Cambodia, like much of South-east Asia, was early made up of fiefs (small states) 
interlinked by kinship and patronage. May Ebihara describes kinship ties as the 
most important bases for interpersonal relationships in village life. The general 
features of Cambodian kinship are characterised as a bilateral type of cognatic 
social organisation. She further describes:  
Cambodian kinship is basically bilateral (cognatic). The paternal or 
maternal line may be emphasized in certain respects…In general, however, 
there is no significant weighting of either the male or female lines with 
respect to property ownership and inheritance, kin terminology and 
residence patterns in general, and recognition of and behaviour toward 
kinsmen. Any skewing toward one side or another is usually due to certain 
circumstances rather than to absolute rules, for in this as in many bilateral 
systems there is considerably flexibility (Ebihara 1968: 94–95).  
Ebihara’s view is that the general features of Cambodian kinship 
characterisation are similar to a bilateral type of cognatic social organisation that is 
widespread throughout South-east Asia. There are seven different types cognatic 
system: 
i) The primary kin unit is the small domestic unit of a nuclear family or some 
sort of extended family. ii) Monogamy is predominant; polygyny is legally 
permitted but actually rare. iii) Marriage with any degree of cousin is 
permitted. Iv) Residence is neolocal or ambilocal; there is strong tendency 
toward, but no firm rule dictating, uxorilocality. v) There are no rules 
concerning community exogamy or endogamy. vi) Beyond the family there is 
only a bilaterally extended personal kindred. vii) Cousin terminology is in 
terms of reference, and avuncular (Ebihara 1968: 95).   
It is highly unlikely that a person would move into a new community unless 
he or she was marrying or had inherited land in the village from a person native to 
the village. The web of kinship ties extends beyond the village as well (Ebihara 
1968). Kinship ties are normally intertwined with patronage and political loyalty, 
which together create an informal institutional system that influences the public or 
formal authority (Ledgerwood & Vijghen 2002). As such, the differentiation 
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between private and public is often weak, impeding a simple introduction of a 
bureaucratic system as in democratic decentralisation. 
The idea of age is important. It is used not only to differentiate people of 
different generations but also to separate people of the same generation who are of 
different ages. As in other societies in South-east Asia, respect for elders and for 
hierarchy remains sacrosanct in Cambodian society. Marie Martin points out: 
In the Cambodian milieu, the bang or “elder,” is automatically right. Elder 
means not only older persons but also those who have knowledge, power, 
wealth, or influence with people in high places. The wife calls her husband 
Bang even if he is younger than she is (Martin 1994: 11).  
According to Cambodian cultural norms, one should be respectful and not 
protest against a parent’s decision or criticise one’s boss or spiritual master. The 
primary social rules are discretion, unobtrusiveness and keeping to your station 
(Martin 1994). 
Traditional kinship and age relations are relevant to decentralisation reform 
because they are reflected in the daily interactions of commune councillors and 
people. Most well-respected people are relatively old, and the majority of 
commune councillors are, for example, above 50 years old, typically making their 
performance more than their political mandate.  
Social structure 
Cambodian society remains fundamentally rural (Ledgerwood & Vijghen 2002). 
About 80 percent of the population lives in the countryside, and most of them are 
farmers (neak srae), largely self-sufficient and cultivating mainly rice. Fabienne 
Luco describes Cambodian rural society thus:  
In this shattered society, people long for personal safety and greatly fear 
disturbing the established order. People like to stay at home and to rely 
solely on themselves. Long journeys are feared. Aside from their native land, 
people’s main interest is the market in town. Any contacts with the 
authorities are kept to a strict minimum (Luco 2002: 14). 
Luco’s description may not entirely reflect a socially changing contemporary 
Cambodia, but reasonably describes the pre-war and civil war eras, with tenets into 
the post-war era.  
At the village level, caste considerations never took root. What resembled a 
caste system in ancient times was probably little more than a set of ritual 
procedures that showed respect for Indian traditions (Chandler 2000; Harris 2007). 
Cambodian society was traditionally formed essentially of three classes: peasants, 
officials (urban dwellers or bureaucrats) and royalty (Thion 1993). There is 
stratification within rural and urban society.2 Social stratification is, however, not 
                                                
2 The social stratification in contemporary Cambodia is characterised by an increasing wealth gap 
especially between ordinary people and the urban business people who are the emerging urban 
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fixed, but rather changeable according to socio-political circumstances. Serge 
Thion describes the situation:3 
Occasionally, perhaps in time of war, or for exceptional services to a 
powerful patron, someone from a peasant background might rise into the 
official class and thereby change the status of his immediate family; and 
clever children might be educated in an official family or at court to become 
officials; but such occurrences are too rare for any expectation of social 
mobility to be part of public consciousness (Thion 1993: 97). 
In contemporary Cambodia, there is a small urban middle class, i.e. the 
commercial bourgeoisie mainly composed of Chinese or Sino-Cambodians, who 
usually dominate the economy. These urban dwellers can access education and 
control the bureaucracy (Thion 1993; Gottesman 2004). In contemporary 
Cambodia, there is still a wealth gap between urban and rural people, but in each 
provincial and district town there is since recently an emerging middle class.  
Before the war era of the 1960s, authorities were respected by the people 
(Ebihara 1968). Since the war in the early 1970s, there has been a profound 
mistrust of the authorities, and mistrust of the authorities hassled to a fragile social 
situation. Mistrust between ruled and rulers is due to low self-confidence among 
citizens, bad behaviour of authorities, low education levels and lack of skills to 
analyse the meaning of events in society, which makes people vulnerable to 
manipulation by others (Bit 1991). In contemporary Cambodia, still, most people 
are extremely reluctant to challenge the authorities or pose any critical questions to 
them. People usually hold back their resentment and remain patient (pou ke trorm).  
Before the civil war in the 1960s, there was a certain respect towards local 
leaders. With the internal strife and civil war, the role of local authorities (in 
particular the commune authorities in the 1980s) changed towards a more 
controlling one, including military conscription and security, which made people 
sceptical and fearful of the authorities (Öjendal & Kim 2006). This also was a 
return to historical patterns of power, rather than service-oriented authorities. 
Understanding the Cambodian “rural” social structure could be relevant to 
decentralisation, in particular the relationship between authorities (CCs) and 
people. The middle class or the rich have more bargaining power in dealing with 
the authorities than the poor, and overall generalised mistrust makes it difficult for 
newly elected CCs to generate sustainable political legitimacy.  
Buddhism 
Buddhism (the Theravada school) is a dominant element, which has influenced 
political, social and economic realms in Cambodian society for generations. Since 
                                                                                                                        
elites. This wealth gap is caused by the inception of a market economy in the early 1990s, 
changing political regimes and the recent bubble economy in land. 
3 During the time of research from 2006 to 2008, land transactions were booming and the price of 
land and properties was skyrocketing. It caused many farmers to sell their farmlands and become 
financially rich. 
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the time of Sihanouk in the 1950s and 1960s, with the exception of the Khmer 
Rouge era, Buddhism has been the official or state religion. Almost every village in 
Cambodia has a Buddhist pagoda (wat), which is the centre of rural life. 
Historically, the wat was not only a religious centre, but also a moral, social and 
educational centre (primary schools are often located in the wat compound), 
providing miscellaneous services (cf. Ebihara 1968). People make numerous 
offerings to the Buddhist temples because they think they represent nourishment of 
life and are a source of moral authority (Martel: 1975).  
During the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979, formal Buddhism was 
eliminated and considered an enemy of the regime. All wats in the country were 
used as torture centres or warehouses. After the Khmer Rouge period, the wat 
again came to be considered the most important social institution in Cambodian 
society as in the pre-war era (Curtis 1998). During the PRK, the wat played an 
important role as a moral, social and educational centre. The PRK regime allowed 
monks to be officially ordained, and monks had various critical roles such as 
representing Buddhism for various traditional ceremonies and giving advice to 
people. However, its role in stimulating social solidarity and helping develop the 
country was only slowly recovering and Buddhism was under the strict control of 
the communist PRK. Many temples were being rebuilt only in the 1990s, and only 
in the late 1990s did the number of monks reach pre-war levels. Many of these 
monks are younger and less experienced than their pre-war counterparts (cf. Harris 
2001; 2005; Marston 2009), failing to command the respect than the previous 
generation did. 
A study conducted by Hiroshi Komai (1997), The Role of Buddhism in the 
Reconstruction of the Cambodian Rural Village, provides some fundamental 
insights into Buddhism and community development. To discover the role 
Buddhism plays in Cambodian communities, one can ask why people donate 
money and time to the wats. The main answer lies in the reciprocal relationship 
between laymen and Buddhist monks regarding “merit making” or “seeking 
nirvana”, two significant spheres which are integrated in the religious 
consciousness of Cambodian farmers (Kim 2001; Komai 1997: 23). According to 
Komai’s findings, most donations to the wats come from the private sector and 
individuals. There is no funding from the state to support the building of wats. The 
wat has become an important element in communities as a moral, social and 
educational centre. People organise ceremonies in order to raise money to build 
bridges, roads and schools in return for gaining “merit”, which is an extension of 
the reciprocal network of Buddhism in society.  
William Collins (1998) juxtaposed two Cambodian dialectical paradigms of 
leadership: the indigenous leadership processes of the pagoda committee (one of 
the committees in the Buddhist temple), which centre on a self-help approach, and 
the state-centred bureaucratic approach possessing formal state power. The wat-
centred indigenous organisation reflects the moral integrity of effective leadership, 
which is respected, sustainable and able to generate internal resources from the 
villagers. This indigenous approach embeds popular/voluntary participation, a 
strong sense of ownership and responsibility of all members of the pagoda 
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committee, as well as respect, trustworthiness, transparency, autonomy and 
empowerment. This is the core for leaders to be able to build moral legitimacy and 
to achieve harmony between the Buddhist leaders and villagers. Conversely, the 
state-centric bureaucratic approach is based on a rational political point of view and 
implies authoritarian leadership with weak accountability and responsiveness 
toward citizens. Collins argues that the state-centred paradigm reflects a 
hierarchical and authoritarian structure in which political legitimacy is blurred.  
Buddhism at the present time in Cambodia has changed. Various studies 
(Kent 2003; Kim 2001) on Buddhism have indicated that Buddhism has changed 
due to the impact of the market economy since the early 1990s and its 
politicisation. 
The discussion above shows that Buddhism in many ways retains a crucial 
role in Cambodian society, constituting a key part of rural life (Marston and 
Guthrie 2004; Kent 2003; Marston 2009; Pak & Craig 2010; Harris 2005; Kent 
2007). At the present time, Buddhism is politicised and used by political parties via 
commune councils to disseminate their political agendas, especially before the 
elections (cf. Pak and Craig 2010; Kent 2003, 2007). Wats are largely less 
developmental than they used to be; popular respect is half-hearted. They do not 
constitute an alternative source for local democracy and local development. Instead 
the pattern is one of overlap or tight cooperation among individuals in each sphere.  
Characteristics of rural society and institutions 
Due to a protracted period of internal conflict, when regimes practised authoritarian 
rule, government decisions are often perceived as a threat to the stability and 
coherence of communities (Luco 2002; Hughes 2003). Furthermore, Caroline 
Hughes has noted that state-society relations in Cambodia are highly dependent 
upon the ability of power-holders to find alternative means of consolidating both 
partisan support and broader notions of citizenship among farmers (Hughes 2003). 
The gap and relation between state and society are marked by corruption, rent-
seeking and vote-buying (Un 2004). These trends, known as ksea and knaong 
(patronage politics and rent-seeking), undermine democratic development (Marston 
1997; Pak et al. 2007).In addressing this, Thion observes that Cambodian society 
lacks fully fledged intermediary structures or “institutions” between the population 
of peasants and the higher authorities, which leaves the way open to the exercise of 
centralised power (Thion 1994; Bit 1991). This is what makes the CCs so 
interesting—they may be the first ever attempt to build “intermediary” structures in 
Cambodian society, hence closing this endemic gap between state and society. 
Lack of responsibility among leaders and steep hierarchy have led to weak formal 
state institutions. As Bit Seanglim describes it: 
… Cambodian culture has not developed any other social institutions or 
groups beyond the family structure which might facilitate the concept of 
collective social responsibility. Cambodia does not have a tradition of 
associations, volunteer groups, trade unions, or other networks composed of 
people who come together for a common purpose (Bit 1991: 49). 
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Since the 1990s, trade unions, associations, volunteer groups and other 
associations have emerged. However, most associations cannot work freely, due to 
politicisation and internal problem such as blurred accountability and transparency 
(cf. Ou et al. 2010; Un 2004). Again, however, this gap may slowly be closely and 
breaching a historical pattern, when CSOs are increasingly penetrating Cambodian 
rural society (cf. Kim & Öjendal 2011; Chea 2010). 
Another observation on the nature of social cohesion was addressed by Paula 
Uimonen (1994). Similarly to Ebihara, she argues that households and extended 
families are the main socio-economic components of rural communities. There are 
no formal or informal village socio-economic institutions beyond the household 
level. In the village where she conducted research in Pursat province, villagers still 
get “interest-free loans from relatives”, but if they borrow from moneylenders they 
must pay high interest rates. She argues also in line with many others that 
community coherence and reciprocity are weaker than in pre-war times because of 
widespread of poverty.  
As commonly stated, “Cambodia’s tragedy” is caused by a turbulent past 
and overall social fragmentation, which David Chandler expresses, “Cambodian 
history sometimes repeats itself” (Chandler 1996: 297). The tragedy lies with the 
structure of leadership where a deeply ingrained sense of hierarchy determines 
where people are positioned. Cambodians have historically experienced rulers 
whose power has, theoretically, been absolute and rested mostly with individuals or 
groups rather than with official state institutions. Throughout history, power has 
been pervasive and unrestrained. Considering accountability and responsiveness, 
rulers have not been accountable to others for their behaviour. As David Chandler 
describes it, “the essence of leadership in traditional Cambodia was exploitation 
rather than service, patronage rather than cooperation” (Chandler 1996: 302). 
Historically, rural communities probably had their genesis in a cluster of 
households of close kinsmen, which then grew through the constant addition of 
new homes established by successive generations of married children and other 
relatives (Delvert 1961). Since the civil war ended in the early 1990s, there has 
been population growth and people have been distributed over the territory, most of 
them living in dense agricultural settlements. Though in some ways little has 
changed in rural Cambodia, there are some changes such as youth migration to 
urban areas and cross-border to Thailand and Malaysia to seek jobs. The 
infrastructure has improved, especially roads, electricity and the availability of 
vehicles for transportation, which eases travelling. The growth of broadcast media 
such as TV and radio is also making people well informed about the government’s 
activities. And overall the political economy of rural areas is vastly more 
diversified than it used to be. 
The discussion above indicates that there has been a lack of local institutions 
mediating between state and society, apart from the local commune authority 
(possibly the village authority is included but it is just a line of authority to support 
the commune), which historically has not assumed the role of a functioning 
intermediary structure.  
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Patron-client relations and power structure 
Patron-clientelism describes a kind of dyadic relationship and pattern of social 
organisation. In Cambodia, it is difficult for a leader or a person to be independent. 
An individual needs to build alliances—in particular vertical ones with a more 
powerful person. Patron-clientelism is an extension of the networks of mutual 
obligation among close associates and kinsmen (Marston 1997; Pak et al. 2007). In 
the past, the patronage network of the king depended on local power-holders. 
However, over a period of time, the patronage system became diffused. 
Realistically, in contemporary Cambodia, powerful people in urban and rural areas 
(rich businessmen or well-connected people and government officials) need to 
strengthen their political and patronage linkages down to the grassroots to remain 
in a position of power. Patronage and clientship are important for survival and are 
possibly mutually beneficial. Patron-client relationships are perceived as natural 
and even obligatory; hence patronage is deeply entrenched in Cambodian society 
and habit-forming (Chandler 1996; Marston 1997; Chandler 2000). 
Reflecting Cambodian rural society, patron-clientism is the extension of 
kinship ties to non-kin relationships of hierarchies, linking people to the state 
apparatus (Marston 1997). What exists at the grassroots is a great deal of personal 
dependency, in particular (as it played out the last two decades) on a political party 
(Pak and Craig 2010). Currently, the prevailing systems of patronage and clientism 
apparently occur via political party lines which run parallel with state institutions. 
This patronage relationship sometimes permits individuals to gain a great deal of 
power and benefits at the local level by exploiting the personal dependency 
between clients and patrons. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between the patron-
clientism of personal dependency and that of state institutions. The formal state 
institutions make up the ascribed hierarchy and the rational authority, with which 
citizens do not comfortably interact. The informal patron-clientism has always 
competed with such institutionalised hierarchies of the state, and informal 
hierarchies may have made it easier for individuals to work informally through this 
system (Roberts 2006; Ledgerwood & Vijghen 2002). 
In Cambodia, a person’s status in society depends on value and wealth. It 
could also to a large extent depend on performance in the past, and one’s behaviour 
here and there determined where one would stand when one returned to the next 
life (Chandler 2000). Different analyses of local leadership in rural Cambodia 
(Marston 1997; Ledgerwood & Vijghen 2002; Ovesen et al. 1996; Thon et al. 
2010) illustrate that kinship and patronage are still the core of Cambodian social 
organisation (Ebihara 1968). Kinship relations play a critical role in patron-
clientelism because they imply informal interaction, are mutually tolerant and have 
moral authority/responsibility towards their kinship networks. The conduct of 
kinship and patron-clientelism is perceived as meritorious behaviour and is 
rewarded by society (Ledgerwood & Vijghen 2002). This patron-clientelism is 
important and yet contradictory to state laws because Cambodian society appears 
to be pragmatic and not always very strict in enforcing rules. Within this 
contemporary perception, governance is part of the political administrative domain, 
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in which the power of the leader derives from control over scarce resources and via 
personal networks (Hughes & Un 2007; Un & So 2009).  
Patronage ties in Cambodia today, however, tend to be drastically 
unbalanced, with patrons less likely than before to fulfil their presumed obligations 
to protect and provide support for their clients (Ann 2008; Seidl 2000). Patrons are 
less responsive to their clients than in the past because their power and means of 
wealth accumulation rather depend on linkages beyond the village (Ann 2008).  
As outlined above, power and patron-client relations in Cambodia are 
intertwined. There are patrons and power brokers (power holders) within different 
domains of influence, such as local authorities, police, military, rich people 
(including large landowners and creditors), political activists, well-connected 
people and educated people (such as teachers and NGO personnel). The domains 
work interchangeably. For example, the administrative and political domains 
overlap with commune councillors, village chiefs, police officers, political 
activists, well-connected government servants and possibly the rich. These power 
holders/brokers in the village are webbed together in apolitical and patronage 
network. Among them, there are some balances of power because each might be 
affiliated with different patrons, including outsiders in urban areas. Being a party 
member (especially in the ruling party) would make a person secure and safe; 
however, the rich can use political party affiliation to protect their wealth in the 
community. Direct abuse of power (by powerful people in the government using 
their state power to enrich themselves) within the administrative domain is rare, but 
people are usually extremely reluctant to challenge or question the local authorities, 
as they are afraid of administrators taking revenge when their services are needed 
(Thon et al. 2010).  
Studying local leadership in Cambodia, one needs to understand who the 
power holders are and what their power rests on. A study by Ledgerwood and 
Vijghen (2002) shows that there are at least six domains of power brokers in the 
Cambodian village. Firstly, the administrative domain consists of people working 
in the district, commune and village authorities. These people (local nobles) 
possess considerable status, especially as holders of administrative power. Since 
Cambodia was a rather centralised and communist state for a long period of time, 
administrative power has been critical for authorising services (licensing and other 
paperwork such as birth certificate and civil registration). During the 1980s when 
the country was under the communist system, local authorities also had substantial 
power in conducting military conscription and in distributing land, farm tools and 
other inputs. The most important power that local leaders possessed, however, was 
security as they were the local militia commanders.  
The second domain is the religious one, consisting of people affiliated with 
or working in Buddhist temples such as monks, achar (male lay persons working in 
the wats), yeay chi (lay women) and other old respected people. Most local 
religious leaders in Cambodian villages are not educated on religious matters or 
even aware of the meaning of most rituals. However, they have learned from 
experience to perform religious activities and to interact with the Buddhist 
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monastery. In the religious domain, affiliated people do not have absolute power or 
rational authority, but they may earn trust and respect in the realm of Buddhism.  
Thirdly, the knowledge domain involves people who work in the field of 
education and people with high education such as school teachers, traditional birth 
attendants and the well educated, who are both influential and respected. Before the 
war, monks used to be schoolteachers because the wat was the centre of education. 
Teachers at public schools are currently employed by the government and mostly 
struggle to make a living because of meagre salaries. As a consequence of being 
employed by the government or private sector, they tend to receive less respect 
from villagers than teachers at the wats did in the past.  
Fourthly, the spiritual domain embraces the power structures linked to the 
spiritual world. The primary spiritual domain involves traditional healers (krou 
khmer) who used to play a critical role in the community through a moral 
obligation to cure people without much payment. However, this has become less 
prevalent in most rural communities because of the availability of modern health 
services. The fifth domain is the economic. The power holders of this domain are 
the rich and people with political influence, reflecting a general sense that wealth 
and power are twin forces (Scott 1985). These people, who control political 
decision making and economic resources, include local authority people and local 
businessmen, constituting the local elites with connections to the larger society and 
access to the means to manipulate their fellow villagers. Finally, there is the 
development assistance domain, which points to the emergence of a new group of 
powerbrokers in Cambodian society, predominantly at village level. These people 
are government servants and NGO employees affiliated with different 
organisations and local NGOs (Ledgerwood & Vijghen 2002).  
Local leadership and power dynamics in rural Cambodia in relation to 
commune councils point in a slightly different direction than Ledgerwood’s and 
Vijghen’s work (Thon et al. 2010). Considering the legitimate power structure of 
Weber—rational, traditional and charismatic power—in contemporary Cambodian 
society, rational power is the dominant factor. It includes the political elites and 
resource-rich businessmen, who occupy the administrative, economic and political 
domains. Therefore, the people in the first and fifth domains are actually the same. 
People in the religious, knowledge, spiritual and development domains possess less 
direct and influential power, yet they are recognised as holding traditional and/or 
informal authority. These people are less influential in the formal state 
institutions/systems, whereas people affiliated with rational power have more 
control of formal state institutions, though the content and style of their exercise of 
power are still based on traditional forms of patron-client relations. Personalised 
power is practised by the local nobles and political elites in the form of 
politicisation, patronage politics and vote buying. 
To sum up, the dominant pattern of the existing Cambodian political order is 
in many ways based on a value system far separated and deviating from that of 
liberal democracy, remaining complex and mixed and gradually changing. This 
dominant pattern is not immediately conducive to democratic decentralisation.  
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History and chronology of Cambodian communes 
To understand the current situation of communes and their administration in 
Cambodia, one needs to consider their history. This section will provide the 
historical backdrop and its links to the contemporary local administrative system. It 
will first briefly describe the varied administration reforms between the 1870s and 
2001. During that period, Cambodia has experienced a number of political regimes: 
1863-1953 French colonial rule, 1953-1970 the first Kingdom (Sihanouk’s time) or 
Sangkum Reash Niyum, 1970-1975 Republican or Lon Nol regime, 1975-1979 the 
Khmer Rouge regime, 1979-1993 People’s Republic of Kampuchea, 1993-2001 
Royal Government of Cambodia, and from 2001 the inception of democratic 
decentralisation reform of the RGC. Throughout these regime shifts, the 
administrative system of the commune has drastically changed. 
French colonial administration reforms, 1863-19534 
Before the arrival of the French in 1863, Cambodia was a centralised royal court. It 
was called a “galactic” state in which the central power was diffused only to areas 
close to the capital (Chheat 2004). The French administration 1863–1953 made 
some weak attempts to establish a modern form of government in the country.  
The French administration was loose inside rural areas, in fact continuing the 
legacy of the traditional state (cf. Chandler 1983). The colonial regime, however, 
needed to strengthen its control for political as well as tax collection reasons, and 
hence tried to consolidate the administration of rural areas. The first initiative of 
creating communes should be seen in this light. Although containing several 
progressive dimensions, it was initially designed to strengthen the French colonial 
administration and local governance, and to establish the state’s presence in rural 
and remote areas, and thus its ability to sustain itself (cf. Öjendal 2005). The hope 
was that “administration would be brought closer to people while simultaneously 
making it more efficient” (Roome 1998: 17). While the historical evidence is 
inconclusive, as far as we can tell the commune (khum) was established by a royal 
ordinance as early as 1908 and further defined in 1910 and 1925 (cf. Delvert 1961; 
Roome 1999; cf. Öjendal 2005; Chheat 2004). A council of councillors (krom 
chumnum) was outlined in which the me khum was the chairman who decided the 
affairs of the khum, assisted by his deputies (chumtup) (cf. Roome 1998: 18). At 
that time, a Cambodian commune chief or me khum administered the khum, 
assisted by some lower ranking officials in the khum itself, sent from the district 
level (Sarraut & Gourou 1929). From the beginning, the commune chief was 
supposed to be selected by democratic means (Roome 1998). While the French 
administration at the time obviously had limited ambitions of introducing any 
democratic procedures, it did have a need to enhance its local legitimacy (Öjendal 
& Kim 2008). Some dimensions of representation were therefore introduced, 
                                                
4 There is virtually nothing written on this topic in this era, and the sources that exist are partly in 
contradiction with each other. The below is my interpretation of the available sources. Possibly 
archival research would be able to further our knowledge here, but this is outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
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though it is highly unlikely that there was any major popular input into the eventual 
composition of the commune council leadership. A French historian has recounted 
that the commune chief was elected by villagers with the approval of the provincial 
governor, and that he (it was not sure that there were any female commune chiefs) 
played a vital role in executing the laws of the central government and collecting 
taxes (Forest 1980; Roome 1998; cf. Baudoin 1919).  
According to Baudoin (1919) and Chheat (2004) the money raised through 
tax collection by the commune office was divided into three categories: (a) money 
used for supporting the operation of the communes; (b) money used at district 
level; and (c) money used at national level or “office du resident”. However, the 
overall supervision of the commune budget was under “conseil de notables” 
(provincial level). Chheat also noted that the division of responsibilities of the 
commune office was that the chief was in charge of overall activities in the 
commune, the first deputy was responsible for security, and the second deputy was 
in charge of managing a commune’s financial matters (the division of 
responsibility in the past is similar to the responsibility of the commune councillors 
nowadays).  
This description of the role of the communes in 1863-1953 indicates that 
commune leadership was directly influenced by the district and central levels, 
which tried to insert political influence and gain legitimacy in rural areas. The main 
responsibility of the commune was tax collection and general administration (civil 
registration), while the commune council did not have much of a role in service 
delivery or rural development. These roles and responsibilities are different from 
those of the current elected commune councils, which are not allowed to collect 
local revenues and mostly deal with general administration of the commune. It is 
not clear from the literature what role political parties had in the commune during 
colonial rule, if any, while now political parties influence the affairs of commune 
councillors as well as the line of accountability. 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum regime, 1953-1970 
Although independent, in the 1950s and 1960s, the administration of the 
government was greatly influenced by French administrative practices (Ebihara 
1968). The regional government at that time was organised into several levels: 1) 
Regional grouping of provinces, which was of minor importance. Its main function 
was the election of a representative to the upper house of the legislature. 2) The 
province (khet) was the first and major link between national and local 
government, headed by a governor and deputies of various national ministries and 
departments. 3) According to Ebihara (1968), the district chief and deputies were 
civil servants under the Ministry of the Interior. The primary duties of the district 
chief were to act, in the general sense, as an intermediary between the national and 
provincial government and the lower levels, to oversee various administrative 
matters pertaining to his district, including the duties of sub-district chiefs (i.e. 
Commune chiefs) and to supervise the operation of several departments in his 
office.  
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While the commune chief deserved and received respect for his official 
position, commune staff were residents of the area, basically peasants like 
everyone else, who were also known as kinsmen, neighbours and acquaintances. 
During the 1950s–60s the “commune chief was selected by the villagers 
themselves in a popular election held every four years” (Ebihara 1968: 514). 
According to Ebihara (1968), any aspirant to the position could submit an 
application for candidacy to the district chief and take a literacy examination.5 The 
district chief then selected two or three candidates from among the applicants. 
Officially, the main qualifications for the post were literacy and evidence of 
competence and good character. Unofficially, the commune chief had to be a 
person of at least moderate wealth and must have been found by the provincial 
authorities to be loyal to the regime. The commune chief was assisted by deputies 
and a clerk.  
According to Öjendal, the commune chiefs were only moderately involved 
in promoting development and served as the local arm of the king (or Sihanouk) in 
duties such as tax and data collection rather than in the promotion of local 
development (maybe they played the role of delivering services, but we do not 
have any historical records on this issue) (Öjendal 2005: 301). On the role and 
function of the commune authority during the 1950s and 1960s, Ebihara has 
contended: 
It was the sub-district chief (commune) to whom people turned as an 
intermediary with the higher state bureaucracy—responsible for important 
duties [such] as tax collection, adjudicating disputes, writing bills of sale of 
land, organizing and executing public works, conscripting men for 
government projects and acting as a representative of the police in 
apprehending criminals—as well as passing down proclamations, laws, and 
propaganda from the central government to the village level. The sub-
district chief had not received salary but had been allowed to retain three 
percent of the taxes collected from the residents of the sub-district (Ebihara 
1968: 520–530). 
Ebihara further describes the roles and responsibilities of the commune chief 
in the 1950s–60s: supervising the collection of taxes; adjudicating any disputes that 
had been brought to him for reconciliation; registering all births, marriages and 
deaths, which had to be reported to his office within three days; handling the 
initiation of proceedings for divorce or annulment of marriage; keeping lists of all 
qualified voters and tax payers; issuing identity cards that had to be carried by all 
males over 18 years of age when travelling any distance from home; writing bills 
of sales for transfers of land, cattle and houses; assessing the character of anyone 
from another region who wished to live in the sub-district and granting permission 
to do so if the person was reputable; supervising the organisation and execution of 
any public works; conscripting men for work on government projects; organising 
                                                
5 There might not have been such elections in all parts of the country, but the selection of 
commune chiefs may have varied from one district to another. We are also not sure whether the 
candidates were affiliated to political parties. 
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communal efforts and relief activity in case of any emergencies or calamities such 
as epidemics or fire; supervising the election and conduct of village chiefs; acting 
as a representative of the police in apprehending criminals, reporting accidents and 
assessing fines and damages, supervising the village guards and maintaining 
security in the villages; and disseminating information from the central government 
(mostly legal information). 
According to the structure and function of the commune in the pre-war 
period (Sangkum Reastr Niyum), there are some similarities of administrative 
systems with the present commune councils in terms of leadership structure, 
administrative relations between central and local government and interaction 
between local authorities and residents. In terms of accountability, it is fairly clear 
that, in the pre-war era, commune chiefs controlled the administration and were 
allowed to collect taxes and conduct local development. 
Communes in the Lon Nol regime, 1970-1975, and under the Khmer 
Rouge, 1975-1979 
According to Öjendal’s work, during the Lon Nol period, 1970-75, the role and 
function of the commune declined and during the Khmer Rouge years the 
commune was de factor placed by other mechanisms of control (Öjendal 2005: 
301).  
During the Khmer Rouge time, most of the state administration from 
previous regimes was abolished, and a collectivised system was created in which 
Khmer Rouge military commanders strictly controlled all the regions of the 
country for forced labour (the regime evacuated and forced people, mainly urban 
dwellers, into intensive forced labour in rice cultivation). Forced labour was a 
strategy to kill people indirectly because the urban people were not used to this 
kind of work. According to Vickery (1984), the KR regime was divided 
administratively into seven geographical zones named after their compass 
directions: North, North-east, East, West, South-west, North-west and Centre. 
Within those, there were many sub-zones which were numbered and not always 
completely stable. Each zone of the seven included more than one of the old 
provinces, and some provinces were split between two zones. Each zone was 
numbered and sub-divided into regions (damband), all of which crossed old 
administrative boundaries and which were known by numbers (Vickery 1984: 72). 
Below the regions, the administrative units seem to have generally followed the 
pre-Khmer Rouge terminology: srok (district), khum (commune or sub-district) and 
phum (village). Each village had a population of two to four hundred people. The 
everyday administrative control was headed by a triumvirate of officials called the 
“committee” and revolved around the cooperative (sahakor), generally equivalent 
to a khum and incorporating several phum. The role of the sahakor was to have 
tight control of forced labour, food distribution, security and execution. According 
to Vickery: 
…One of the more intriguing aspects of KR administration in general, was 
its extreme decentralisation with a very great degree of autonomy for each 
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vertical administrative unit and virtually total compartmentalization of units 
horizontally. [The region differed in terms of policy], the amount of foods, 
its distributions, work discipline, and general hardship, number of 
executions and execution policy, even the content and extent of political 
education (Vickery 1984: 74). 
The administrative authority of the Khmer Rouge gave a strong role and 
responsibility to the commune, the tasks of which were dominated by executions 
and recruitment of forced labour. The brutality of the commune during the KR 
continued to influence people’s perceptions of the local authorities in the 1980s or 
may still do, as people may still fear that local authorities will exercise fierce 
power. 
Commune administration during the PRK, 1979–1993 
During the regime of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1979–1989, dramatic 
changes in local administration took place. According to Gottesman’s work, the 
emergence of local leadership after the Khmer Rouge was a chaotic and often 
autonomous affair (Gottesman 2004). For a few months in 1979, the PRK regime 
permitted a generally autonomous selection of local leaders, describing the process as 
the “people’s movement” or “getting the masses to build state authority” (Gottesman 
2004: 55). The masses selected decent people of good character and sufficient 
qualification to join the state (in the communist party system). Although Vietnamese 
advisers were clearly in charge at the district level, there were no permanent 
Vietnamese advisers present in communes or villages (ibid.). Local government 
during the PRK era was structured as a communist, centralised and subsistence 
economy. The historian Margaret Slocomb has spent considerable time unveiling the 
structure of the political system and the local government structure of the PRK. She 
contends:  
From the early days of 1979, it was a few scattered members of the National 
United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea … and fledging mass 
organisations who supervised the nomination and selection of commune 
chiefs and members of the commune people’s revolutionary committees. By 
the end of the PRK, the commune was firmly under control of the party 
(Slocomb 2001: 2).  
The PRK was renamed the State of Cambodia in April 1989, but this made 
little change in terms of the central party’s control over local levels (communes). The 
renovation of the state in 1989 caused few or no changes in the legal framework or 
practical work of the commune administration (cf. Öjendal 2005). There were about 
1,300 communes in the country under PRK jurisdiction, while some regions, 
especially in the north-west, were controlled by the KR and other fighting groups as 
the country was in the middle of civil war. In 1988 the number of communes was 
1,517 (the number was increased because the PRK established new communes in 
order to create local administrations to cope with KR attacks and the PRK gained 
more control of regions from the KR), divided into 11,785 villages (Curtis 1990). 
Two major cities, Phnom Penh and the seaport city of Kompong Som, were directly 
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controlled by the central government, whereas local level government (district and 
commune) reported to provincial authorities. People’s Revolutionary Committees 
(PRCs) were elected in March 1981 at khum and sangkat levels. The PRC bore 
responsibility for local administration, public security and social order (Curtis 1990). 
According to Slocomb (2004), provincial officials were granted the right to select 
local leaders, who were then hastily trained for their political tasks. There was no 
distinct division of labour between district and commune authorities.  
… in the district and commune, the People’s Revolutionary Committees were 
supposed to consist of at least five people: the chief with the responsibility 
for economy and livelihood and members responsible for military, security, 
information, social cultural affairs, and education and health. They were in 
theory, at least, answerable to the Party Committee as they executed the 
circulars and directives which came down to them from the centre (Slocomb 
2001: 4).  
As we have seen, inevitably, the commune administration played a key role 
for the PRK regime because it was responsible for the proper functioning of the 
solidarity groups (kromsamaki) which were established in June 1980, in order to 
quickly restore and increase agricultural production and to strengthen the security 
system. Solidarity groups suited the leadership of the PRK ideologically, “as the 
backbone of a socialized economy, channelling food to a state commercial network 
that would, in turn, distribute goods throughout the country” (Gottesman 2004: 91).  
Commune chiefs were elected early during the PRK (Gottesman 2004: 116; 
Slocomb 2001). Gottesman describes the elections: 
In March [1981] the PRK organized elections for commune-level officials in 
about 30 percent of the communes. The elections were marked by extreme 
caution in selecting candidates and the heavy involvement of Vietnamese 
advisors and local military officers. The election was to select the state 
authority in the communes and urban areas (Gottesman 2004: 116). 
During the PRK, the commune administration was under the People’s 
Revolutionary Committee. The PRC was directly elected by the communist party 
and accountable only to the party at the district and provincial levels. This 
commune leadership system from the PRK remains influential on the current 
system of commune councils. The period 1989-93 was a turbulent period, with 
liberalisation, internationalisation, intervention and overall rapid societal change, 
but the role and position of the commune administration did not alter much. 
Times of change (and not)—commune administration during 1993-2001 
The administrative organisation of modern Cambodia after the end of the civil war 
in 1998 was determined primarily by the national constitution of the government 
(Cambodian constitution was rewritten in 1993 with support from the UN), which 
was similar to that of the pre-war period (1950s-early 70s). Beneath the king were 
the legislative council, Senate, parliament, prime minister, national ministries, 
provincial and district authorities and local government (the commune). As 
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stipulated in the constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, regarding the 
administration of the country: 
Article 99: “the council of ministers in the Royal Government of Cambodia 
shall be led by one prime minister assisted by Deputy Prime Ministers, and 
by State Ministers, Ministers, and State Secretaries as members”. […] 
Article 102: “members of the Royal Government shall be collectively 
responsible to the assembly for the overall policy of the Royal Government. 
Each member of the Royal Government shall be individually responsible to 
the Prime Minister and the Assembly for his/her own conduct.”  
Articles 126–127: “the territory of the Kingdom of Cambodia shall be 
divided into provinces and municipalities. Provinces shall be divided into 
districts (srok), and districts into communes (khum). Municipalities shall be 
divided into khan and khan into sangkat. Provinces, municipalities, districts, 
khan, khum, and sangkat shall be governed in accordance with organic law” 
(The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1993: 16 & 20). 
Society changed deeply, and on the national level the system was entirely 
different. At commune level there was no real reform, other than that the pressure 
on security was reduced and that the commune administration was reduced to 
roughly half. Hence the old administrative system for the communes remained till 
2001, when the government enacted the decentralisation law, which led to the 
commune elections in 2002. This marks the start of the current era, which is at 
focus for the remainder of the thesis. 
To summarise, over the last three decades of turbulence in Cambodian 
society, significant changes have taken place in local administration (Ledgerwood 
& Vijghen 2002). Cambodia has experienced at least four significantly different 
administrative systems: i) the French colonial system 1863-1953, ii) the first 
kingdom of Sihanouk (Sangkum Reastr Niyum) 1953-1970, iii) the Khmer Rouge 
period 1975-1979, iv) the PRK 1979-1989 (and SOC 1989-1993). The above 
description shows that from the end of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979 until the 
late 1990s, the local authorities (commune) neither pursued any progressive 
development processes nor acted with democratic means. After the UN’s 
intervention in 1993, the Cambodian state now searches for enhancing “regime 
legitimacy, re-building political institutions, and the legal framework. Ultimately, 
decentralisation reform is justified; it is claimed, by the need to strengthen local 
governance” (Öjendal 2005: 292). Whereas, as we have seen, the communes are 
long established, they have served different purposes. In the early French 
administration, they served to legitimise that regime and possibly to draw financial 
resources to the centre. In later eras, they served to consolidate local loyalty and 
stability. During the 1980s, the communes took on a security role before they were 
revitalised in the early 2000s. One thing that differs over these eras is the election 
process. In the past, commune elections were the responsibility of the district 
authority and/or irrelevant, while currently there are nationwide commune 
elections, such as the one held in February 2002. The commune now also has a 
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distinct development mandate, as well as a budget. Below is a description of the 
contemporary reforms and the evolution toward decentralisation reform. 
Contemporary reforms: evolution toward decentralisation 
Centrally, democratic procedures have been in place since 1993, and the 
comprehensive democratic decentralisation reform was formally launched in 2001. 
There were external and internal reasons triggering decentralisation reforms. The 
external factor was introduced through international organisations such as the UN 
(Öjendal 2005; Öjendal & Kim 2006). The external demands for reform in a 
neoliberal direction concerned in particular two areas: privatisation of the economy 
and democratisation of local institutions, for example by rebuilding state 
institutions and restoring the legal framework, and thereby increasing 
responsiveness and accountability (Öjendal 2005).  
Decentralisation in Cambodia originates in the refugee repatriation of 1992-
93 through participatory development activities within the Cambodia Area 
Rehabilitation and Regeneration Project (CARERE) and the subsequent Seila 
program, which had a certain degree of success (Rudengren & Öjendal 2002). 
CARERE, in some places, triggered sensitisation of the local authorities to issues 
of local development and acquaintance of the donor community with local level 
dynamics (cf. Öjendal 2005). Some mechanisms of decentralisation were 
introduced by CARERE-2 (1996-2001),6 as the provincial and commune 
authorities were given a wider mandate and were encouraged to be involved in a 
bottom-up participatory development. Elected village development committees and 
other democratic practices were also introduced under the Seila7 programme (cf. 
Öjendal 2005), producing ad hoc (and uneven) local democracy even before 
“decentralisation” was introduced. The popularity and success (and no doubt a 
central politically motivated observation on how strongly the local “communes” 
generated legitimacy and gathered strength by appearing democratic and 
development oriented) made central policymakers keen to transform this project-
based disparate democratic decentralisation into a fully fledged democratic reform. 
After years of deliberation by various agencies in the government, a draft surfaced 
in 1999 and was subsequently turned into a law by 2001 and elections by 2002. 
Democratic decentralisation: elected commune councils 
A decentralisation reform in Cambodia was being considered as early as 1994 
(Öjendal & Kim 2011). It was formulated in policy between 1998 and 2000 and 
was inscribed in law in 2001. It was then put into effect through the first commune 
                                                
6 The project was designed to facilitate the rapid, sustained shift from direct implementation to 
intensive capacity building focused on Cambodian institutions entrusted with local development. 
7 The SEILA programme is an experiment in the decentralised planning and financing of integrated 
local development managed by the government. The programme focuses on poverty alleviation 
and the promotion of peace, by fostering improved local governance through intensive capacity 
building and technical assistance, broadly based participatory planning, financing and 
implementation of development projects. 
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election in 2002 and backed up by subsequent funding. Commune council elections 
were conducted using a proportional system of representation of the political 
parties contesting the election. All the commune council members are selected 
from parties’ candidate lists (cf. Mansfield & MacLeod 2004; COMFREL 2007). 
Four political parties were elected to commune councils. The Cambodian People’s 
Party, the ruling party, remained the dominant political party with 7,703 or 68.4% 
of commune council seats. Of these, 1,598 held the position of commune chief, 789 
first deputy chiefs, 154 second deputy chiefs and 5,162 regular councillors. 
FUNCINPEC had the second most councillors with 2,211 or 19.6% of commune 
council seats. Ten of these councillors held the position of commune chief, 547 
were first deputy chiefs, 852 second deputy chiefs and 802 regular councillors. The 
Sam Rainsy Party won the third most seats with 1,346 councillors or 12%. Thirteen 
of these held the position of commune chief, 285 were first deputy chiefs, 615 
second deputy chiefs and 433 regular councillors. Finally, the Khmer Democratic 
Party had one councillor.  
Below, the thesis will review previous empirical research findings on the 
role of decentralisation reform in Cambodia in democratic development, with a 
focus on a descriptive review before we turn to briefly assess its achievements and 
constraints. Reviewing materials pertinent to decentralisation and deconcentration 
reforms will offer a contextual framework to use in the reflection in the empirical 
chapters. 
Figure 3.1: Commune Council Structure 2002–present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Law on Commune/Sangkhat Administrative Management (the 
decentralisation law) (see boxes 1 and 2 below for the key points of the law), 
created in 2001, stipulated that communes acquire new roles, responsibilities and 
powers. The detailed description of democratic decentralisation reforms will follow 
below in this chapter. 
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The attraction of decentralisation might be that it holds promise for both the 
deepening of democracy and the addressing of development problems (Manor 
2008). Given its high degree of internal conflicts and historical fragmentation, the 
Cambodian government searches for enhanced regime legitimacy and a renewed 
nation state building process, including the rebuilding of the legal framework and 
political institutions (Öjendal 2005). The institutions of local governance have to 
be reinvented and restructured in order to create a safe space and vibrant 
interactions between ruled and rulers. Cambodian political culture seemingly does 
not allow for much “trickle-up” (also see Chapter 2). However, increasing local 
political space is critical and may also allow people to access political power and to 
rebuild trust in the (local) state. Öjendal and Kim point out: “the overall 
assumption is that decentralisation may contribute to enhanced political legitimacy 
at local level, which in turn may support democratisation and overall political 
reconstruction” (2007: 70). 
Box 1: Summary of commune councils in the first mandate (2002-2007) 
Four political parties won seats in the commune election for the first mandate, 2002–2007: 
Cambodian People’s Party, FUNCINPEC, Sam Rainsy Party and Cambodian Democratic 
Party (KDP).  
 
Total communes: 1,621  
Total elected councillors: 11,261  
Number of councillors in a council: 5–11 
Mandate: 5 years 
Ratio of councillors to residents: up to 5,000 residents = 5 councillors; from 5,000 to 7,000 
residents = 7 councillors; from 7,000 to 9,000 residents = 9 councillors; more than 9,000 
residents = 11 councillors. 
 
CPP: the dominant political party, won the majority, with 7,703 = 68.4% of commune 
council seats. The CPP had1,598 commune chiefs, 789 first deputy chiefs, 154 second 
deputy chiefs and 5,162 regular councillors.  
 
FUNCINPEC: gained the second most councillors with 2,211 = 19.6% of commune 
council seats. Funcinpec had10 commune council chiefs, 547 first deputy chiefs, 852 
second deputy chiefs and 802 regular councillors. 
 
SRP: won the third most votes in the commune council elections with 1,346 councillors 
elected = 12% of the seats. The SRP had13 commune council chiefs, 285 first deputy 
chiefs, 615 second deputy chiefs and 433 regular councillors. 
 
KDP: had only one councillor in the country, in Prek Tnot commune, Kampot province 
(the commune is also covered in this research). 
 
Commune Clerk: Each commune council has a clerk appointed and trained by the 
Ministry of the Interior who is employed within ministry’s administrative framework. The 
clerk is responsible to the commune council and has no supervisory or disciplinary 
functions over councillors. The clerk’s roles are to act as a secretary to the council and to 
inform it about legal and procedural requirements. The clerk is also responsible to the 
ministry. He or she must be neutral and unbiased, and must act impartially towards all 
citizens, political groups, councillors and members of committees. 
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Source: Mansfield & MacLeod 2004, PACT Cambodia 
Box 2: Legal Framework: Law on Administration and Management of 
Commune/Sangkat Councils 
Roles and Duties of CCs: Article 39: A khum/sangkat chief shall perform the following 
roles and duties: implement the decisions of the khum/sangkat council; implement rules and 
principles received from the khum/sangkat council; prepare reports on work performance to 
his/her khum/sangkat council at least once a month; raise recommendations and assist the 
khum/sangkat council in preparing planning, finance and the implementation of roles, 
functions and powers of the khum/sangkat council and other affairs assigned to him/her by 
the khum/sangkat council.  
 
Article 40: The khum/sangkat deputy chiefs are assistants to the khum/sangkat chief in 
performing [the tasks] assigned to them by the khum/sangkat chief and shall act as 
khum/sangkat chief, in order of hierarchy of the khum/sangkat deputy chiefs, in the absence 
of the khum/sangkat chief. The khum/sangkat deputy chiefs shall be assigned with [such] 
duties as: the khum/sangkat first deputy chief shall assist the khum/sangkat chief with 
financial and economic affairs; the khum/sangkat second deputy chief shall assist the 
khum/sangkat chief with administrative and social affairs, public services, and public 
orders; the khum/sangkat chief may assign other additional duties to his/her deputies.  
 
Article 43 (Table 2) of the decentralisation law defines the roles and responsibilities of 
commune councillors in maintaining security and public order; managing necessary public 
services and ensuring that these services work well; encouraging the well-being of citizens; 
promoting social and economic development and upgrading the living standards of citizens; 
protecting and preserving the environment and natural resources; reconciling people’s 
views for the sake of mutual understanding and tolerance; and performing general affairs to 
respond to people’s needs. 
 
Article 27: A khum/sangkat chief shall have the right to appoint various committees to 
provide advice and to assist affairs, as necessary. Any councillor or any citizen, other than a 
councillor, who is entitled to vote, may become the chair of the above committees. 
 
Capacity requirements for CCs: Article 14: A Cambodian citizen who is eligible and 
intends to stand as a candidate for the election of a khum/sangkat council shall meet the 
following conditions: Cambodian nationality at birth; able to read and write Cambodian 
script; registered in the voters’ list in the khum/sangkat where he/she stands as the 
candidate for the election; at least 25 years of age on the election day of the khum/sangkat 
councils. 
 
Roles, functions and powers of khum/sangkat administrations: Article 41: A 
khum/sangkat administration shall uphold and support good governance by using all 
available resources to address the basic needs of its khum/sangkat to serve the common 
interests of citizens in respect of the national interest, in accordance with the general policy 
of the state. 
 
Article 42: A khum/sangkat shall have two functions: to serve local affairs for the interests 
of the khum/sangkat and citizens in the khum/sangkat; and to represent the state as 
designated by the state authority. 
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Article 43:In the role of serving local affairs, khum/sankat administrations shall perform the 
following duties: maintain security and public order; manage necessary public services 
[ensuring] that these services work well; encourage the creation of contentment and well-
being of the citizens; promote social and economic development and upgrade the living 
standards of the citizens; protect and preserve the environment and natural resources; 
reconcile people’s views for the sake of mutual understanding and tolerance; and perform 
general affairs to respond to people’s needs. 
 
Article 44: Within the agency function representing the state, a khum/sangkat 
administration shall perform in compliance with the laws, royal decrees, sub-decrees, 
proclamations and other legal instruments concerned. In this case, the state authority may 
delegate powers to the khum/sangkat together with capacity building, ways and means, 
materials and funds for work. The above delegation of power shall be applied to the 
khum/sangkat as a whole only. 
 
Article 51:A khum/sangkat may delegate powers to the khum/sangkat chief following the 
instruction of the minister of the Interior, except for the following matters: the adoption of 
the khum/sangkat budget; the imposition of local fiscal taxes, local non-fiscal taxes and 
service charges; the adoption of internal rules and regulations and resolutions of the 
khum/sangkat; the adoption of khum/sangkat development plans; any other matters 
prescribed by the minister of the Interior; and the chief to whom the powers are delegated 
may not transfer these powers to any other persons. 
 
Article 74: A khum/sangkat shall have the right to collect direct revenues from fiscal taxes, 
non-fiscal taxes and other service changes. The above taxes shall include land taxes, taxes 
imposed on immovable properties and rental taxes. In case the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy collects the revenue of the commune/sangkat, this collection shall be conducted 
in the name of the khum/sangkat. A separate law shall establish the categories, degrees and 
manners in which the above fiscal taxes, non-fiscal taxes and service charges are collected. 
 
Article 75: The khum/sangkat is entitled to resources appropriated from the national 
revenues for its budget. The appropriation of resources shall include: total or partial transfer 
of specific tax income and non-tax income of the state, and financial endowment and 
appropriation, granting or allocation from the national revenues. 
 
 
In line with this discussion of the background of decentralisation reform, 
decentralisation may be the most viable option for establishing democratic 
institutions in Cambodia with “soft local politics” where democratic values are 
spreading and political regime legitimacy is being harnessed (Öjendal & Kim 
2011; Öjendal & Kim 2006; Öjendal & Lilja 2009). The aims of the government in 
endorsing decentralisation revolve around restoring effective state institutions. As 
the deputy prime minister and minister of interior put it:  
Deconcentration reform is being considered seriously from the government 
by forming the inter-ministerial committee and organic law. The government 
is relying on four major strategies for the reform: fighting corruption, 
reform [of] the court system, decentralisation and deconcentration reforms, 
and military reform…the principal concepts of the reform are: 
representation, responsibility, participation, and accountability. The power 
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sharing between national, sub-national, and local government is critical but 
based on the principle of subsidiarity (H.E.Sar Kheng, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of the Interior, Seila Annual Workshop 12–13 
September 2005). 
In the commune/sangkat law, communes are entitled to collect revenues and 
are given access to development and administrative grant assistance through the 
nationally managed Commune Development Fund, which receives a share of 
national revenue. Prum Sokha’s8 work entitled Decentralisation and Poverty 
Reduction in Cambodia envisaged that the elected commune councils would be 
empowered to articulate their need for access to natural resources (land, forests and 
fisheries). The expectation of the government is that investments made through 
communes in physical infrastructure have the potential to contribute to local 
poverty alleviation (Prum 2005).  
The decentralisation law of 2001 contains radical features, allowing the 
elected councils to collect local revenues and protecting sustainable use of natural 
resources. There are at least four major reasons for launching decentralisation: i) to 
strengthen local participation in local affairs; ii) to increase local ownership of 
local development; iii) to change the attitudes between the local state and the 
people; and iv) to strengthen democracy (Prum 2005; cf. Öjendal 2005). Below, the 
thesis will describe different dynamics and activities of commune councils from 
2002 till now. 
Dynamics of commune councils 
When the first five-year mandate of commune councils (CCs) ended in April 2007, 
there were achievements and remaining challenges. In order to understand the 
purpose of the reform in 2002, this section will describe various policies of the 
government, different research findings on decentralisation in Cambodia and the 
challenges being faced.  
In the highly politicised atmosphere of Cambodia, decentralisation reform 
was deemed by the Royal Government of Cambodia and development partners as 
an appropriate option of soft reform to neutralise the dominance of hard central 
politics, especially for strengthening state-building from below (Kim & Öjendal 
2009; Öjendal & Lilja 2009; Prum 2005; Öjendal 2005).  
The core of the Rectangular Strategy—a policy package introduced as a 
high-profile reform attempt of the RGC—is good governance focused on four 
reform areas: anti-corruption, legal and judicial reform, public administration 
reform including decentralisation and deconcentration and reform of the armed 
forces, especially demobilisation. Concerning the decentralisation and 
deconcentration reform: 
…the implementation of decentralisation and deconcentration to the 
commune is crucial to the strengthening of democracy at the grassroots 
level, improving the quality of public services and promoting the culture of 
                                                
8 He was Secretary of State at the Ministry of Interior at the time. 
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participation and participatory local development in all sectors. A key 
priority in local governance is to build local management capacity and 
provide reasonable levels of financial resources to the communes. Indeed 
decentralisation must be implemented in conjunction with deconcentration 
to build capacity at the municipal, provincial, and district levels and thereby 
ensure harmonized and mutually supportive and complementary operations 
with and among the grassroots-level communities. Therefore the RGC will 
proceed, as soon as possible, with the appointment of village chiefs, deputy 
village chiefs and the members of village committees in accordance with the 
principles of decentralisation at the commune level (RGC 2007: 7-8). 
A recent well-articulated study, Cambodia Governance Analysis, by 
Caroline Hughes and Kheang Un, highlights many issues related to governance and 
the functioning of state institutions in Cambodia. The authors denote governance in 
Cambodia as consisting of a system of black hats and white hats (Hughes &Un 
2007: 1). The white hat system conforms to professional state institutions with 
developmental intent, while the black hat system operates through personalised 
connections of kinship, cronyism, patron-clientism and rent seeking. The “black 
hat” obviously runs counter to the “white hat” and undermines its governance. This 
results in poor establishment of the rule of law, poor combating of corruption and 
poor mechanisms of accountability.  
However, various researches on decentralisation in Cambodia point out that, 
since the commune council elections, the relationship between ruled and rulers has 
improved, power is being exercised more softly, and the authorities treat 
constituents better than in the previous regimes, for example encouraging 
participation and small development activities (Kim & Öjendal 2009; cf. Manor 
2008). The elected commune councils, however, are still facing disputes, perhaps 
most intensively over land and natural resources (water, fish, forest and land) (Kim 
& Öjendal 2011). Commune officials are still subjects to the dictates of the 
political party to which they belong, which means that their loyalties are divided 
between party bosses, constituents and district government officials. There is still 
potential for conflicting interests between these groups, which puts great pressure 
on commune chiefs and councillors. 
As the CDRI report Moving Out of Poverty indicates, local authorities 
(commune councils) can do more to manage local conflict, such as involving 
community members in decision making, reducing domestic violence and being 
more responsive and accountable to people’s needs. However, this will be effective 
only up to a point, as elected councils are in effect powerless as soon as powerful 
external influences (rich and well-connected people) are involved (CDRI 2006). 
The report also highlights some significant governance failures, in particular in 
relation to natural resource management, which cannot be addressed at the local 
level but requires a national response.  
According to Eng Netra and Caroline Rusten’s work on fiscal 
decentralisation and communes/sangkats, the potential sources of revenues in the 
commune (own source revenues) such as service charges are from civil 
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registration); commune councils having the right to develop their own sources of 
revenue and making local revenues function effectively were indispensable means 
to make decentralisation work (Eng & Rusten 2004; Pak & Craig 2008). At the 
present time there are a number of revenue sources at the commune/sangkat level 
(from small business activities and transportation). However, those sources of 
revenue are still tightly controlled and collected by provincial/district authorities 
and technical line departments, which is contrary to the decentralisation law. The 
central government and provincial technical agencies do not share the non-tax and 
tax revenues with the communes.  
Although the law says elected CCs are supposed to have the authority to 
collect local revenue, until now this task has not been delegated to the CCs, the 
excuse being that it is still too early for CCs to assume the responsibility for tax 
collection since they lack the capacity. There is little collaboration with CCs in tax 
collection from the provincial/district and line agencies, since there are no 
incentives for such cooperation (Pak & Craig 2008; Horng & Craig 2008). This 
creates many obstacles to improving local governance and accountability. 
One of the key elements of decentralisation reform is to make elected CCs 
responsive to the needs of constituencies and, for example, to provide services. The 
Law on Administration and Management of Communes/Sangkats envisages elected 
commune councils having a lead role in service provision and local development, 
but does not mandate any specific responsibilities. An empirical study of local 
service delivery in Cambodia indicates that it is hindered by a lack of assigning 
functions to different levels of government (Eng et al. 2005). The commune 
councils have done much project planning, but lack the funds to execute the 
projects. Commune councils’ role in monitoring service provision is also rather 
limited because of low technical capacity, limited mandates and small budgets 
(Eng & Craig 2009; Eng et al. 2005). 
Accountability is one of the most important aspects of decentralisation in 
Cambodia. The significance of accountability has moved to the forefront of both 
the Cambodian government’s and donor community’s reform agenda in recent 
years, particularly among those who focus on good governance, poverty reduction, 
decentralisation and democratic development (Pak & Craig 2008; Pak et al. 2007; 
Burke & Nil 2004). A study conducted by Pak et al. (2007), “Accountability and 
Neo-Patrimonialism in Cambodia”, shows that accountability is understood in 
Cambodia in a wide variety of ways. There are at least four generic relationships 
pertinent to accountability identified in Cambodia: 
Firstly and perhaps most importantly, donors introduce Western-oriented 
public reforms which fail to factor in Cambodia specific conditions. As a 
result, such initiatives are poorly understood, much less owned by Cambodian 
policy makers…secondly, accountability currently is an invented term in the 
Cambodian language…thirdly, vast informal relational networks underlie the 
formal governance system. These informal networks also shape formal 
bureaucratic activities and functions…fourthly, higher and lower levels of 
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government, civil servants, and politicians lack an adequate understanding of 
institutional and individual accountability (Pak et al. 2007: 1). 
As we see, accountability is difficult to understand in a Cambodian context. 
The term is a relational term which is linked to different sectors and contexts 
(which will be described thoroughly in chapter V). The meaning of accountability, 
as it is generally used by donors and Cambodian policy makers, is in conflict with 
the actual conditions in Cambodia. Empirical research shows that decentralisation 
in Cambodia is often constrained by power not being delegated to the elected 
councils, by inadequate devolution of resources to the local level, by problems of 
uneven development and by the possibility of resources and power being captured 
by local elites (Ninh & Henke 2005). Another study, however, finds that there is 
little sign of elite capture of the CCs’ development fund because there has not been 
much funding available for development and because the funds are well monitored 
from above (Rusten et al. 2004).  
An effort to increase the depth of democratic decentralisation is made 
through the interaction of civil society organisations, such as NGOs and CBOs, 
with the elected commune councils. Good interaction between NGOs/CBOs and 
the CCs would improve the accountability, responsiveness and capacity of 
councillors, contribute to safeguarding natural resources such as fisheries and 
forests, prevent land grabbing, improve responsiveness and accountability to 
constituencies, help strengthen institutional social capital, improve conflict 
resolution and create local dialogue. Some empirical findings have envisaged that 
the function of decentralisation is still challenged by poor interaction between 
elected CCs and villagers (MacAndrew 2004; Kim & Öjendal 2007). NGOs’ 
development activities, often running parallel with the commune councils’ 
programmes and eventually bypassing CCs, have the potential to disable CCs’ 
efforts.  
Since the implementation of decentralisation in Cambodia, there have been 
few large-scale surveys to gauge its impact. In 2005, the Centre for Advanced 
Study (CAS), in cooperation with The Asia Foundation (TAF) in Cambodia, 
conducted a survey to assess public opinion on the roles, responsibilities and 
performance of CCs. Although the study was geared towards understanding the 
roles and nature of conflict resolution at the grassroots, it also covered many 
aspects of decentralisation such as trust, the responsiveness of CCs to the demands 
of constituencies, accountability and power relations between CCs and citizens. 
The survey covered all 24 provinces in the country with a total of 310 commune 
councils, 620 commune councillors, and 1,240 voters (Ninh & Henke 2005). 
Generally, voters think that councillors are working hard. More than 90 percent of 
voters think that CCs are performing well on planning, implementing development 
projects, fulfilling administrative tasks, organising social events and ensuring 
security. This is at the same level as the councillors’ own impressions (Ninh & 
Henke 2005).  
The same survey explored the responsiveness and accountability of CCs to 
electorates. Voters believe that CCs face a number of constraints. Sixty-eight 
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percent of voters think that the communes lack sufficient funding to be responsive. 
Forty-four percent of voters think that CCs are lacking in skills. Thirty-five percent 
think that CCs lack the power to be responsive and accountable. About 35 percent 
think that CCs spend too much time on conflict mediation. A large number of 
respondents (81 percent) have personally contributed to development projects in 
the community. About 60 percent of voters are aware of the village planning 
meetings, and 90 percent know that they have the right to engage with the 
planning, and 76 percent have attended such meetings. The interaction of voters 
with CCs is crucial for strengthening accountability and building trust between 
citizens and state. The survey shows that 37 percent of voters never engage with 
CCs, 29 percent come to the CC office to get official certificates and 13 percent to 
see the voter list. CCs think that they are approached by individuals much more 
frequently than by groups. Voters generally perceive that party loyalty of CCs has 
obstructed their performance. Twenty-one percent think that delegating of 
responsibility to CCs would be helpful, while 37 percent do not. About 70 percent 
of voters experience fee collection by various local authorities such as commune 
and line agencies, primarily for administrative requirements. The problem is that 
CCs are legally allowed to charge some fees, but the legal framework is not yet 
fully in place to give CCs the power to collect local revenues. Upward 
accountability remains intact among the elected CCs. About 70 percent of CCs 
interviewed said that they are subordinate to district and provincial authorities. 
Eighty-four percent of CCs have the power to protect and manage natural 
resources, while 35 percent of voters think that CCs lack the authority to perform 
effectively. Hence, there is arguably a structural change in the making, but the 
picture is mixed. 
Decentralisation seldom works as promised in theory. Peter Blunt and Mark 
Turner (2005) explain that in developing countries, decentralisation normally fails 
to deliver in practice. They argue that decentralisation in Cambodia involves little 
devolution of authority to the elected councils and little or no reallocation of 
service delivery roles. Instead, decentralisation could be seen as serving as an 
effective method of consolidating the nationwide political control of the ruling 
CPP, with all political and economic power being controlled by political elites. 
Further, the paper argues: “Cambodia’s cultural context is largely unreceptive to 
the values that are the essence of decentralisation” (Blunt & Turner 2005: 77). Two 
empirical studies argue that the “fatigue” of decentralisation in Cambodia is caused 
by the slow progress of deconcentration (Kim & Öjendal 2007; Pak et al. 2007). 
Some progress has been made, however. At this early stage of decentralisation, 
there has been no report of elite capture of the development fund, people are more 
engaged with the authorities than previously, some local infrastructure has been 
built, and the leadership system of CCs is more democratic and tolerant than before 
(Rusten et al. 2004; Kim & Öjendal 2007; Kim & Öjendal 2009). 
It is generally accepted by the tentative research on the matter that so far the 
lack of deconcentration remains the predominant problem, i.e. the low extent to 
which power is delegated to CCs. The implementation of decentralisation is 
severely challenged by Cambodia’s complex political order such as patronage and 
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rent seeking and by the lack of resources, which makes it difficult for CCs to be 
responsive to the electorate.  
A review of the literature on decentralisation and deconcentration reforms 
shows that the development of democratic decentralisation in Cambodia is 
currently a halfway house. There are certain positive achievements, but also many 
remaining challenges (Kim & Öjendal 2007). Decentralisation is the main driver 
for strengthening political institutions, particularly at the local level, by introducing 
democratic principles, including: firstly, the ability of elected CCs to be responsive 
to voters at a certain level; secondly, accountability; and thirdly, the devolution of 
power from the centre to elected CCs. Decentralisation also carries some positive 
aspects for the improvement of democratisation, creating space, a multiparty 
system at the local government level, enhancing people’s participation and 
demanding that leaders be accountable and responsive to constituencies. However, 
decentralisation in Cambodia is still constrained by a complex political situation, 
with some CCs still operating under a patrimonial logic instead of prioritising 
public needs. This could be related to an incomplete transition from a traditional 
system to one operating on liberal democratic principles, constituting a hybrid 
political system (cf. Kim & Öjendal 2007). Decentralisation has been followed by 
further (or deeper) reforms such as indirect election of the village chiefs and Senate 
members and, recently, reforms of sub-national administrative management 
(Organic Law)9 so that through unified administration it would be able to deliver 
services effectively and also be responsive and accountable (Kim & Öjendal 2009).  
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have described how the democratic dimension of post-conflict 
reconstruction of Cambodia is intertwined with and constrained by a complex 
political order of personalised and patronage politics, cronyism, power absolutism, 
kinship ties and absence of experience in practising a formal state system. In this 
cultural and social atmosphere, legitimacy and political tolerance are difficult to re-
establish, and there is little room for those who are politically disconnected and/or 
“losers” in the democratic process. The historical trajectory plays an important role 
in Cambodia’s political development—the country has a legacy of civil war, no 
experience of peaceful transformation of regimes, a tradition of centralised 
administration and a lack of professional and well-functioning state institutions. 
Since the inception of democracy in the early 1990s by the UN-led intervention, 
with various development interventions by international agencies, Cambodia has 
experienced “local” democratic decentralisation, and this was considered seriously 
by the Cambodian government in 2002. 
I will therefore empirically explore the case of decentralisation during the 
first mandate of the elected commune councils, focusing on three concepts: 
                                                
9 It is a deeper reform at the district, city, provincial and municipal level. The fundamental purpose 
of the reform is to have a unified administration at the sub-national level and create elected 
councils at those levels. However, those councils are not elected directly like the commune 
councils but indirectly by the commune councillors. 
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responsiveness, accountability and devolution of power, which will be presented in 
three separate chapters (V, VI and VII). In Chapter IV, I will examine the general 
processes of decentralisation based on empirical findings. 
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PART 2 
 
 
Part 2 consists of Chapters IV, V, VI and VII. These four chapters will present and 
discuss the empirical findings on the current decentralisation reform of commune 
councils from 2002 (the follow-up field information after 2007 will be used for up-
to-date information on decentralisation reform in Cambodia). Given that 
decentralisation involves many key concepts, the thesis selected three main ideas, 
as defined in Chapters I & II. Chapter IV will discuss the general factors affecting 
emerging trends in decentralisation, while responsiveness will be discussed in 
Chapter V, accountability in Chapter VI and devolution of power in Chapter VII. 
Before discussing the empirical findings, the methodological approach for data 
collection will be described. The research method was addressed in Chapter I, and 
the purpose of discussing the methodological framework again is to describe 
detailed field methods applied, for example, an ethnological characterisation that I 
conducted in the field.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FACTORS OF DECENTRALISATION 
 
The reform of the Royal Government of Cambodia is based on democratic 
participation via national and local elections. Experiences of 
decentralisation and deconcentration reforms of the first mandate have 
brought up three lessons learnt for Cambodia’s reconstruction: firstly, 
decentralisation has contributed by enhancing democratic development; in 
particular it has introduced the multiparty system and ensured political 
stability. Secondly, decentralisation has contributed by revitalising social 
capital and political capital for Cambodian society; social capital is focused 
on the relationship between citizens at local level and political capital 
bridges the gap between citizens and state institutions. Thirdly, 
decentralisation has brought in a successful process of poverty alleviation 
and community development. (H.E. Sar Kheng, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of the Interior, at the launching of the Organic Law, Phnom Penh, 
28 January 2009) 
 
According to the remarks above, the RGC is optimistic about the results of 
the first mandate of decentralisation, 2002–2007. This statement may, however, 
deserve a closer scrutiny. In order to understand the initial development of 
decentralisation in Cambodia, this chapter will illuminate the achievements and 
constraints of the decentralisation by the RGC. The chapter is divided into three 
parts. Firstly, it will present commune councillors’ perceptions of democratic 
leadership of decentralisation and of central–local relations. Secondly, overall 
relations between voters and CCs and voters’ perceptions of democratic 
decentralisation will be discussed. Thirdly, the chapter will discuss the role and 
responsibilities of the village chief.10 To illuminate these three parts thoroughly, the 
quantitative survey data from74 CC members and 583 voters will be presented, 
followed by some detailed anthropological discussions. 
Commune councillors’ perceptions of democratic decentralisation 
This section begins by presenting the general profiles of the 74 commune 
councillors surveyed, including their age, gender and education. Then a 
presentation and discussion of their overall perceptions of democratic 
decentralisation follow.  
 
 
                                                
10 Village chiefs arguably play a very important role in decentralisation reform, because they serve 
as gatekeepers between voters and commune councillors in terms of administration, political party 
liaison and security. They channel information, mobilise people for various activities, liaise 
between villagers and commune councillors and are responsible for administration. 
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Figure 4.1: Ages of the 74 CC members 
 
 
 
Age provides status in Cambodia, and seniority is an important factor for 
taking on certain roles in society. Older people are both more respected and more 
easily forgiven than younger people. The age of CC members in this survey ranged 
from 38 to 69 years. Of 74 CCs members, about 53 percent were aged from 50 to 
60 years, 23 percent from 60 to 69 years old and 24 percent from 38 to 49 years. 
Hence, about 80 percent of the 74 CC members were over 50 years old. These 
people have been exposed to and have experienced numerous political regimes: the 
monarchy of Sihanouk’s time in the 1960s, the Cambodian republic of General Lon 
Nol, the Khmer Rouge, the Russian-style communism of the 1980s and the current 
system. Most people of these generations have experienced military service, with 
all its violence and the associated experiences. A CC member in Battambang offers 
his view: 
Both leaders and people in my generation are deeply used to many political 
regimes and traditional practices. We are old, so it is not that easy to change 
to the new process that is being implemented now, for example 
decentralisation (CC member, Battambang, 11 May 2007).  
 
Figure 4.2: Number of male and female councillors among 74 CC members 
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The number of women in commune councils is limited; 89 percent of CC 
members included in this study were male and 11 percent female.  
 
Figure 4.3: Education of 74 CC members interviewed 
 
 
The ability of CC members to perform their tasks relies on their professional 
capacity (educational level/capacity). This is often regarded as a bottleneck in 
Cambodia, and in rural areas it is occasionally acute. In our sample, 17 percent of 
the 74 CC members had spent 3–4 years in school, 37percent had spent 5–6 years, 
20 percent 7–8 years, 22 percent 9–10 years and 4 percent had completed high 
school. There were two primary sources of education: public schools and Buddhist 
temples (studying in the wat with monks). Most commune councillors aged 55 and 
above had studied in Buddhist temples in the 1950s–60s. In some cases, with this 
limited schooling, they lack the capacity to interpret laws and regulations. A former 
commune chief in Battambang describes the educational capacity of people in his 
age group: 
People in my generation obtained their education from the Buddhist temple. 
Most CC members have only completed five to seven years’ education in 
public schools. It is normal for them to be working and learning at the same 
time. Plus, the older generation seems to combine traditional practices or 
norms with formal state systems for their daily commune work (former CC 
chief, Battambang, 27 April 2006). 
From this, we can see that most local leaders possess very limited education, 
and learn through doing and combining traditional practices and work experience. 
Turning to the reform as such, let us first contextualise this historically. 
The overall view among CC members is that the current decentralised 
system is quite different from the previous systems they had experienced. CC 
members’ view of decentralisation was that it had brought improvements and 
changes to communities. The survey data show that 99 percent of the CC members 
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believed that the current system of decentralised commune councils is different 
from the systems of previous regimes. Overwhelmingly, this figure, including CC 
members from opposition parties, revealed widespread agreement that the 
leadership system of the commune council is vastly different from that of previous 
regimes. 
 
Figure 4.4: Is the current democratic decentralisation different from previous systems?
(74 CC members questioned) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The major differences the CC members observed were that the current CC 
leadership was acting according to bottom-up principles (35 percent), that CCs use 
a multiparty system (34 percent), that there were many elected councillors from 
different political parties working together in each council (18 percent) and that 
voters are starting to be aware of decentralisation (7 percent). As discussed above, 
most CC members have experience with different political regimes—providing a 
good basis for comparison—in particular the centralised system of the 1980s, 
which was very different from the current decentralisation system. 
 
Figure 4.5: How is the current democratic decentralisation primarily different from the 
previous system? (74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
The main purpose of this question was to learn the perception of CC 
members on the political leadership system (power), because most commune 
councillors have experienced many political regimes. The majority of CC members 
recognised that in the new system, the way that CC members exercise power is 
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distinctly different from that in previous regimes. This is reflected in the survey, 
which shows that an overwhelming 93 percent of CC members thought that the 
way local leaders exercise power had been changed by decentralisation and from 
other political systems they had experienced.  
 
Figure 4.6: Is the way CC members now exercise power different from previous systems? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CC members felt that since the commune election in 2002, interaction 
between CC members and civil society organisations has increased, especially in 
connection with community development. The survey found that 62 percent 
thought that interaction had increased, 12 percent thought it had decreased, 24 
percent thought it had remained the same, and 2 percent did not know. Of the CC 
members surveyed, 62 percent thought that participation with local authorities was 
increasing. 
 
Figure 4.7: Councillors’ view of civil society participation since 2002 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
Moreover, 61 percent of the CC members thought that the main challenge in 
implementing decentralisation was the lack of financial resources to meet the 
people’s demands.15percent thought that the main challenge was that people did 
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not understand decentralisation, and about 22 percent thought the main challenge 
was that commune councils are not permitted to generate local revenue or create 
sources of revenue. These issues will be explained throughout this chapter and 
further in Chapters VI and VII. An open-ended question asked respondents to 
express their own experiences of the challenges they are facing in implementing 
decentralisation. 
 
Figure 4.8: Major challenge CCs face in implementing decentralisation 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
 
From the in-depth interviews with CC members, it is evident that there is a 
general perception that commune administration and leadership styles have 
improved since the 2002 commune elections, having become less centralised, more 
downwardly accountable to voters and less bureaucratic. Besides the overall 
changes, improvement at the commune level could be observed in the form of local 
infrastructure (paved roads, bridges, irrigation structures, schools etc) financed 
through the Commune Sangkat Fund (CSF). Many CC members from different 
political parties recognised two primary factors emerging from commune council 
reform. Having elected CC members based on a multiparty system in which the 
leadership arises from bottom-up decision making, villagers are less afraid of the 
local authorities (the CC members), and local leaders are listening more to people 
than in the previous regimes. As a group of commune councillors explained: 
Leadership of the commune has changed a lot. As commune councillors, we 
must listen to people before making any decision. Before the election in 
2002, the commune authority just used to command; now the leadership 
style is bottom up, and we cannot hide anything from villagers (group of 
commune councillors, Kampot province, 28 March 2006).  
The change of attitudes among local leaders (CC members, village chiefs and 
police), which is recognised by the majority of CC members, is said to have been 
Little funding 
from central 
government 
61% 
People don’t 
understand  
15% 
CCs can't 
mobilize 
resources 
11% 
No given power 
to generate local 
revenues 
11% 
Others 
2% 
87 
achieved through the local elections. Many CC members said that within the 
decentralised system, leaders need to be gentler in dealing with people. This is 
particularly the case when people ask for something and the CC members are unable 
to respond: they must clearly explain the reason. Given that people and leaders have 
been exposed to a variety of political regimes, CC members are able to make 
comparisons with previous political regimes in terms of leadership styles and general 
attitudes. A commune council chief of the same commune elaborated this nicely: 
Decentralisation is a big change for the local community if we compare it to 
the previous regimes. The relationship between the leaders and citizens is 
much closer; authorities share information with people. The leadership style 
is less top down, but we are using the bottom-up approach by listening to the 
majority of people before making decisions (commune chief, Kampot, 30 
March 2006). 
Local leaders see that decentralisation has changed the leadership style of 
political parties to be more responsive and accountable to citizens. A political 
activist from the ruling party expresses his view: 
The decentralisation reform has made political parties change their 
leadership style. Each political party must listen to the demands of people, 
and political candidates have to be popular in the community; otherwise 
they cannot win election. I observe that since the commune election, local 
leaders are more compliant with the law than in the past (political activist, 
Kratie province, 17 June 2010). 
CC members feel that decentralisation has introduced a less complex 
bureaucracy, in which power is less personalised. It has a more bottom-up 
approach, and has led to the development of local infrastructure in the community. 
A commune chief in Battambang province illustrates this belief: 
The advance of decentralisation has introduced many good things, such as 
reducing heavy bureaucracy at the local level by improving the 
administration of the commune councils, making it very systematic. Power 
does not rest only with individuals but is more participatory. Development 
and improvement of infrastructure, cultivating a bottom-up approach and 
development planning have been improved. People from different political 
parties can work together with few problems. And confidence is built—
people are more interactive with authorities, which reduces the fear of 
authority (a commune chief, Battambang province, 27 April 2006).  
Commune councillors viewed decentralisation as influential in creating local 
political competition and pluralism. A group of commune councillors expressed this: 
The good thing about decentralisation reform is that there are many political 
parties in the commune competing with each other for positions, forcing 
them to be more accountable and more committed for people. If those 
political parties are not committed, they are not elected (Group of commune 
councillors, Takeo province, 24 June 2010).  
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There are still obstacles to be addressed. Constraints on the implementation 
of decentralisation, many CC members believe (going beyond the cruder statement 
on challenges above) are similarly caused by lack of devolution of power and 
responsibilities from line agencies, and the withholding of the power to generate 
local revenue. Lack of financial resources means that CCs are unable to be 
responsive to voters. These challenges were an on going issue during the course of 
this research. A commune chief described the complicated context: 
Local authorities are facing a lot of difficulties in terms of responsiveness to 
the people’s needs, accountability and mobilisation of people for different 
activities. It is difficult to explain laws and regulations to people—the only 
way is to keep explaining and to be patient. I think people do not like to 
interact with authorities. They lack trust and are always pessimistic about 
authorities because of the scars of the past [trauma]. Another issue is 
political competition: people are very prone to political manipulation by 
different parties that keep spreading rumours about authorities, for example 
on the selection of the village chief. They never give any credit to the 
authorities for their performance (commune chief, Kratie province, 29 
September 2006). 
After many years of decentralisation, a group of commune councillors 
expressed their mixed views of it: 
Decentralisation has a good impact in changing the attitude of leaders in the 
government and in the political party. However, the real leadership control 
of the commune councils remains with the political party, and only a few 
people in the party are taking the lead (group of commune councillors, 
Kompong Cham province, 28 July 2010). 
Although decentralisation has been implemented for only a short time, we 
have seen that CC members are optimistic about the outcomes in terms of 
infrastructure and overcoming the lack of trust between CC members and voters. 
Nevertheless, some emerging constraints also appear to be prevalent among CC 
members’ perceptions. A group discussion of CC members, a commune councillor 
complained: 
Besides the positive outcomes of decentralisation, the lack of decision-
making power poses many constraints. We face a lot of problems such as 
land conflicts, exploitation of natural resources by powerful people, lack of 
resources to meet peoples’ needs, no clear lines of responsibility between 
different institutions and people’s limited awareness of decentralisation (a 
group of CC members, Kampot, 29 March 2006). 
As indicated in the quantitative data as well as in the in-depth qualitative 
interviews, CC members’ perceptions of decentralisation are that it has brought two 
basic changes to communities. Leadership styles have moved towards a 
participatory and bottom-up approach, and the commune councils, with limited 
budgets from the central government, have been able to respond to voters’ needs, 
albeit only in the form of small-scale infrastructure improvements.  
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After discussing CC members’ perceptions of democratic decentralisation, 
the following is a summary of key findings: 
• The majority of CC members are above 50 years old. People of this 
generation have been exposed to many authoritarian political regimes, 
which make it confusing and difficult for them to adapt to the new system 
(decentralisation). CC members do not have sufficient education to 
analyse the laws and regulations from the central government because the 
majority of them received only primary school education or are just able 
to read and write. Some CCs members said that this is part of the capacity 
challenge. 
• Almost all CC members recognise that the democratic decentralisation 
currently being implemented is different from the leadership styles that 
they have experienced in previous political regimes. Democratic 
decentralisation has introduced new leadership practices, such as the 
bottom-up approach and the multiparty system in the commune council, 
and has also increased people’s participation and engagement with local 
authorities. Many CCs interviewed said that exposure to so many political 
regimes and hardships might make it difficult for them to adapt to the 
new democratic decentralisation. From observation, these generations of 
people are also ingrained with different traditional and cultural practices, 
which are sometimes not flexible or adaptable to the new reform. 
• CC members agree that the way they exercise power is different from that 
in previous systems, which consisted of centralised and personalised 
power even though they also had a participatory element. 
• The majority of CC members feel that there is more engagement than 
before between commune councils and civil society organisations and 
local groups.11 
• CC members face challenges including lack of funding, having no power 
to collect local revenue and the fact that decentralisation is new for the 
people.  
The following section will examine voters’ perceptions of democratic 
decentralisation along similar themes.  
Voters’ perceptions of democratic decentralisation 
The social atmosphere in this commune at the moment is generally better 
than in previous regimes. Commune councillors are elected directly by 
citizens. In the past, commune authorities were appointed by the communist 
central government, and most of them were militia. The responsibility of 
commune authorities was to conscript young men for military service and K-
                                                
11 It might be that CC members’ statements are biased, because they need to show that they have 
good relations with civil society organisations. However, from general observation and my chats 
with many CC chiefs, most CCs do want to have good relationships with NGOs because most 
NGOs are engaged in rural development activities. 
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5.12 Nowadays, people are the owners of power because they have the right 
to elect their leaders. There is no more pressure from authorities, but people 
are still fearful of the authorities because people have been dominated by 
harsh regimes for many decades. Authorities still have a critical role, and 
people cannot avoid authorities. If you challenge authorities, they might take 
revenge on you in the future by not providing services or authorising 
paperwork or whatever you need from them. People must be patient or 
ignore the conduct of authorities (tveu min deung min leou). The system of 
leadership is still based on patronage ties (tam ksea). Real leadership 
remains personalised power. Leadership is based on two different systems: 
rational state law and traditional norms. Both systems are very important. 
Sometimes if you abide too closely to the state’s laws, you are not popular or 
recognised by the majority of people in your community. Leaders need to 
keep a balance between the two systems (achar in a Buddhist temple, 
Battambang province, 11 May 2007).13 
The aim of this part is to discuss voters’ perceptions of democratic 
decentralisation, including leadership, the multiparty system, interaction between 
voters and elected CCs, CC decision-making, voices of voters and the atmosphere 
in the commune after the commune elections. 
According to the achar above, changes in the commune leadership are 
perceived to have led to more democratic and participatory practices. It seems that 
voters have compared the positive present with the conditions during previous 
authoritarian regimes that they have experienced over a number of decades. People 
also seem sceptical about and fearful of authorities, probably because of their 
memories. This sub-chapter will describe the quantitative and qualitative findings 
on voters’ overall perceptions of decentralisation.  
CC members’ perceptions of decentralisation are that it has created an 
awareness among people of their rights and emboldened them to make demands to 
which CC members must respond. The following are some of the results of the 
quantitative survey of 583 voters’ perceptions of the performances of CC members 
and decentralisation.  
Of the respondents, 52 percent were male and 48 percent female. The age of 
respondents ranged from 20 to 78 years (the voting age is 18 years). The level of 
education among people aged 25–50 years in rural areas is relatively low.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 This was the name of a national campaign in 1984 to clear forest in order to prevent attacks from 
the Khmer Rouge. 
13 Laymen sometimes can give good analysis since they are mostly former public servants and the 
most educated people in the commune, with both knowledge of Buddhism and an understanding 
of the state system.  
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Figure 4.9: Education among voters (583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
21percent of respondents were illiterate, 47 percent had 1–3 years of 
schooling, and 32 percent had received 5–8 years of schooling. Almost 70 percent 
of the surveyed voters had thus received 3 years or less of schooling. This factor 
alone is likely to impede voters’ understanding of different regulations and laws of 
the reform process.  
 
Figure 4.10: Are CCs democratically elected? (583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
When asked whether the CC members were democratically elected, about 72 
percent of voters thought that they were. 6 percent thought they were not, and 22 
percent did not know. 
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Figure 4.11: Has the style of leadership changed since the commune elections in 2002? 
(583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
53 percent of the voters interviewed expressed the view that the leadership 
of communes had changed since the commune election in 2002. However, almost 
half of the respondents thought there had been no change in commune leadership, 
such as a more bottom-up approach, CC members being more approachable or the 
CC members listening to voters more. The results in figure 4.11 are similar to 
figure 4.10: 7 percent do not understand the democratic decentralisation because it 
is new for them; mixed and confused views persist. 
 
Figure 4.12: What do you think about having commune councillors from many political 
parties? (583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
 
The majority (77 percent) of voters believed that having CC members from 
different political parties is good (Fig. 4.12). The majority of voters thought that 
CC members were representing the voters well. About 90 percent of people 
surveyed thought that CC members’ main activities were representing voters or 
working hard for their villages. 
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Figure 4.13: Would you go to see the CC if you had a problem? 
(583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
CC members play a role as local leaders when the commune council is the 
place where people can seek assistance if they have a problem. 61percent of the 
surveyed voters would seek assistance from the CC members if they had a 
problem. However, 39 percent said they would not go directly to CC members. The 
primary reasons for visiting CCs are to obtain official certificates, to see voter list, 
to have a meeting and to solve conflicts (cf. TAF/CAS 2005). 
 
Figure 4.14: Do you know the name of the commune chief? 
(583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
The survey also records people’s familiarity with commune leaders. It 
suggests that it is normal in Cambodian society for people to pay more attention to 
the chief than to other CC members. About 90 percent of the 583 voters surveyed 
knew the name of their commune chief and 81 percent knew the names of some of 
the other commune councillors. It is common that all of the councillors are native 
to the commune, so this is not so surprising. The diversity of councillor 
representation is relatively high: about 60 percent of voters had councillors from 
their village, 34 percent did not, and 6 percent did not know.  
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Figure 4.15: Do you think CC members’ decisions affect  
your everyday activities? (583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
More than 70 percent of voters thought that the CCs’ decisions did not affect 
their daily lives. As previously noted, the survey indicates that CCs believed they 
had little direct impact on voters’ lives because they lacked sufficient financial 
resources to respond to the needs of voters. 
Voters mostly think that the atmosphere in the village has become more 
harmonious than at the time of the UNTAC election in 1993. About 53 percent of 
voter respondents thought that the situation in the villages had become more secure 
due to the end of the civil war and with a peaceful environment. According to a 
TAF/CAS 2005 survey, 95 percent of citizens and councillors are generally 
optimistic about the direction of the country after the commune elections in 2002. 
 
Figure 4.16: Do you think the atmosphere in the village is more harmonious than  
at the time of the UNTAC elections in 1993? (583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
Most voters are not afraid to express their opinions to CCs. In the survey, 
about 78 percent of voters stated that people were not afraid, while only 22 percent 
felt that people are afraid to express their opinions to CCs (Figure 4.17). 
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Figure 4.17: Are people afraid to voice their opinions to CCs? 
(583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
Most voters interviewed believed that they now have more bargaining power 
with the authorities, presumably because now the leaders are elected by citizens. 
The majority of voters recognise that CCs are democratically elected. For most 
people this was the first time in their lives that they had experienced the chance to 
elect their local leaders directly. The quantitative data above indicate that voters are 
generally optimistic about the commune councils’ performance and the increased 
interaction that is now possible with CC members. 
In-depth interviews with voters largely provide confirmation of the above 
data. People recognise generally that CC members are democratically elected 
through competition between different political parties. A female villager 
expressed her view on the performance of the CC members and election thus: 
Most people’s awareness about the election is better than before because 
people have experienced many elections since the UNTAC elections of 1993. 
The commune election is fairly good because we have a chance to choose our 
leaders in the commune directly. We also have experience of living under 
different political regimes so that we see some changes in the commune 
compared to the past (female villager, Siem Reap province, April 2006).  
Some people recognised changes in the commune leadership since the 
commune election in 2002, in particular towards less authoritarian and more 
participatory bottom-up approaches. The majority of voters believed that the 
leadership of the commune had changed, and they agreed that having councillors 
from different political parties was good for checks and balances of power in the 
commune office. People’s perceptions of leadership change are built on their 
experiences of previous regimes. A village elder observed the current leadership 
situation in the commune: 
Yes!
22%!
No!
78%!
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I have some ideas about how to compare the local leadership system now 
[commune council] to previous regimes. The current commune council is 
similar to Sihanouk’s time (1960s), but the party list system right now is 
good, forcing each party to work hard and compete with each other as 
groups. If they do not work hard for the sake of the community, they will not 
be elected. The leaders cannot be authoritarian. Instead of using power 
aggressively, they must be humble and listen to the people. Otherwise they 
cannot gain popularity with samak thor (mutual and moral leadership). At 
the present time, CCs consist of members from different political parties. 
They must compete with each other to gain support from citizens (village 
elder, Kompong Speu province, 3 April 2006). 
Similarly, a villager in Battambang province expressed his view that having 
elected councillors from different political parties is good and that they manage 
nevertheless to work as a team for the benefit of the commune: 
The commune councillors come from three political parties. They work as a 
team with very little controversy. All the CC members work hard for the sake 
of the community without discrimination even though they come from 
different parties (villager, Battambang province, 6 May 2007). 
Another villager in Siem Reap judged that the commune councillors are more 
interactive and impose their power on ordinary people less than before. He said: 
Since the commune election, the local authorities cannot force people to do 
what they want as they used to. The authorities use a more bottom-up 
approach and they are more interactive with villagers (villager, Siem Reap 
province, 24 April 2006).  
Despite the fact that it is difficult to mobilise people for meetings and to 
absorb ideas from them, and although the leadership structures are new for CC 
members, they are working hard to be transparent. Some villagers thought that the 
CC members are more accessible than previously. In particular, they had observed 
that leaders (at commune level and above) were working and interacting with 
people directly, which was seldom the case in the long-established centralised 
tradition of Cambodia. Voters were seeking assistance from CCs if they faced 
problems, and they felt confident about voicing their opinions to CCs directly. 
Voters repeatedly mentioned that most villagers were used to receiving meagre 
services from the authorities in the centralised system. Villagers were pleased to 
see their leaders pay attention and listen to them, even more so because leaders did 
not expect any material support from the villagers in return. Many voters agreed 
that since the commune election, there had been some infrastructure development 
outcomes from the CC members. An elderly person noted: 
Since we had the commune election, leaders in the commune office come down 
to work closely with villagers more often than they used to. Although there 
have not been many outcomes in terms of infrastructure provided by the 
commune councils, there have been some achievements of local infrastructure 
built by the commune council. As villagers, we are happy to see leaders care 
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for ordinary people and to see that they are doing some development work 
even if it is not much (village elder, Siem Reap province, 4 April 2006).  
The passage above reveals that people are optimistic about the current 
leadership of CC members in that leaders come to meet and speak with people 
directly, and people have seen CCs’ efforts towards local development, especially 
small-scale infrastructure. 
The following is a summary of the key findings of voters’ perceptions on 
democratic decentralisation: 
• The overwhelming majority of voters acknowledged that decentralisation 
has changed the leadership of CCs. 
• The majority recognise that CC members are democratically elected. 
• Only half of the voters agree that CC leadership style has changed since 
the implementation of decentralisation in 2002. However, people believe 
that having CC members from different political parties is good. 
• The majority of voters would seek assistance from CCs if they had a 
problem. However, the majority did not believe that CCs’ decision 
making would affect their daily lives. 
• The overwhelming majority are not afraid to voice their opinion to CCs. 
• Generally, voters observed that compared to the UNTAC election in 
1993, the commune elections were safe and peaceful because of security 
and the absence of civil war. Voters are optimistic about local leaders, 
believing that there is a change in attitude and leadership style. Voters are 
kept informed by CC members about different development schemes, and 
local leaders listen more to voters. Voters have seen the commune 
councils implement some small-scale infrastructure development projects 
in their communities. 
Up till now, I have been discussing the perceptions of commune councillors 
and voters on the process of decentralisation. Although decentralisation has been 
implemented for only a few years, the findings of this chapter reveal that the initial 
influence of decentralisation is opening space for people’s engagement with 
authority, democracy is introduced to local leaders (CCs and village chiefs), and 
local political structure is stated to be changing. However, I have not illustrated the 
roles and responsibilities of village chiefs, who play a critical role as intermediaries 
between CCs and voters. Below the thesis will describe the role and responsibilities 
of village chiefs. 
Role of village chiefs 
The Cambodian constitution does not include the village or hamlet (phum14) as an 
administrative structure. It is just a collection of a number of households. However, 
the village is a liaison between villagers and the commune councils. Although village 
                                                
14 This is a Sanskrit term, phumi, which means land or small location. 
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chiefs are on the lowest rung of the administrative ladder, they still play an important 
role in political leadership and administrative responsibilities (see the regulatory 
framework of the village chiefs by the Royal Government of Cambodia below).  
Village chiefs remain the gatekeepers for communities and in particular for 
the commune councils. The survey of 74 CC members indicates that 45 percent say 
village chiefs are the most effective in information dissemination. 50 percent of 
commune councillors think that the information flow is best via public meetings, 
but all of the public meetings were arranged by village chiefs. 
 
Figure 4.18: What is the most effective mechanism for disseminating information to 
villagers? (74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
The village structure has not changed much since the pre-war period, but is 
a continuation from the 1980s, when Cambodia was in the middle of civil war 
and in a communist system. Slocomb quotes a speech by H.E. Heng Samrin, who 
was Head of State during the time of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, on 
the nature of the village in 1979, when Cambodia had just emerged from the 
Khmer Rouge era. In it, he said: “Villages which do not yet have a state authority 
should organise to mobilise the masses to vote to choose people of distinction 
and sufficient good characteristics to be village chief and deputy chief” (Slocomb 
2004: 4). 
The size of a village varies, depending on different regional settings. A 
normal rural village ranges from 150 to 250 households (Rusten et al. 2004). 
Although, as stipulated in the regulatory framework by the Ministry of the Interior 
in 2006, village chiefs need to be elected by commune councils, most village chiefs 
have been working in the role since the 1980s. Though there is no formal or direct 
election of chiefs by villagers, the selection was normally based on the general 
opinion of respected elders, monks and possibly the will of the majority of 
villagers. However, according to recent observation of CCs, to be qualified as a 
village chief candidate, political party affiliation and commitment are the core 
requirements. 
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Regulatory Framework For the Selection and Replacement of Village Chiefs  
(Ministry of Interior, Royal Government of Cambodia) 
 
According to Articles 30 and 86 of the Law on Administrative Management of 
Communes/Sangkat and the sub-decree on the delegation of power and responsibility to 
commune/sangkat councillors of 1 March 2006 by the Ministry of the Interior, village 
chiefs shall be elected by commune/sangkat councillors. The selection process should be 
that each village has three candidates selected and agreed upon by all commune/sangkat 
councillors. To be a village chief, he or she shall be voted for by the majority of the 
commune/sangkat. Once he or she is elected as the village chief, he or she could suggest a 
person to be deputy village chief, another person to be an assistant to the village chief and 
other active members. The proposal must be submitted to the commune/sangkat council. 
 
Mandate and end-of-work term of the elected village chiefs: there is no specific mandate 
for a village chief, deputy or members, as they will not lose their position except in the case 
of death, becoming handicapped in an accident, resignation, conviction for a criminal 
offence, moving out of the village or having their employment terminated by the 
commune/sangkat council. The role and responsibility of the village chief is to be the 
representative for all citizens in the village, liaise between villagers and the 
commune/sangkat council, cooperate and assist the commune/sangkat council, be involved 
with local development and planning activities in the village and the commune/sangkat, 
report directly to the commune/sangkat council, implement tasks given by the 
commune/sangkat council, participate in commune/sangkat council monthly meetings, sign 
contracts on behalf of the village, arrange and disseminate information from the 
commune/sangkat to villagers via meetings and not to delegate authority or replacement 
without the approval from the Ministry of the Interior. 
 
(Unofficial translation) 
 
The criteria for selection are informal. Chiefs must be patient or humble 
(slod), popular, hold some formal education (be able to read and write), in their late 
40s or older and considerate (mostly male). Each political party tries to seek 
candidates for village chiefs based on the above qualifications.15 There is no 
official count of the old village chiefs who have been replaced.16 At the present 
time, the commune council needs to be informed and to approve when deciding if a 
village chief should be selected or replaced. 
For the selection, there have to be at least three candidates nominated, at 
least one of whom is preferably a woman. The voting of the council is by secret 
ballot among all the councillors (mostly from different political parties). The 
selected village chief then proposes to the council his candidates for assistants (i.e. 
                                                
15 This is from my interview in November 2010 with four commune council chiefs in Battambang, 
Kompong Cham, Takeo and Kratie. 
16 The estimatedis that about 30 per cent of village chiefs have been replaced bynew ones. 
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a deputy and an assistant; one of them must be a woman). The council votes on the 
selection of the village assistants by show of hands. However, since the CPP won 
more than 90 percent of the commune councils in the country, most of the newly 
elected village chiefs are from the CPP. 
In the legal framework, village chiefs are only a liaison between villagers 
and the commune authority and do not possess a great deal of decision-making 
power, most of which resides with the commune councillors. However, their actual 
power and responsibility are critical. A deputy commune chief from the opposition 
party (SRP) expressed his view on the role of village chiefs and the 
decentralisation process: 
The issue of village chiefs remains the same as before. It is a continuation 
from the previous regimes. All are from the ruling party, the CPP. Politically 
speaking, they have a direct link with the commune authority because they 
were recently elected by commune councillors. Village chiefs serve as the 
eyes and ears of the commune councillors, especially for the political party 
that they belong to. They even know exactly who or which villagers are in 
what political party. The commune council chief would not sign anything 
without approval from the village chiefs. All services and administrative 
responsibilities must be agreed upon by village chiefs (Deputy commune 
chief Battambang province, 6 May 2007). 
Most informants have reported or complained about village chiefs. In actual 
practice and in the everyday life of the village, the chiefs are indirectly powerful in 
areas such as administrative and political matters, security, information 
dissemination and development activities. Village chiefs possess administrative 
power over civil registration, licensing, selling property and other minor services. 
Although village chiefs do not have final power to approve anything, if, for 
example, a farmer wishes to sell a cow, he or she still needs to get the permission 
via the village chief first, then proceed to the commune chief. Also, to hold a 
ceremony, wedding or other miscellaneous activities, people must seek the 
approval of the village chief first, then the suggestion must be approved by the CC 
chief. Sales or property transactions also require recognition from the village chief 
in order to be approved by the commune chief. All of these administrative activities 
require villagers to make a minor payment (1,000–5,000 riels about US$0.2–1.2), 
but it is common that the village chief asks for considerably more. There is a belief 
and fear among villagers that they should not have sour relations with the village 
chief because, one way or another, people need his services.  
I feel positive towards my village chief. For example when I needed his 
favour, he helped me right away. After receiving several favours (services) 
without paying him sakun [informal fee of gratitude], I felt a bit guilty. I am 
afraid he will develop a bad attitude or feeling towards me, and if I need his 
favour another time, he will not do it for me. Therefore, it is better to pay 
him an extra fee or sakun each time I receive his help (female villager, 
Kratie province, 27 September 2006).  
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This demonstrates a rent-seeking tendency which is deeply rooted in 
Cambodian society. People feel that they need to reciprocate or pay respect to their 
leaders to build a good relationship with them.  
Commune councillors from the opposition party view the selection of village 
chiefs as just another means to legitimise and institutionalise village chiefs, most of 
whom come from the ruling party. A commune councillor from an opposition party 
expressed it thus:  
Only commune councillors vote in the village chief election. This is unjust 
for the smaller parties. For example, we have a total of 11 councillors in this 
commune—seven from the CPP, two from FUNCINPEC and two from the 
SRP. It is predictable that the CPP will definitely win the election. This is a 
good way to legitimise the CPP village chiefs. People do not have a choice 
in the selection of their village chiefs. Most of the village chiefs have been in 
their positions for too long. The hope is that each party would try to select 
the most qualified and popular candidates who would work for the 
community but not the party (commune councillor, Battambang province, 28 
April 2006) 
Many village chiefs knew all the individual families well and could identify 
the political party affiliation of every villager. However, village chiefs cannot 
force, but only trying to convince, villagers who are not in their party to vote for 
their party. But many villagers were still afraid of their village chiefs since they 
could be deliberately excluded from receiving development benefits or gifts from 
politicians. A village chief in Kompong Speu stated:  
As a village chief, I know the political affiliation of people in my village. We 
hold a monthly meeting for people who are members of my political party. 
The rest of them either belong to other parties or are independent. However, 
those affiliated with a political party show a different attitude towards 
authority. I just know the membership but I cannot ensure that they would 
vote for my party. People make judgments about leaders based on 
infrastructure outputs and gifts. Whoever can deliver will win the vote 
(village chief, Kompong Speu province, 5 April 2006). 
Empirical findings on the role of village chiefs in this study are that village 
chiefs play an equally or even more critical role than the CCs because they work 
directly with villagers, serving as the liaison between villagers and CCs and as 
protectors of villagers’ interests (cf. TAF/CAS 2005). Although the data show that 
the majority of villagers can access CCs directly and whenever they wish, villagers 
usually do not dare to bypass the village chiefs because people do not want to have 
a bad relationship with the village chief.  
The role of village chiefs is important for decentralisation and local 
democratisation. The village chiefs were selected by CCs in 2006.Although there 
are multiparty councils in the communes, the overwhelming majority of village 
chiefs are from the ruling CPP. There are many complaints that village chiefs are 
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ears and eyes for the CPP, loyal and accountable only to the party; this is affecting 
democratic decentralisation.  
Concluding remarks 
To summarise CC members’ perceptions: Firstly, decentralisation has 
changed leadership style from centralised towards a democratic multiparty system 
and a bottom-up approach. Secondly, decentralisation has shifted the way leaders 
exercise power from authoritarian control towards leadership that is participatory, 
accountable and interactive with civil society. Thirdly, decentralisation faces many 
challenges because the capacity and resources of CCs are not sufficient and 
understanding of democratic decentralisation is limited among CCs and voters.  
Voters’ perceptions of decentralisation are generally positive. Firstly, most 
voters interviewed believe that CC members are democratically elected and that the 
leadership of CCs has changed towards a pluralistic system. Secondly, voters trust 
the elected CCs, which consist of councillors from different political parties. 
Thirdly, voters feel safe and confident in voicing their opinions to leaders. 
Fourthly, the general atmosphere in the community is more harmonious, especially 
in terms of political stability and the lack of civil war. 
Finally, the village chief remains an essential figure in local politics and in 
villagers’ everyday lives. Village chiefs are still powerful because the 
overwhelming majority of CC chiefs and councillors and village chiefs belong to 
the ruling party. As discussed in Chapter III, these findings indicate that local 
politics is starting gradually to shift from a quasi-authoritarian toward a 
“democratic” rule-based process. 
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS ON RESPONSIVENESS17 
 
The effort being made by commune councillors to respond to villagers’ 
needs is fairly good, especially their achievements in improving local 
infrastructure. Since the commune election, the councillors have been 
working hard to get some projects for our community. We should be proud 
of their performance, unlike in the past, when we used to get almost nothing 
from the commune authority (head of village development committee, 
Kampot province, 30 March 2006).  
Having ascertained the general perceptions of decentralisation and 
deconcentration and their cornerstones, the primary purpose of this chapter is to 
scrutinise in depth the responsiveness of commune councils to electorates. 
Responsiveness here is defined as the elected commune councillors’ ability to 
respond to the electorate’s demands and to implement policies and deliver services, 
especially material outputs (cf. Chapter II). The chapter also focuses on the 
challenges being faced by CC members in terms of the lack of skills, the lack of 
financial resources, people’s perceptions of the CC members and the way demands 
are presented by citizens. In order to understand CCs’ responsiveness, therefore, 
we need to “unpack” both CC members’ perceptions—focusing on their ability to 
respond, take action and produce an output—and citizens’ perceptions of the same 
aspects. 
For decentralisation to be successful, the efficacy must be improved with 
which people’s demands for public goods are expressed. Arguably, locally elected 
officials18 are better placed to respond rapidly to local needs and more likely to be 
aware of local situations than remote national officials (Blunt & Turner 2005; 
Manor 1999). Demands by citizens are often not fully realised, and elected 
councillors’ responsiveness is typically constrained by their lack of capacity and 
resources, as few or no resources are allocated from central government to support 
local government Manor (1999). Responsiveness is sometimes inadequate due to 
petty corruption and the inadequate bureaucracy of sub-national government. The 
determining factor of the success of responsiveness relates to how demands are 
posed and how consistent they are with existing plans. Responsiveness as discussed 
by Yishai (1984) relies primarily on the ability of elected councillors to deliver 
                                                
17 In Cambodianresponsiveness is kar cleuy torb (answering to something/question/idea, action and 
ability, expecting something in terms of an answer, replying to something, explaining something 
or articulating in material outputs) or heap oeu peu (concerning something or worrying about 
something that has been happening). Responsiveness is linked to the question of responsiveness 
by whom and to whom. This term implies a reciprocal relationship between two sides and it has 
hierarchical connotations. The meaning of responsiveness in Cambodian is overlapped and mixed 
with the meaning of the term accountability. In Cambodian society, people find it easy to 
understand the term responsiveness but not the term accountability. 
18Village chiefs/leaders are even closer to villagers, but in Cambodia the village chiefs are just 
assistants to the commune councils and normally are loyal to the ruling party. 
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efficient outputs in terms of speed, quality (precision) and quantity (as was 
discussed in Chapter II). Another precondition of responsiveness is councillors’ 
willingness to listen to demands from electors. The recent assessment of 
Cambodian decentralisation by James Manor (2008) has emphasised the 
importance of responsiveness.  
To be responsive to citizens, Manor says, elected councils should meet three 
demands: speed, quantity and quality of responses (Manor 1999; 2008). First, the 
speed of responses usually increases with a local governance system (as compared 
to a central one) because elected councils at lower levels have a position from 
which to react quickly to problems and pleas that arise from ordinary people. 
Second, the quantity of responsiveness may also increase because those councils 
tend to stress many small projects rather than the much smaller number of large 
projects that higher level authorities favour. Third, the quality of responses 
improves if by quality we mean the degree to which responses conform to the 
preferences of ordinary people (Manor 2008: 6).  
Drawing from the above ideas, some empirical research questions linked to 
responsiveness can be posited: Are commune councillors able to be responsive to 
demands from their local constituencies? (After the commune councils were 
elected there was high expectation from citizens that elected CCs would be able to 
respond to people’s needs.) What are the constraints faced by the CC members in 
being responsive to citizens? What mechanisms do CC members use to be 
responsive to citizens? Following on from these queries and in line with the 
theoretical and methodological design outlined above, this chapter is divided into 
two sections. 
• The purpose of the first section is to assess commune councillors’ 
perceptions of responsiveness in terms of: (a) the ability of councillors to 
understand the local situation, (b) the nature of demands by citizens, (c) 
outputs of responsiveness, (d) constraints on responsiveness and (e) CC 
mechanisms to handle issues of unresponsiveness to citizens. Each of 
these aspects will be explained by presenting the survey data, followed by 
findings from the in-depth interviews. 
• The second section seeks to explore citizens’ perceptions of the 
responsiveness of the commune councils in terms of: (a) CCs’ 
responsiveness with regard to general performance and ability to 
understand the local situation, (b) the nature of demands by citizens and 
(c) outputs of responsiveness. Each of these aspects will be explained by 
presenting the survey data, followed by observations from the in-depth 
interviews (people do not have constraints and mechanisms to handle 
responsiveness because they are the recipients of this process, so for the 
section on citizens’ perceptions, the discussion of these two aspects is not 
necessary).  
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Commune councillors’ perceptions of their own responsiveness 
Commune councillors’ responsiveness to their electors depends, among other 
things, on their ability to understand the local situation, which will be discussed in 
the following section. Before discussing CCs’ perceptions of their own 
responsiveness, there are a couple of points to be contextualised. Commune 
planning involves a five-year commune development plan (CDP), which is created 
after the council is formed. A CDP is a master plan of one mandate of commune 
councils. When preparing a CDP, strategies for local development, physical 
infrastructure and non-physical infrastructure to respond to prioritised needs of 
citizens must be considered. There are two meetings to gather information for the 
CDP, a village meeting in which villagers meet with commune councillors to voice 
their demands, and the commune council meeting in which councillors, village 
chiefs and old respected people decide on the priorities. The mandate of CCs in 
responding to people’s needs is to make use of the Commune Sangkat Fund (CSF) 
which is about US$15,000 per year allocated by the central government to each 
commune. There are different sources of funding such as political parties, NGOs 
and contribution from generous people (mostly politicians from the CPP).  
CC members’ ability to understand the local situation 
The effectiveness and outcome of CC members’ responses to the needs of citizens 
depend on the extent to which CC members are able to understand the overall 
situation in their communities, such as community preferences. Below are some of 
the survey results which gauge the views of 74 CC members and their confidence 
in their own understanding of local situations. 
 
Figure 5.1: Do you have enough knowledge to understand the feelings of  
people in your commune in order to respond accordingly to their needs? 
 
 
Approximately 96 percent (Figure 5.1) were confident and considered 
themselves to have enough knowledge to understand the needs of the people in 
their commune, while only 4 percent considered that they were not sure whether 
they had sufficient knowledge to understand the local situation. This is an 
overwhelming display of confidence. 
 
Not sure 
4% 
Yes 
96% 
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The in-depth interviews with many of the commune chiefs and council 
members also showed that they are confident, that they think that they understand 
the community milieu well, especially in terms of villagers’ living conditions and 
the kind of infrastructure and other services required. It became evident that the 
primary obstacles to the CC members’ ability to go further in promoting 
development are the lack of funding from central government and limits to 
people’s awareness that CCs should be responsive. A commune council chief in 
Battambang described this: 
We know the situation well enough, but we lack the funding to make all the 
demands happen. We cannot just stay quiet without responding to their 
wishes; we must explain to them the reason for not being able to respond. 
Otherwise people will be angry with us and will not participate with the 
commune council in the future. We cannot keep our promises to them. We 
just keep proposing their demands to the relevant agencies in the provincial 
and national governments (CC member, Battambang province, 5 May 2007). 
Many CC members said that they are confident of understanding the general 
situation in their community because they interact closely with people on various 
occasions such as ceremonies, informal chats and other activities in the commune. 
Since the ability of the CC members to respond to people’s needs is limited, CC 
members sometimes avoid talking about responsiveness. Although the demands 
will always exceed the funding available to the CCs, it is nevertheless critical to 
listen to what people need and to put all of their needs on the commune councils’ 
development planning agenda. A commune chief in Kompong Speu explained: 
Since the commune election, all of the CC members from different political 
parties have been working together as a team [making all efforts towards 
being responsive to villagers]. We all understand the situation in the 
commune well because it is not that large and people here know each other 
well as friends and distant relatives. We grew up in the same commune. We 
pay a lot of attention to the community, listening to their demands (commune 
chief, Kompong Speu province, 3 April 2006). 
It appears that CC members have a good understanding of their community 
through various means and, more importantly, aspire to assist the community.  
Simultaneously, CC members also face many problems in understanding 
what people’s needs are because of the social and traditional norm that villagers are 
cautious about interacting with the authorities. A village chief in Kratie province 
expressed his personal feeling: 
I think the CC members and village officials find it difficult to understand 
people’s perceptions. Viewed from my own experience, there are at least two 
main reasons: firstly, villagers do not like to express their ideas frankly with 
authorities. This is a social norm in our community. And secondly, people 
are not curious to understand the agenda and what is going on in the 
commune office, so the relationship is blurred (village chief, Kratie 
province, 30 September 2006). 
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However, as Figure 5.2shows, different factors shape CCs’ ability to respond 
to people’s needs, in particular in terms of material outputs. About 70 percent of 
CC members thought that to be responsive to citizens they needed enough funding, 
and only 16 percent thought that the capacity of CC members was key. 
 
Figure 5.2: What are the factors that make CC members able to respond  
to citizens’ demands? 
 
 
A commune chief explained the difficulty in responding to the needs of 
citizens: 
I think all the CC members in this commune do know well what people want 
because we work and live in the same community. The problem is we cannot 
respond to their needs because there are many demands which exceed the 
availability of our resources, and the CC receives only a meagre amount of 
financial support from the national government (commune council chief, 
Battambang province, 4 May 2007). 
These empirical results, illustrating the claimed ability of CC members to 
understand the local situation, suggest they do not believe they face any major 
difficulties except other factors such as the lack of funding that would enable them 
to be responsive to citizens. Another factor identified above is that people engage 
in self-censorship, i.e. are reluctant to interact with authorities, aspects of which we 
will further address below.  
The nature of demands from citizens: views of CC members 
CCs’ responsiveness to people’s needs also depends on people’s interest in 
participating in different local development activities. As mentioned in Chapter II, 
Cambodians are still traditionally cautious and remain in a state of self-censorship 
in terms of social interaction with the authorities. Authorities are considered as 
parents (doch me ov) (cf. Thon et al. 2010) with overall responsibility for their 
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children, i.e. the citizens. This subsection will examine CC members’ views on the 
nature of citizens’ demands on CCs. 
 
Figure 5.3: Are the demands from citizens suited to the policy of the commune 
development plan? 
 
 
Figure 5.3 shows that 85 percent of CC members thought that people’s 
demands were well in line with the commune development plan, while 15 percent 
thought that the demands were not. 
 
Figure 5.4: How active are citizens in CC development planning? 
 
 
According to the survey (Figure 5.4), 58 percent of CC members thought 
that citizens were fairly active in participating in the design of the commune 
development plan and 30 percent thought they were strongly active. 
Many CC members reported that the fact that many projects are proposed 
individually rather than collectively is a challenge: i.e. many individual demands 
concern food, fertiliser, cash and other gifts. However, the commune development 
plan is designed according to the meagre funding from the Commune Sangkat 
Fund and mostly aims at small-scale infrastructure of a public nature such as paved 
roads, irrigation, wells and school maintenance. A former village chief and current 
CC member in Battambang described this: 
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It is a real challenge for the CC members to be responsive to the people’s 
wants since there are many people in the commune; each individual has 
different interests from the authorities. The demands from villagers are 
based on individual interests, rather than on collectively representing the 
community’s needs. This is impossible for the CC members to respond to 
because the CC members’ work is based on planning and is prioritised 
according to the existing annual budget. Besides infrastructure, demands 
from the people are in the form of rice, cash, fertiliser and gifts from 
politicians—sometimes such gift giving is seen as vote buying. Local 
contributions are difficult to collect because people are poor and do not like 
to contribute anything to the authorities. The best way to collect local 
contributions is to approach Cambodian expatriates [Cambodian diasporas] 
when they come to visit their birthplace (CC member, Battambang province, 
10 May 2007).  
A female commune councillor who is actively engaged with citizens 
expressed a similar view on the nature of demands: 
Sometimes it is difficult to respond to citizens’ needs since many of them 
have made different requests based on their personal wishes. The reason 
that citizens request too many things individually is that they do not 
understand the CC fund availability and the requirements of planning, for 
example, that CCs face (female CC member, Kratie province, 30 
September2006). 
Given that the CC members have limited funds allocated via the CSF, hardly 
any individual demands are responded to by CC members, occasionally causing 
frustration and resentment. A commune council chief in Battambang explained: 
The commune council cannot please everyone because there are too many 
requests from villagers and the commune council has a meagre and limited 
budget every year, so not all demands are met (27 April 2007).  
The relative lack of responsiveness from the elected CC members has 
allowed political parties and politicians to fill the gap, as these individuals or 
groups can afford to meet some of the individual demands. This, however, is also 
for the purpose of political gain. Political parties could respond to other needs, such 
as paved roads, irrigation systems, school buildings, food and even cash. These 
interventions are commonly called gifts (omnoy) and are reciprocated with political 
loyalty, partly in the form of votes.  
In all the five communes covered in this study, the CPP is the ruling and 
most resource-rich party, with which rich business people would like to have 
affiliations and for which, in return, they get political support (patronage politics). 
This undermines democratic principles because other parties do not have to the 
same opportunities to gain support, especially during election time. The lack of a 
clear division of responsibilities between political parties and elected councils can 
be seen to undermine the accountability process (see Chapter VI). A commune 
councillor from the opposition party noted: 
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As the opposition party in the commune council, we suffer from the issue of 
responsiveness: people do not understand the source of money that the CC 
members have or how the politicians generate money. As the opposition, we 
are perceived by people as being unable to perform well in response to the 
people’s needs. I think the revenues of the commune councils must be 
institutionalised; now, there is confusion between state and political party 
funding. We have good ideas but lack resources and power to properly carry 
out our responsibilities as elected councillors (first deputy, Battambang 
province, 6 May 2007).  
He continued: 
Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of commune councillors 
think that the key issue to making CCs responsive is funding, there are many 
other factors that would increase responsiveness, such as the ability of CCs 
to attract funding and projects from different sources, and their ability to 
mobilise people for the development of the community. 
Citizens seem to be active in formulating and expressing their needs in the 
commune development plan because they expect that their demands will be met. 
However, at the end of the day, CCs do not meet most of the demands due to their 
limited funds. The councillors from the opposition complain that the ruling party is 
the only party able to respond to most of the demands from citizens, which is 
reciprocated by citizens, i.e. vote buying. 
CC members’ views on their responsiveness: speed, quantity and quality 
As outlined in Chapter II, responsiveness can be measured according to speed, 
quantity and quality. This section presents first the quantitative data on these three 
indicators and then the information from the in-depth interviews with CC members. 
 
Figure 5.5: How do you rate the CC’s responsiveness to citizens’ demands  
in terms of speed? 
 
 
Speed: the survey indicates that 73 percent of councillors were not satisfied 
with the speed of CC members’ response to citizens’ demands, while 27 percent 
thought that the speed was acceptable. The latter should be compared with the 
performance of commune authorities before the 2002 election, when the commune 
did not respond well to people’s needs (cf. Slocomb 2004; cf. Öjendal & Kim 
2011).  
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Figure 5.6: How do you rate the CC’s responsiveness to citizens’ demands in terms of 
quantity? 
 
 
Quantity: CC members stated their views that if people were to ask for ten 
projects, one project was likely to be responded to, if they were lucky. 26percent of 
the CC members felt satisfied with the quantity of responsiveness in relation to the 
number of demands made by citizens, while 74 percent felt that they did not 
respond enough to citizens’ requests. 
 
Figure 5.7: How do you rate the CC’s responsiveness  
to citizens’ demands in terms of quality? 
 
 
Quality: The majority of CC members seem to be satisfied with the quality 
of infrastructure. The CC members have the right to inspect infrastructure projects 
completed by construction companies and the right to accept or reject projects on 
that basis. Among the CC members surveyed, 80 percent were satisfied with the 
quality of the infrastructure and about 20 percent dissatisfied.  
After talking with many CC members about the challenges to the speed, 
quantity and quality of their responses to citizens, it appears that many CC 
members think that responsiveness is difficult to deliver according to people’s 
wishes because there are so many demands. As a group of CC members 
expressed it: 
Some people are pleased with the CC members because they got what they 
asked for. But people whose villages have received nothing are complaining 
and envious. Citizens do know that they cannot expect to get the projects that 
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they want within the time and in the exact amount that they would like, but 
they keep on asking the CC members. For example, if they were to ask for 10 
projects, they may get one, but only if they are lucky. Anyway, as CC 
members we must tell them the truth that not all the villages can get 
everything at the same time. They have to wait and take turns. We cannot 
make everyone happy (group of CC members, Siem Reap province, 22 April 
2007). 
The in-depth interviews with the CC members also indicate that commune 
councils are facing difficulties in responding to the needs of people promptly. 
Usually the response is too late for the people to see the outcome because it takes a 
long time for CCs to realise demands from the people and sometimes the demands 
are not met. However, many CC members said that a tardy response was 
acceptable and much better than not getting a project done at all. It seems that 
citizens agree and remain reasonably satisfied (see below) possibly because they 
are comparing CC responsiveness with that of previous political regimes, when 
they got hardly any services at all from the authorities. A commune chief in 
Kratie19 stated: 
Usually we are slow in responding to people’s demands, but this is normal. 
Most people know that one needs to be patient when waiting to get 
infrastructure from the government. There are at least two main reasons for 
the responses being late. Firstly, the allocation of funds from the central 
government (CSF) is sometimes late and channelling the paperwork from the 
commune to the national government takes some time. Secondly, a project is 
required to go through a bidding process, technical inspections and 
handling with a private subcontractor who will do the work directly (CC 
chief, Kratie province, 29 September 2006). 
This passage illustrates that CC members are not particularly concerned 
about responding slowly or about the number of projects demanded by citizens that 
have not been realised, because both citizens and CC members are used to this 
problem. As one female commune councillor put it: 
It is usually difficult to respond to the exact number of projects and to get 
them done in the timescale suggested by the citizens. The reason is that 
citizens ask for many projects based on their individual preferences. This 
means the total number of demands from the citizens exceeds CCs’ budget 
and planning. It is obvious that we do not have much funding; it is only 
meagre and limited. Some demands are not in line with the commune 
development plan, which is difficult to explain to them. Some citizens are not 
aware of the financial constraints that CCs face. Each project requires a 
certain amount of local contribution [3 percent], and it is extremely difficult 
to raise local contributions these days (female CC member, Kratie province, 
30 September 2006). 
                                                
19 All the five commune chiefs in this study are male.  
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The informal interviews with CC members largely confirm the quantitative 
data. It is reported that when it comes to responsiveness, CC members face some 
difficulties in dealing with citizens, particularly in terms of the quantity and speed 
of projects. However, CC members know that citizens do not expect much from 
them. People whose villages have received something from the commune councils 
are pleased, but those whose villages do not get anything occasionally show 
resentment towards the CC members. Overall, the CC members agreed that they 
are slow to respond to people’s needs and, in particular, that the quantity of 
responses is inadequate. Meanwhile, the quality is acceptable because there is a 
technical committee to inspect projects, and people participate in both the 
monitoring and the construction. The trade-off between quantity and quality is 
largely dealt with in a balanced way. 
Increasing the financial resources is not the only means to improve 
responsiveness to citizen needs, though most of the commune council chiefs 
interviewed shared the idea that the key constraint on their responsiveness was the 
lack of financial resources. This is also reflected in the survey, which found that, 
61 percent of CC members thought that the main reason for their inability to be 
responsive to their electorates was the lack of funding from the central government. 
For 17 percent, it was people’s limited understanding of community development, 
and for 22 percent the main reason was that they could not mobilise local resources 
and had no power to generate additional revenue. 
 
Figure 5.8: What is the main challenge to CCs’ ability to be responsive to citizens? 
 
 
Currently there are three issues related to funding that together risk making 
communes unresponsive to citizens’ needs. First, the CSF is not large enough to 
pay for the required administrative functions such as stationery, transportation and 
other miscellaneous costs. Although the CSF is well regulated from above, it does 
make CCs dependent on and accountable to the central government, as will be 
discussed in Chapter VI. Second, the revenue that CCs get from various 
administrative tasks is very limited. It mainly consists of fees from civil 
registration, service charges from land transactions and other service charges. The 
fees collected have to be deposited in the provincial treasury. On average, each of 
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the ten communes could collect about 300,000 riels (USD75) in a month. However, 
the amount varies considerably, depending on the size of the commune. The 
administration of this agency function (mainly civil registration) is time consuming 
for the councillors and clerks, and the fees are not commensurate with the time 
required. Moreover, it is frequently reported that petty corruption is common 
within this agency function. Clerks and CC members will sometimes ask for 
10,000 riels (USD2.50) extra for a birth certificate, and for land transactions, 
people need to pay a much higher fee (depending on the price of the land) to CC 
members and the clerk to get a certificate of recognition. A commune council 
deputy chief from the opposition party noted: 
The general situation of the CC leadership is not good because people often 
complain about the high service charges. For example, to get a wedding 
licence issued, one needs to pay an extra 40,000–50,000 riels to the 
commune chief and clerk, which is not the exact amount set by the 
government (deputy chief of commune council from SRP, Battambang 
province, 6 May 2007). 
Third, CCs are currently not allowed to collect their own taxes and non-tax 
revenues, which will be explained in further detail in Chapters VI and VII. A group 
of commune councillors disclosed their understanding of responsiveness with 
regard to this aspect: 
The main challenge for the CCs in terms of responsiveness is the lack of 
financial resources and having no power to generate local revenue to be 
more responsive and accountable to the electors. The resources allocated 
from the central government are meagre, and all of the main sectors are still 
controlled by various central government departments. We, as elected CC 
members, know how to implement decentralisation and we know exactly 
what people want because we live among them (councillors, Kompong Speu 
province, 3 April 2007). 
People seem to depend on material outputs from NGOs and politicians, 
which make it difficult for CCs to collect local contributions.20 Many of the CC 
members interviewed said that when village chiefs or the village development 
committee go to collect local contributions, they are often asked why the 
authorities need to collect money from villagers since the CCs receive money 
directly from the central government through the CSF. The lack of power 
delegated from the line ministries to generate local revenue is a primary problem 
expressed by the commune councillors, an aspect that will be further elaborated 
in Chapter VI.  
Hence, as outlined above, a lack of financial resources from the central 
government and the fact that the communes have no power to generate their own 
revenues provide the key constraints on responding to citizens’ needs. The next 
                                                
20 According to the decentralisation regulation, CCs should collect local contributions from citizens 
for infrastructure development. Normally, the local contribution should be at least 3 percent of the 
total amount of the funding for development of each commune. 
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section describes the mechanisms used by the CC members when demands by 
citizens are not responded to.  
Commune councillors’ mechanisms to handle insufficient ability to 
respond 
The commune councillors generally stated that the best way to manage the 
villagers when their election promises have not been fulfilled due to alack of funds 
is to explain and to be honest (moul heit and smos trang) about why they have been 
unresponsive. Many CC members I talked to considered that not acting on 
promises is not a serious problem. According to the CC members, when it comes to 
un-kept promises to the electorate, they have to be mild and patient/humble (ort 
tmot) when dealing with complaints from villagers. As local authorities, CC 
members must understand the context and the local situation. Many CC members 
also hold the view that villagers are not interested unless their actions are of direct 
benefit to them. People are output and material-oriented. Since poverty is rampant, 
people are too dependent on, and have high expectations of, output from the CCs.  
The way that CC members handle their lack of responsiveness to citizens’ 
demands depends on tradition and local circumstances. CC members have three 
strategies to manage their lack of responsiveness to constituents. The first is to 
keep explaining the reasons. The second is to explain that villages have to take 
turns in the allocation of projects because the CSF is the only reliable source of 
funding from the central government. The third is to manage the existing funding 
in a transparent way. For example, many of the CC members described their 
difficulty in responding to the needs of citizens as being like “one hair that is 
chopped into ten pieces” (sork mouy criek chea dob). A group of commune 
councillors described the challenges: 
To deal with villagers in regard to responsiveness issues is of course the 
most challenging task for the CC members because we are directly 
questioned by citizens. We compare CCs’ ability to respond to people’s 
demands as being like parents towards children. Suppose you have six 
children and you have a very limited family income—all you can do is to 
keep explaining to them. We are like the parents working hard to feed them 
and to provide a better future for the family. It is like one strand of hair 
which is chopped into ten pieces (commune councillors, Battambang 
province, 27 April 2006). 
A commune chief in Kratie similarly said: 
The best way to deal with the unresponsiveness issues relating to 
citizens/villagers is to keep explaining to them about the hardship that the 
CC is facing, such as the lack of funding, no sources of alternative funding 
and that their demands are many. Another way is to be patient with 
complaints from citizens. However, our villagers do understand all of the 
difficulties that the CC is facing (CC chief in Kratie province, 29 September 
2006). 
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This explanation reflects that CC members must be very knowledgeable 
about the traditional way of thinking in the community, using the vernacular, which 
is easy for people to understand and makes people trust them. As a historical 
consequence of oppression and brutal authoritarian regimes, some people still do 
not dare to engage with the authorities directly.  
From the empirical findings outlined above, given the short experience of 
decentralisation, it appears that CC members and citizens are frank with each other 
and recognise the progress of decentralisation and its constraints. 
Summary of key findings of CC members’ perceptions of responsiveness 
CC members’ views on responsiveness to citizens are interconnected in two 
respects: ability and output/action. 
• The need for CC members to understand the local situation is not seen to 
be problematic (by themselves). Both in-depth discussions and the survey 
of CC members illustrated that more than 90 percent of CC members 
believe that the local situation is not difficult to understand. However, 
many CC members believe that, as elected councillors, they need to try to 
be responsive in terms of material outputs such as small-scale 
infrastructure and services to the citizens because people are poor.  
• The above view of CC members shows that responsiveness is material 
output and other performances by CCs to meet citizens’ needs. Many CC 
members agree that responsiveness is provided not only through funding 
and materials, but also includes other aspects such as knowledge, good 
management and participation.  
• The ability to respond to citizens’ needs ultimately depends on the nature 
of the demands. Citizens may pose demands to CCs based on their 
individual preferences, which have led to excessive demands that far 
exceed the capacity of CCs’ very limited annual budget. Citizens’ 
knowledge of the new development framework of decentralisation is 
limited, so if their demands are not responded to it could lead to 
resentment and lack of participation. 
• When it comes to material outputs or responsiveness to requests, CC 
members face many difficulties, in particular regarding speed and 
quantity. However, the quality of projects delivered is not a challenge for 
CCs because there are not many projects and there is strict monitoring of 
the technical quality of every project. Quantity is not a real challenge to 
CC members, as long as CCs are able to deliver some small-scale projects 
of good quality, even if they are usually late and fewer than the number 
requested by citizens. Therefore, most CC members are confident to work 
with the limited CSF, as they can respond to at least some of citizens’ 
needs. 
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Citizens’ perceptions of responsiveness 
This section will present citizens’ perceptions of (i) CCs’ general performance and 
ability to understand local situations, (ii) the nature of demands from citizens and 
(iii) the speed, quantity and quality of the material outputs that CCs are able to 
deliver to citizens. Each of these aspects will be illuminated by presenting the 
survey data and explained by in-depth interviews. 
Citizens’ perceptions of CCs’ general performance 
The 583 citizens’ views of the CCs’ ability to understand the local situation is 
shown below.  
Figure 5.9 shows that 70 percent of the citizens believed that the CC 
members understand the overall situation in the community. 
 
Figure 5.9: Do you think that the CCs are knowledgeable about the situation in your 
village? (583 citizens questioned) 
 
 
Citizens were asked open-ended questions about their observations of CC 
members’ activities when they visited their villages. 63percent said that the CC 
members were there to chair a meeting, 14 percent to disseminate information, 10 
percent to conduct civil registration and 7 percent to make development plans. This 
indicates a certain degree of visibility, but “meetings” often turn out to be rather 
secluded and non-participatory.  
Figure 5.10: When CCs visit your village, what kind of activities do they normally do? 
(583 citizens interviewed) 
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Figure 5.11: Has the CC’s responsiveness increased or decreased since the commune 
election? (583 citizens interviewed) 
 
 
Citizens have mixed views of CCs’ responsiveness. According to the data, 
about 46 percent of citizens thought that CCs’ responsiveness has increased since 
the commune election, 38 percent thought that it had remained the same, 8 percent 
thought it had decreased, and 8 percent did not know. Although this indicated that 
citizens have mixed views of CCs’ responsiveness, nearly half of citizens think that 
there have been improvements. Citizens’ optimism about the performance of CCs 
represents a critical change in the way citizens regard leaders.  
People expressed mixed views of CC performance in some of the in-depth 
interviews too. Generally, people recognise that CC members are well aware of the 
situation in the communes because they are native to the communes and are well 
exposed to the place. As one villager said: 
All CC members were born and grew up here in the commune. They know 
the situations and people well. However, it depends on their [political] will 
whether they help us or not. Most CC members channel information and 
work based on the hierarchy of the political party and the administration, 
which sometimes makes things slow to be realised (villager, Siem Reap 
province, 22 April 2006). 
Citizens look at the education among CC members in understanding local 
situations. Education plays a crucial role in enabling CC members to perform 
effectively in their dealings with donors and politicians, making plans and 
analysing development policies/regulations. One villager expressed his observation 
of the performance of the CC: 
The CC’s performance depends on the educational capacity of each CC 
member. I know nearly all of the CC members in this commune. They just 
know how to read and write, which is a bit of a constraint on them in 
analysing the laws and policies for community development. I agree they are 
learning by doing and gaining experience at the same time, but they are all 
old, and their performance is poor, and especially with this limited 
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education they cannot initiate new ideas for development (village elder, 
Battambang province, 2 May 2006). 
Citizens seem active in the beginning of each programme introduced by CCs 
because they are expecting some material output. However, most of their 
expectations are not immediately realised, which leads to discontent and 
resentment with CCs. One villager shared his view: 
Since the commune election in 2002, CC members have come here to 
organise many meetings and ask people what we would like to have for the 
village. We have asked them to build different things for the village, but so 
far almost none of the projects asked for have been built. We do not expect 
much or trust them to give us what we need (villager, Kratie province, 27 
September 2006). 
However, some citizens are curious about the work of CCs and the issues 
that CC members are facing. For example, here are the views of two villagers: 
I think it is a bit unfair to get angry with CC members if our demands are not 
realised. I see the commune council now is working based on different 
systems, and they do not have much money to do the things people need. The 
best way is to wait; if they have money they will develop the commune 
(villager, Kampot province, 30 March 2006). 
Since the commune election, there has been some progress in development 
conducted by the commune council, especially local infrastructure such as 
roads, wells and irrigation (villager, Battambang province, 28 April 2006). 
Most people interviewed were dissatisfied with the performance of the CCs 
because their judgment is typically based on material outputs, especially of local 
infrastructure improvement. Some people view the CC members as being 
politically loyal only to their own political party supporters. This is linked to the 
behaviour of the CC members when interacting with people. Most CC activities are 
still meetings to disseminate information received from the technical departments. 
One villager who is active in community development and curious about commune 
development described this: 
The best way to sort out the responsiveness problem is for CC members to 
work harder to elicit people’s ideas, attracting them to participate in all 
development activities in the commune. Nowadays, the only interaction I see 
between CC members and citizens is in the form of formal meetings. It is not 
active enough. After about five years of decentralisation reform, people’s 
participation in the CC remains weak; some people are used to getting paid 
by NGOs to attend meetings and to receiving gifts from political parties, and 
they always demand things from leaders/politicians and NGOs. People are 
very dependent on leaders/politicians and NGOs. There is not much real 
interaction (villager, Kratie province, 30 September 2006). 
From this passage, it is apparent that citizens are overall fully satisfied with 
the CCs’ performance, and people’s participation in the commune councils is low. 
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People expect material outputs to be delivered by politicians or local leaders when 
people participate in various meetings in the community. 
Nature of demands from citizens 
This section examines the activities and styles used by citizens when putting 
forward demands to CC members and citizens’ perceptions of difficulties of 
commune councillors in being responsive to people’s needs.  
 
Figure 5.12: Have you ever voiced demands to CCs? 
 
 
The survey found that 26 percent of citizens had voiced demands to CCs 
during a commune council meeting, when people have a chance to interact directly 
with CCs, while 74 percent of citizens had never posed any demands to CC 
members. A majority of citizens have thus never directly asked anything from a 
CC. However, indirectly through local talk, gossip, neighbours etc. there is a 
certain pressure on commune authorities. 
Discussion with key informants revealed that within the social context, it is 
commonly accepted that ordinary citizens should not question or demand too much 
from the authorities, especially not during formal meetings (due to a desire to save 
face and a fear of dealing with leaders directly). Leaders are nevertheless supposed 
to fulfil their moral obligation to be responsive to the people, even though demands 
are articulated indirectly in citizens’ complaints or through word of mouth without 
being publicly confronted. A former school principal made the following 
observation: 
People do participate in the meetings organised by the commune council, 
but there is not much interaction or questioning during the meetings. They 
do not like to talk with leaders or strangers, but they do share thoughts with 
or complain to friends and relatives. Most people who attend the meetings 
are women who do not have an incentive or the knowledge to question CC 
members (citizen, Battambang province, 28 April 2006). 
People expect CC members to initiate many development activities in the 
commune without people explicitly asking for them. People are usually reluctant to 
pose questions directly to CC members in order to avoid souring relations. 
 
No  
74% 
Yes 
26% 
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Figure 5.13: Have you ever heard of/do you know about the  
commune development plan? 
 
 
CCs cannot respond to demands from citizens based on individual 
interests, but must follow the regulations and the commune development plan, 
which supposedly is constructed in a participatory process but which nearly half 
of the citizens do not know of. 43percent of citizens did not know what the 
commune development plan was, while 57 percent had heard of it.  
A citizen and school principal described the nature of responsiveness and 
commune development plan thus: 
Responsiveness is the interaction between CC members and citizens, and 
people’s understanding of the CC’s development plan. However, all of these 
aspects remain weak and limited. As a citizen, I can see that the CC does not 
have much money or support from different agencies of the national 
government. CCs face many problems as well as [needing to] be responsive 
to people (citizen, Battambang province, 3 May 2006). 
According to the above observation, the responsiveness of CCs to citizens 
depends on clear interaction with CC members and on people’s understanding of 
the new development procedures.  
Citizens’ perceptions of the outputs of responsiveness: speed, quantity and 
quality 
There are many everyday administrative activities undertaken by commune 
councils (civil registration, solving domestic disputes etc). The most important are 
the development projects funded through the government Commune Sangkat Fund. 
In the five-year commune development plan, CCs are responsible for socio-
economic development, infrastructure, security and gender, but the most common 
projects implemented by councils are infrastructure related, notably roads and 
irrigation. Given that communes did not have any development budget prior to the 
decentralisation reforms, their CSF funds are relatively substantial. Up until 2010, 
every year each commune received USD15, 000-20,000 from the CSF for local 
development. The following is the view from citizens on the speed, quantity and 
quality of material outputs. 
 
 
No 
43% 
Yes 
57% 
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Figure 5.14: How do you rate CC responsiveness in terms of speed? 
 
 
Speed: 32 percent of citizens were unsatisfied, 61 percent satisfied and 7 
percent uncertain. 
 
Figure 5.15: How do you rate CC responsiveness in terms of quantity? 
 
 
Quantity: 27 percent were satisfied, 65percent dissatisfied and 8 percent 
uncertain. The majority of citizens were thus not satisfied with the responsiveness 
of CCs in terms of quantity. 
Quality: Out of the 583 citizens interviewed, 57 percent were satisfied with 
the quality of projects supervised by CC members, 31 percent were dissatisfied, 
and 12 percent did not know. The majority of citizens were thus satisfied with CCs 
in terms of the quality of projects.  
 
Figure 5.16: How do you rate CC responsiveness in terms of quality? 
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The survey results and in-depth interviews with and observations of citizens 
confirm the pattern of the survey on CC members’ responsiveness. One villager in 
Kratie revealed this view on the speed of responsiveness of CCs:  
The speed of the CC members’ response to people’s needs is often late, but 
after many years of being late, people do not blame the CC members 
because we know that there is nothing that the CC members can do 
regarding the speed (villager, Kratie province, 30 September 2006). 
This indicates that even though the response by CCs is very often late, 
people seem to get used to it, not blaming or putting more pressure on the CCs. 
However, another villager expressed resentment of CCs’ responsiveness, in 
particular with regard to quantity and speed: 
Some people are pleased with the responses by CCs in building 
infrastructure, but most villagers are not happy because they do not see real 
outputs from CCs soon after they have asked for them. In particular the 
quantity and speed of responses are not good. For example, if they ask for 
ten things, if they are lucky, only one is responded to. However, we know the 
constraints that CC members are facing, especially lack of funds (citizen, 
Battambang province, 22 April 2006).  
As mentioned earlier, people are accustomed from previous regimes to 
getting almost nothing from the authorities, so a late response is not a serious issue.  
A villager in Kampot, who also serves as the chief of the committee for 
safeguarding natural resources in the commune, expressed his view of CC 
responsiveness: 
Responsiveness of the CC is very important for people in this commune. To 
win the election, a political party needs to realise the demands of the people, 
especially infrastructure and delivering different gifts (villager, Kampot 
province, March 29 2006). 
The views above indicate that a political party’s election success depends on 
realising people’s demands. However, not many political parties can realise their 
promises from the electoral campaign, as a villager in the same commune put it: 
All parties promise to give this and that to villagers if they are elected. Most 
of them are not able to follow through and leave people feeling really 
disappointed. Hence, if the parties can keep their promises, they will gain 
popularity with the villagers (villager, Kampot province, 29 March 2006). 
Generally, both CC members and citizens recognise that the quality of the 
infrastructure funded by the CSF is good. At least three factors ensure the quality. 
Firstly, the CSF is well regulated from above, which provides little room for 
corruption in construction projects. Secondly, each commune has a technical 
monitoring committee consisting of village chiefs, CC members and villagers who 
actively oversee the construction, ensuring that subcontractors deliver good quality 
work, as spelled out in the contract. And finally, there are not many projects every 
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year, so the technical monitoring committee can actively and closely inspect the 
quality of construction. Nonetheless, there are also some complaints from technical 
monitoring committee members that they do not have the technical skills to 
monitor construction as they would wish.  
The matrix below is the view of the quality, quantity and speed of 
responsiveness in councillors’ and citizens’ views. 
 
 Quality Quantity Speed 
Councillors’ 
perceptions 
Almost 80 percent of 
CC members are 
satisfied with the quality 
of infrastructure projects 
completed because CCs, 
village chiefs and 
citizens have the right to 
monitor construction. 
However, some 
councillors are not 
satisfied because of a 
lack of technical 
capacity to ensure 
quality from the 
contractors. 
About 75 percent of 
CC members are not 
satisfied with the 
quantity of projects 
they could initiate to 
respond to citizens’ 
requests. The cause of 
low quantity of 
responses is normally 
lack of funds. 
Similar to the 
quantity of 
responses, about 73 
percent of CC 
members are not 
satisfied with the 
speed of their 
responses. The 
reason for slowness 
is usually the lack of 
cash from the central 
government—late 
and insufficient 
funds to carry out 
projects requested by 
citizens.  
Citizens’ 
perceptions 
Citizens’ view of CCs’ 
responses in terms of 
quality of infrastructure 
is high, 57 percent being 
satisfied, about 31 
percent not satisfied 
and12 percent not 
knowing. The 
satisfaction with the 
quality of projects is 
because there are 
always representatives 
of citizens and village 
chiefs monitoring the 
projects. 
Similar to councillors’ 
views, about 65 
percent of citizens are 
not satisfied with the 
quantity of responses 
from CCs and only 27 
percent satisfied. 
There are many 
requests from citizens 
every year, but the 
number of projects in 
response is very 
limited. 
More than 60 percent 
of citizens are 
generally satisfied 
with the speed of 
responsiveness from 
CCs. The reason that 
citizens are satisfied 
is that, as long as 
they get projects built 
in their village, 
slowness is not a 
problem. 
 
Judging from the interview information, there seems to be a shared 
understanding among citizens and CC members that people are informed by CC 
members about the reasons for late response, commonly late allocation of funds 
from the central government and other procedures such as paper work, bidding and 
technical procedures. Citizens seem to be fairly confident and patient with the 
material output responses by CCs.  
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Findings on citizens’ perceptions of CCs’ responsiveness 
Below is a summary of key empirical findings on citizens’ perceptions of CC 
performance. 
• The majority of citizens acknowledge that CC members do not have any 
problem in understanding the daily life and local situation of the 
commune. The main activities of CCs when dealing directly with citizens 
are meetings, dissemination of information and civil registration. Overall, 
citizens are optimistic about CC responsiveness because, since the 
commune election, they have at least seen that CCs have been able to 
deliver various small-scale infrastructure.  
• Citizens make demands based on individual interests or do not pose any 
demands to CCs. Only a limited number of citizens surveyed are 
accustomed to putting demands to CCs. There are at least two reasons for 
this lack of interaction between citizens and leaders. First, citizens expect 
leaders to be aware of their roles and responsibilities to respond to 
people’s needs, and second, where possible, ordinary people normally 
avoid direct interaction with leaders because it might sour their 
relationship and because people do not expect many of their demands to 
be responded to.  
• Citizens are satisfied with responsiveness in terms of material outputs 
because they have seen at least seen some local infrastructure built. 
Citizens seem more positive than CC members about the speed, quantity 
and quality of responsiveness. Most do not mind that their demands are 
met late and that the quantity is much less than hoped for.  
• The views of the councillors fit rather well with those of the citizens. This 
is interesting and indicates that there are rather developed consensuses on 
the responsiveness of CCs. It also a sign of mutual understanding about 
responsiveness between electors and CCs. Electors are optimistic that 
CCs are working hard to realise the demands from the people.  
Concluding remarks 
The empirical findings on commune council responsiveness are critical to our 
understanding of the current decentralisation process. They shed some light on the 
relationship between the local authorities—who are the actors expected to be 
responsive to the concerns of the electors—and citizens. The output of CC 
responsiveness to demands of the people is not what was expected by the people, 
but there is a general recognition that commune councillors have been working 
hard for the “public good”—in particular there have been some improvements in 
local infrastructure. It is still uncommon for people to present their problems to or 
question the authorities, and their demands are mostly based on individual interest. 
Nevertheless, decentralisation has established an institutional mechanism and space 
for constituents to demand services and responsibility from their councillors. It is 
clear that responsiveness to the needs of people has been introduced in terms of the 
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ability and knowledge of CC members. The outputs or actions of responsiveness to 
citizens’ needs remain limited. However, there seems to be a mutual understanding 
between citizens and councillors of the difficulties in realising demands, which is a 
key aspect to make democratic decentralisation successful. Responsiveness 
cultivates an ideal type of leadership in which the aim is to listen to the people, and 
in present-day Cambodia, a bottom-up leadership style has come into practice. 
Despite CC members’ responsiveness in terms of material output being limited, 
posing demands from people has fostered people’s bargaining power and opened 
space for the people to negotiate with the authorities and to have much franker 
interactions. The mechanism of responsiveness makes leaders listen to people’s 
complaints and resentments, and thus puts pressure on CCs. Lack of financial 
resources, as CC members are not financially independent and cannot generate 
local revenue, makes them mostly unresponsive to citizens’ needs. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FINDINGS ON ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Previous chapters have shown that decentralisation reform is progressing 
with a certain level of responses from CCs to citizens. This chapter examines the 
nature of accountability between commune councillors and voters. Accountability 
here is taken to be the ability of elected CCs to answer to voters for the use of their 
authority (cf. Chapter II). The focus of this chapter is the accountability 
mechanisms used by CCs to be accountable and voters’ perceptions of CC 
accountability. For example, what does it mean to be accountable in the 
Cambodian context? What mechanisms do CCs use to be accountable to voters? 
Who are CCs primarily accountable to? The discussion in this chapter will seek to 
explain CCs’ and voters’ perceptions of accountability.  
Accountability is essential to democracy and requires revealing the truth 
(Huntington 1991; Moncrieffe 2001). Accountability mechanisms work within 
government to set limits on the arbitrary exercise of power, to set checks and 
balances in the separation of powers and to constrain the activities of politicians 
(Grindle 2011). Scholars on decentralisation argue that accountability is a central 
aspect of democratic decentralisation and consider it to be instrumental in securing 
optimal performance by elected representatives and by the public (Grindle 2011; 
Ribot 2011; Manor 1999; Legowo 2003; Crook & Manor 1998; Blair 2000; Smith 
1985; Johnson 2001; Schmitter 2004). Accountability depends on the electorate’s 
belief that the government and other public officials are operating in the public 
interest (Manor 1999; Grindle 2011; Crook & Manor 1998). Accountability is 
commonly seen as a key concept in establishing efficient and democratic local 
government (Ribot 2011). James Manor, in his 2008 study, argues that 
accountability provides the crucial link between increased participation and good 
performance by government institutions. If accountability mechanisms are weak, 
then the performance of decentralised institutions will suffer (Manor 2008). 
Accountability could ex-ante serve citizens’ interests, but elected representatives 
must know what these interests are to enable the citizens’ appraisal of policy 
choice (Moncrieffe 2001). Periodic elections are necessary (but not necessarily 
sufficient) to provide for a reciprocal relationship between officials and citizens, 
and to allow officials to answer for their performance to voters (Johnson 2001; 
Schmitter 2004). The ideas of accountability above will be used as the analytical 
tools to explore accountability in the of decentralisation reform in Cambodia. 
In Cambodia, the term accountability remains unclear and confined to the 
rhetoric of high-level strategy (Horng et al. 2007). Despite its significance, some 
recent studies focusing on good governance and decentralisation indicate that there 
many variations and differences in understanding the term (Pak et al. 2007; Rusten 
et al. 2004; Öjendal & Kim 2006; 2011; Horng et al. 2007). Empirical studies 
indicate that accountability of commune councils to constituencies, civil society 
groups, political parties and government bureaucrats is still unclear (Burke & Nil 
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2004; Blunt & Turner 2005; MacAndrew 2004; Mansfield & MacLeod 2004). 
According to Manor (2008), in Cambodia national officials in line ministries 
legitimately insist that their employees at lower levels should be accountable to 
them in order to maintain standards and adherence to policies. But many in the 
government believe that there has been too much emphasis on upward 
accountability in the past but not much downward accountability of elected 
representatives to voters. In Cambodia, accountability mechanisms are working at a 
level that would be expected, not in a functioning democracy, but in a patronage–
based system (Hughes 2003). 
Here accountability refers to answerability for actions, policies and use of 
funds by CCs to citizens, or contractual and reciprocal relations between CCs and 
citizens. In Cambodia, the word accountability (kanak neiyakpheap) is difficult to 
communicate or understand since the word is new. 
Drawing from the above ideas about accountability, this chapter discusses 
three underlying factors: 
• The vocabulary of accountability: Since the concept is new among 
Cambodians, it is valuable for this thesis to explore the meanings of the 
term “accountability” in the Cambodian language and how the word is 
perceived or understood by commune councillors and voters. 
• Councillors’ perceptions of accountability: In this section, the chapter 
will examine how accountability is implemented (mechanisms) and 
viewed by CC members in their day-to-day activities, including: a) 
perceptions of how to be accountable to voters, b) upward accountability 
and c) sources of funding. 
• Voters’ perceptions of accountability: This section explores voters’ 
perceptions of different aspects of CC accountability, including: a) 
information flows from CCs to voters, b) voters’ awareness of the sources 
and amount of funding for CCs and c) voters’ views of electoral 
accountability.  
Vocabulary of accountability: vernacular meanings 
Various studies of accountability in Cambodia indicate that the concept is locally 
understood in a wide variety of ways because the explanation is largely driven by 
Western public administration thinking (Pak et al. 2007; Horng et al. 2007). The 
concept is rarely used and understood; its meaning is vague due to cultural, 
traditional and historical conditions and not typically related to local democratic 
discourse. Within this context, accountability continues to mean different things to 
different people, so developing a consistent and shared understanding between 
Cambodians and relevant development partners is crucial (Horng et al. 2007). It 
might not be important what word is used; most important is how things should 
work. However, it is critical to discuss the meaning of the term in Khmer in order 
to understand the differences in meaning and how they are reflected in actual 
decentralisation. 
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According to the English-Cambodian dictionary, kanak neiyakpheap 
(accountable/accountability) is a noun which means tortoul khos trov 
(responsibility) and arch ponyul bann (explainable or able to explain) (Huffman & 
Im 1987). The terms did not exist in Cambodian dictionaries before the 1990s. If 
we look at the term responsibility closely (tortoul khos trov), it is related to the idea 
of action. It means being responsible for one’s actions, both when doing wrong 
(tortoul khos) and when doing right (tortoul trov). The implied meaning refers to 
individuals’ (not the state’s) use of rights and authority and, in particular, to their 
responsibility for their conduct. The term “accountability” is also confused and 
blurred both in the way it is understood and in the way it is regarded by 
Cambodians. How is it used and understood locally? In the following, we seek an 
empirical understanding of how the term is perceived by CC members and voters. 
CC members’ perceptions of the term ‘accountability’ 
A question was posed to the commune council members to gauge their 
understanding of the term. The questions were formulated as open ended. About 81 
percent of the CC members had heard the word accountability.21 
 
Figure 6.1: Have you ever heard the word accountability? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
 
The 81 percent who had heard the word had a mixed understanding of its 
meaning. About 27 percent thought that the term was a synonym for responsibility, 
25 percent thought it related to honesty or trustworthiness, 23 percent thought it 
meant transparency, about 9 percent thought that it might relate to other things, 8 
percent thought it meant lack of bias, 5 percent did not know and 3 percent thought 
that it means serving people. Councillors’ views of the word accountability are thus 
primarily related to three terms: responsibility, honesty or trustworthiness and 
transparency. 
 
 
                                                
21 Many CC members had heard the word kanak neiyakpheap via training, documents from the 
central government and NGOs and broadcast media.  
Yes 
81% 
No 
19% 
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Figure 6.2: In your personal view, what does “accountability” mean? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
Building trust is vital for enhancing accountability. 40percent of CC 
members said that to build trust they believe that leaders should be honest, 25 
percent said humble and 20 percent said transparent. 
 
Figure 6.3: How do you build trust between CCs and electorates? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
The meanings of accountability are both implicitly and explicitly embedded 
in the concepts of responsibility, trust, transparency, honesty and lack of bias. In 
order to understand how accountability is being practised in local society, we need 
to investigate how leaders actually relate to citizens. Commune councillor 
interviews suggest that, in their view, to be an accountable leader, one needs to 
comply with principles of political culture such as proper attitude, symbolic 
expressions and norms. Many CC members expressed the view that to be 
accountable, local leaders must practise the principle of samak thor, which is a 
Buddhist teaching that means mutual virtue or tolerance. A group of CC members 
described the role of elected leaders:  
Elected or benevolent leaders must have the moral principle of samak thor. 
By so doing, leaders should be transparent, fair and humble, behave with 
Don't know 
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morality, listen to people and be responsive (CC members, Kompong Speu 
province, 3 April 2006).  
The principle of Buddhist teaching is still being used among local leaders to 
gain legitimacy within the community. Many older people directly or indirectly 
involved in leadership activities in the communes believe that the essence of being 
an accountable leader is to share power and responsibility with colleagues, while 
being humble and, most importantly, responsive to citizens. These ideal types of 
leadership are thus not new, but incorporated in Buddhist teaching. A group of CC 
members explained: 
It is simple for the leaders to follow the four principal virtues of Buddhism: 
(a) meta is responsibility and accountability for your own role, (b) karuna is 
compassion, patience and tolerance, (c) mutita is humility, softness, 
gentleness and generosity and (d) upikha is fairness, justice and balance 
(CC members, Battambang province, 27 April 2006). 
Many villagers strongly expressed the view that the type of leader they want 
is someone who is slod (humble, gentle and patient). Leaders with these personal 
attributes are approachable, not aggressive and, most importantly, have gained trust 
and respect. These types of leaders, even if they do not perform their professional 
roles effectively, are accepted as considerate and accountable.  
To be accountable on rational-legal grounds is difficult, but it is even more 
difficult to be accountable on these traditional grounds. Local leaders believe it is 
almost impossible to separate anarchak (rational-legal domination) and puthichak 
(Buddhism) because the two are like “the two wheels of an oxcart: we need a pair 
of wheels to make the cart move forward” (CC members, KD commune, Kompong 
Speu, 3 April 2006).  
Voters’ views on the term ‘accountability’ 
We have seen commune councillors’ perceptions of accountability because they 
have heard or been exposed to the word engaging with government activities and 
training. As discussed in chapters IV and V, ordinary citizens are not interested in 
interacting with authorities; their exposure to government policies may, thus, be 
limited. Now let us look at voters’ perception of the term. 
Of the 583 voters who were asked if they had ever heard of “accountability” 
(kanak neiyakpheap), only 5 percent responded that they had, and nobody knew the 
meaning of the term (Figure 6.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 132 
Figure 6.4: Have you ever heard the word “accountability”? 
(583 voters interviewed) 
 
The 5 percent who had heard of accountability had done so at different 
meetings, in informal interactions with local authorities (CC members and village 
chiefs) and on the radio. 
As the survey shows, the term kanak neiyakpheap does not really exist 
among voters, so it is difficult to directly ask them to explain it. However, voters 
are familiar with the term “responsibility” used in connection with their leaders, 
which in Cambodian generally refers to accountability.  
 
Figure 6.5: Have you ever heard the word “accountability”? 
(583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
One voter in Siem Reap province commented: 
As voters, we are curious to know about the responsibility and performance 
of CC members. Responsible leaders should be well behaved, humble, have 
good relationships with ordinary people, be transparent and morally 
responsible for their leadership (villager, Siem Reap province, 22 April 
2006).  
It is difficult to elicit the “direct” views of ordinary citizens on the word 
“accountability” since the overwhelming majority of citizens have not heard the 
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word. However, some of people’s ideas seem to relate to the meaning of the word, 
as an elder person in Battambang put it: 
The older people do not like to engage with authorities too much because we 
think that it is the job of the authorities to deal with politics and other 
development activities. This is that why you do not see much interaction 
between authorities and people (villager, Battambang Province, 10 May 
2007). 
From this passage, it seems that in Cambodian society kanak neiyakpheap 
(accountability) refers to the responsibility of the leaders. Since people do not fully 
understand the term accountability, it is difficult to implement it or for people to 
demand accountability from leaders.  
Summary of key findings of CCs’ and voters’ views on the term 
“accountability” 
Following are the key findings: 
• The majority of CC members have heard the term “accountability” 
through their engagement with government activities. There is no 
meaning in Cambodian that matched, and the meaning is confused. The 
term is synonymous with three Cambodian terms: responsibility, honesty 
or trustworthiness and transparency. 
• Almost no voters had heard the term “accountability”, and the small 
number who had did not know the meaning.  
Below, this chapter will look at various implementations of accountability of 
commune councillors to voters. 
Commune councillors ‘perceptions of accountability: mechanisms 
within the councils 
The problem of accountability is the conflict of interest between political 
parties and commune councils. Political activists and elected representatives 
need to exercise their power with professionalism. Accountability also 
depends on the political will of leaders at every level of government. Having 
enough resources and power to collect local revenues is crucially vital for 
elected CCs to be accountable to people (H.E. Leng Vy, Secretary General, 
Ministry of Interior, 20 July 2005). 
Accountability seems to be one of the most vital elements of decentralisation 
for CC members. In the new political system, commune councils must be 
answerable to the electorate for their use of authority. Hence, commune councils 
are downwardly accountable to the electorate, upwardly to central government, but 
also horizontally to political parties that make them eligible through party lists. 
Therefore, the accountability of commune councillors constitutes a conflict of 
interest in the way they exercise power and the extent to which they respond to 
community preferences, such as balancing traditional and rational authority. The 
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conflict of interest between elected councillors and their political parties might be 
caused by the party-list electoral system. The line of accountability of CCs is 
blurred between political parties and the work of CCs for the commune. Elected 
councillors, especially the ones from the CPP, are often accused of putting their 
commitment to the party first. The conflict of interest between political parties and 
CCs is a constraint on commune councillors enhancing accountability and 
generating broad-based legitimacy. Below are some survey results on different 
dimensions of accountability, mechanisms and commune councillors’ perceptions 
of accountability, upward accountability of CCs and sources of funding for CCs.  
Councillors’ perceptions of how to be accountable 
The survey results show CC members’ mixed views on how to be accountable to 
their constituents.  
 
Figure 6.6: How to be accountable to voters? (74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
When asked how they could be accountable to voters, about 40 percent of 
the CC member respondents thought that they should be transparent with voters, 20 
percent that they had to build good relationships within their constituents, 20 
percent that they should be humble and behave nicely towards voters and 13 
percent that it was important to meet with voters often. There are thus at least three 
perceived mechanisms through which CC members can be accountable to their 
constituents: transparency, behaving nicely and good relations with voters. These 
ways to achieve accountability seem to confirm councillors’ views of the term, as 
explained in the previous section.
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Figure 6.7: Who/what kind of people do you think you should first accountable to? (74 
CC members interviewed) 
 
 
Which agencies should CC members answer to? This is perhaps the most 
complicated of all questions for councillors. In the survey, 75 percent of commune 
councillors seemed to understand their role as to be primarily accountable to 
citizens/voters, while about 14 percent thought they should be accountable to 
higher authorities, about 4 percent to the political party that they belong to and 
about 7 percent to the law. The overwhelming majority of the elected CC members 
were thus well aware that they should first be accountable to their constituents, 
putting downward accountability at centre. 
Figure 6.8: Who/what kind of people do you feel most comfortable working with? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
Accountability is about feeling comfortable working together. When asked 
what kind of people they felt most comfortable interacting with, 55 percent of CC 
members said teachers or people with some education, 22 percent said old 
respected people (such as achar), 4 percent said NGOs and 19 percent others. 
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Figure 6.9: What types of commune activities do you think you can mobilise most 
villagers to participate in? (74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
The ability of CC members to mobilise people for different community 
events depends on people’s trust in and respect for the CC members. However, 
such trust and respect are often confined or related to different domains such as 
development, politics and humanitarian, religious or other social events organised 
by CC members. Commune councillors were asked about the types of public 
activities they thought they could mobilise most villagers to participate in. The 
results (Figure 6.9) were mixed: about 25 percent of councillors thought it was 
fairly easy to gather people for humanitarian activities (normally receiving gifts 
from politicians or NGOs), 31 percent for development-related activities, about 30 
percent for religious purposes, 7 percent for political activities and the remaining 7 
percent for other purposes. CC members could thus mobilise people to participate 
in three main areas: development and religious and humanitarian activities. 
 
Figure 6.10: How do you spend most of your time?
(74 CC members interviewed) 
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80 percent of the commune councillors said that they spend most of their 
working time on commune affairs, 15 percent said assisting their own family small 
business or farming, 4 percent engaged with higher authorities who come to work 
in the commune and only a small fraction, 1 percent, spent time dealing with the 
political party they were associated with. This last figure might not be accurate, 
because observation suggests that CC members work for their political parties 
during weekends and sometimes use working hours for party activities, especially 
before an election. This is also confirmed by the 2005 TAF and CAS survey of 620 
CC members, which indicated that 12 percent of CC members spent some time of 
their commune council working hours on party work. Sometimes the CC members 
did not dare to reveal how much time they spent working for the party. 
The accountability of CC members is critical for voters to be able to assess 
the performance of CCs. The survey included a question on how councillors
believe that voters assess or evaluate the performance of commune councils and 
understand the conduct of CC members. Seventeen percent do so through village 
chiefs, 20 percent via word of mouth or friends, 32 percent at public meetings with 
authorities, 6 percent via NGO activities and 25 percent by other means. These 
figures indicate that there is little opportunity for voters to engage directly with CC 
members except via formal meetings.  
 
Figure 6.11: How do voters assess the performance of CC members? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
The accountability of CCs to voters depends on their engagement with 
voters. There are four major activities where voters engage with CCs. Development 
activities are mostly the discussion and implementation of the commune 
development plan and engaging with provincial and national line agencies. 
Religious activities are the traditional ceremonies of Buddhism in which CCs assist 
the wat. Humanitarian activities are meetings for receiving food or gifts from 
NGOs, politicians and the Red Cross. Political activities take place when 
politicians come to the village to disseminate their political agenda to their 
supporters and often also deliver gifts. 
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In-depth interviews with CC members reflected similar views as those 
revealed in the survey data above. Many CC members were well aware of the 
different means of being accountable to voters. These means are combined with 
traditional norms with which people are familiar. A group of CC members in 
Kompong Speu noted: 
To be responsible or benevolent leaders, we need to rely on samak thor 
(mutual tolerance) and to build trust between authorities and people. The 
mechanisms are simple: leaders should be transparent and tolerant, have 
good behaviour and morals and pay attention and listen to people’s 
problems (group of CC members, Kompong Speu province, 3 April 2006). 
A commune deputy chief from the opposition party seemed pessimistic 
about the current situation of the CCs: 
The leadership in the commune nowadays is not good because people often 
complain about the high charge for different services and about corruption 
and poverty. There is some material support from politicians, but they do not 
deliver to everyone in the commune, only to their own party members (CC 
member, Battambang province, 6 May 2007). 
Only 4 percent of CC members expressed the view that they should be 
accountable to a political party, and 75 percent answered that they should be 
accountable to voters (figure 6.7). The figures above might reflect that CC 
members are aware that, as elected leaders, they should be accountable to or work 
for voters, but the current system is not clear. However, observation suggests that 
CC members are primarily accountable to their own political party. A commune 
councillor in Siem Reap province explained: 
In theory, as elected commune councillors, we should answer to people in 
the community. However, the electoral system of Cambodia is a party-based 
system in which the political party has strong power to fire or promote CC 
members, so we must also think about the party (CC member, Siem Reap 
province, 23 April 2006). 
From this passage we can judge that CC members are possibly aware that 
they should be accountable to the voters. However, since political parties hold the 
political and financial power, CC members must balance between being 
accountable to voters and being accountable to political parties. 
A group of CC members further stated:  
As you know, people have lived under civil war for a long time and are very 
depressed by different regimes and leaderships. This makes them distrust the 
authorities; some even become selfish. To heal this social fragmentation, the 
authorities and citizens need to understand and tolerate each other (group of 
CC members, Kompong Speu, 3 April 2006).  
139 
Getting people to trust the authorities is essential for enhancing 
accountability. Given the different social and political interruptions that people 
have experienced, it is difficult to build trust between people and authority. 
Upward accountability: CC members’ views 
In order to create a better understanding of the upward accountability of 
CCs, this section will discuss various mechanisms that CCs use to learn the policies 
of the central government. The mechanisms that CCs use to obtain information 
from the central government and CCs’ views of who their direct supervisors are 
discussed below. 
 
Figure 6.12: How do you learn of the current activities and policies of the central 
government? (74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
The survey data on how commune councillors learn about current activities 
of the central government indicates that 25 percent learned from meeting with 
central officials, 35 percent from broadcast media and 40 percent from district and 
provincial officials. CC members are dependent on information from higher 
authorities such as line ministries, provincial and district authorities and political 
parties.  
Figure 6.13: From your own perspective, who is the current direct supervisor/boss  
of CCs? (74 CC members interviewed) 
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The data on who CC members believe their direct bosses are suggest 
confusion, which makes it difficult for them to be clearly accountable. 30 percent 
of them thought the district to be the direct boss of the commune, 30 percent 
thought it was the national government (Ministry of the Interior), 36 percent were 
not sure, and 4 percent thought it was their political party. These figures could be 
compared to a 2005 TAF and CAS survey of 620 CC members, according to which 
70 percent endorsed the statement that they were subordinate to district and 
provincial authorities. 
One of the remarkable results in the quantitative data is the confusion about 
who the CCs are accountable to. During the fieldwork, I asked many commune 
councillors who the bosses of the CCs were. A commune councillor in Siem Reap 
explained: 
In theory, as the elected commune councillors we should answer to the 
people in our community. In fact, our real boss is the district authority 
because they have been our boss since 1979, so we are used to that 
traditional norm/habit. Another problem is that CC members are still 
reluctant to exercise decentralised power, bypassing the district authority, 
because the district is still powerful and officials there are in the same 
political party (commune councillor, Siem Reap province, 23 April 2006).  
Many CC members fully understand that they should be accountable to 
voters (as above). Despite the fact that the district does not have direct control 
over commune administration and finance, many CC members still consider the 
district as the boss and hierarchically superior. The district has the power as the 
general commander of the military, military police and police. In the political 
party structure, the district governor is usually the district head of the political 
party, to whom CC members are subordinate as party members. In this regard, 
the district governor remains the boss in the party system (see Öjendal & Kim 
2008).    
As stated above, although local elections have helped to define the role and 
responsibility of the CCs, the complex patronage network within the political parties 
and electoral system does not allow CC members to operate fully independently from 
their political party and from higher authorities. The political party and electoral 
system confuse the role and accountability of the CC members. I asked some 
commune councillors which agency has the right to fire them, and got mixed 
responses. A commune chief in Battambang said:  
I am not sure. It could be the national government such as the Ministry of 
the Interior, the provincial or district level, the political party and people. 
All of these agencies have influential power over councillors. Each CC 
member must be affiliated with a political party. If he or she is fired from the 
party, he or she automatically loses her/his position in the council. However, 
if a party is not elected, one cannot come to power either. The upper 
authorities at the national and provincial levels are in charge of rules and 
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regulations. So to speak, I do not understand the procedure (commune chief, 
Battambang province, 4 May 2007). 
According to the above data, elected CCs are still directly receiving 
information from the upper authorities such as the district level. Although the 
media play a critical role in disseminating information, the state has an influential 
role in controlling the media. Besides the central government, a political party 
has ultimate power to determine the fate of the commune councillors who belong 
to that party. Councillors seem to be confused about accountability or who to 
report to between the national level, district level and political party.  
Sources of funding for CCs 
Chapter V showed that the demands for materials outputs from CCs are many, 
and that CCs have very limited resources to realise these demands. In this 
difficult situation, politicians or rich business people provide the material outputs 
in return for political loyalty. Informal funding from politicians makes CCs 
upwardly accountable to those funders. Other sources of funding are vital for 
creating a clear line of accountability between CCs and voters. The discussion 
below will present the different sources and the views of voters on this issue that 
are relevant to accountability. First comes a description of current funding of 
commune councils. 
There are not many sources of funding available to CCs. Article 75 of the 
Law on Administration and Management of the Commune) specifies the right of 
the commune/sangkat to receive grants from the national revenue. First, the CSF 
includes both national transfers and national donor funds for the communes, 
which are earmarked for development and administration. The only reliable 
sources of funding are the CSF and donors’ support to development projects, 
which are mostly run by NGOs. On-budget or direct cash flow from the national 
transfer to CCs, which is about USD15,000-20,00022 for each commune annually, 
depending on population, is spent on councillors’ salaries,23 administration and 
small development projects in the commune. Besides these sources, from time to 
time there are other funding sources that are not permanent or reliable. These 
include contributions by generous people or private donors,24 NGO projects, the 
Social Fund of Cambodia (funds from the World Bank in the form of services 
and infrastructure projects), political parties or politicians25 and local villagers. 
                                                
22 By 2010 the CSF had almost doubled to US$15,000-20,000 for each commune. 
23 From January 2011, the government has increased the salary of commune councillors and village 
chiefs by 50 percent (60,000R about $15).  
24 In thenorth-west, for example in Battambang and Siem Reap provinces, most of the private 
donors are Cambodian expatriates in America and Europe. However, there are some cases of rich 
people in urban areas, mostly politicians, paying huge contributions to build local infrastructure. 
This kind of contribution is mostly perceived by people as vote buying. It has been common in 
rural areas, occurring especially before election time. 
25 It was very difficult to elicit information about funding from political parties. Very often, 
informants categorise it as part of private funding, or called it a gift (omnoy) from generous 
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The communes’ own sources of revenue are currently service charges and 
revenues for performing agency functions of civil registration, i.e. the issuing of 
birth, death, ceremonial and marriage certificates. The rate set by the government 
for issuing such certificates is 400 riels (US$0.10). The annual amount of such 
fees collected by a commune range from about US$ 440 in Phnom Penh, US$ 
300 in provincial towns and US$170 in district towns to US$ 100 in rural areas 
(EIC 2006). The actual fees and charges, however, vary from place to place 
because of petty corruption. It is reported that, to get a certificate issued, one 
needs to pay at least 10,000 riels (US$2.50) unofficially, and this price could be 
many times higher in urban areas. As we have seen, the remaining funding is not 
reliable and the amount is low.  
Major development projects funded by the CSF26 are paved roads, irrigation 
schemes and school buildings. Minor projects are the construction of wells and 
latrines, training and advocacy by NGOs and various repair and maintenance 
schemes.  
Below are the sources of funding for the commune councils each year from 
2002 to 2005 and their share of total funding. It is sensitive for CCs to disclose 
the exact amount of funding, i.e. from politicians, and contributors rarely provide 
cash to CCs but only infrastructure, so that the calculations of funding are based 
on the number of projects. Sometimes there are many small projects, whereas 
other communes may have fewer projects but larger amounts of funding. These 
four sources of funding commonly exist in every commune in the country (cf. 
Pak 2011). 
For 2002, the data from the 10 communes surveyed show that 57 percent of 
project funding came from generous contributors, politicians and others (this year 
was an election year, and many politicians sponsored projects during the electoral 
campaign; it was also the first year of the CSF), 20 percent from NGOs, 16 percent 
from the CSF and 7 percent directly from political parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
people (saboros chun). This funding is normally in the form of infrastructure such as roads, 
schools or irrigation. 
26 These kinds of project are frequently funded by politicians from Phnom Penh because the CPP 
has a structure of working groups down to the commune level.Also many business tycoons are 
normally loyal to the CPP; they help to fund a lot of local infrastructure, especially before 
elections (Cf. Pak, 2011). 
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Figure 6.14: Sources of funding for 10 communes in 2002 
 
 
The figures for 2003 show an increase in the share of funding from the CSF 
to 23 percent. NGOs provided 54 percent (NGOs normally have many but smaller 
projects, and sometimes the CCs include training as projects by NGOs); 18 percent 
was contributed by generous people and politicians, and 5 percent came directly 
from political parties. 
 
Figure 6.15: Sources of funding for 10 communes in 2003 
 
 
In 2004, the level of CSF funding increased further. Meanwhile, since 2004 
was not an election year, funding from political parties, politicians and generous 
people decreased. The data indicate that 31 percent of the funding was from the 
CSF, 58 percent from NGOs, 2 percent from political parties, and 9 percent from 
generous people, politicians and others.  
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Figure 6.16: Sources of funding for 10 communes in 2004 
 
 
The distribution between different funding sources in 2005 was similar to 
2004, and NGOs were the main project funding source in all 10 communes. The 
number of projects funded by the CSF decreased a little to 28 percent (observation 
suggests that after many years of experience with development planning, the CCs 
think that instead of spending CSF on many projects they should spend the money 
on a few major projects—mainly roads and irrigation, which aid productivity in the 
local economy—by accumulating the funds for a few years). Funding from NGOs 
remained the same at 57 percent, 2 percent came from political parties, and 13 
percent came from generous people, politicians and other sources.  
 
Figure 6.17: Sources of funding for 10 communes in 2005 
 
 
By way of comparison, the survey by TAF and CAS in 2005 with a much 
larger sample indicates that 45 percent of CC funding for development projects 
came from the CSF, 23 percent from NGOs, 16 percent from the Social Fund of 
Cambodia, 11 percent from generous people and 2 percent from political parties. 
Commune councillors are from time to time asked to perform other agency 
functions such as service delivery and civil registrations, but without corresponding 
funding to cover the administrative costs. CCs get little support from the line 
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from the line department, yet get all the blame from the villagers. A commune 
council deputy chief described how this affects them: 
We, the CC members, are sometimes the servants of the villagers and the 
officials from the line departments at the provincial level. For example, the 
officials always come to ask us to do this and that for them. We must spend 
our own time and fuel to work for them. You know, what we get in return is 
just a thank you (CC deputy, Battambang province, 5 May 2007). 
Besides inadequate funding, CCs face difficulties in raising awareness about 
their constraints, in particular regarding their sources of funding. Voters are 
confused about the sources of funding and the distinction between the CSF and 
funding from political parties, NGOs and generous people. CC members are 
castigated by voters when they collect local contributions because people have 
heard that the CCs have other sources of funding. 
According to commune councillors, there are various reasons why villagers 
are unaware of or confused about funding sources and other financial procedures. 
Lack of awareness or information about the sources of funding to CCs would blur 
accountability. First, CCs inform villagers about the sources of funding only when 
they receive a project. Second, villagers are not curious about the activities of the 
authorities. Third, when they come to meetings there is no interaction or curiosity 
from villagers. Finally, the large number of rules and regulations about 
decentralisation are difficult for villagers with limited education to understand. As 
one commune chief in Battambang explained: 
It is extremely difficult to raise villagers’ awareness of the commune’s 
sources of funding. Normally, we disseminate this information via village 
chiefs and CC members for them to help explain to people. However, we 
have several meetings with the villages that will get the development 
projects, so they understand most of them. They are not curious to know 
about it. You see in front of my house we put a bulletin board, but I have 
rarely seen anyone stop and read it. We do have accountability boxes [every 
commune council is required to have accountability boxes in villages for 
letters of complaint, if villagers want to express grievances] but there are 
not many letters when we check them (commune chief, Battambang province, 
27 April 2007).  
In the communes in Kratie and Kompong Speu, councillors face difficulty in 
collecting local contributions. Local contributions are designed to improve people’s 
ownership and participation in community development activities. The rates of 
contribution vary between communes, depending on living conditions. Most people 
face poverty, do not understand the purpose of local contributions and also do not 
trust the local authorities. A commune chief in Kratie described the difficulty in 
collecting local contributions (see Chapter III for the discussion of this local 
contribution): 
In this commune, collecting local contributions is a burden for councillors. 
Villagers are not willing to pay local contributions because most of them 
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are poor, some do not understand the procedures of local development, 
and most of them do not trust the authorities to spend their money 
effectively. People sometimes question the authorities about why they need 
to collect money when they receive a lot of money from the central 
government and NGOs (angkar) every year (commune chief, Kratie 
province, 29 September 2006). 
It is very often the lack of trust, CCs’ weak responsiveness to people’s 
needs, difficulty in convincing people to interact with the authorities, bias towards 
a political party and blurred information sharing. There are many reasons for this 
leader-villager gap, such as the political history, the poor performance and low 
legitimacy of representatives (commune councillors and sub-national government 
authorities) and the lack of a clear line between private and public domains 
(blurred accountability and blurred funding).  
Many commune councillors also expressed the view that humanitarian 
activities are mostly funded by gifts from politicians, which happens frequently but 
especially before national and local elections. Humanitarian activities, such as 
development projects, are also sometimes carried out by NGOs. People in the 
north-western part of the country are used to a programme of the 1990s called 
“Food for Work”. This programme was designed to help alleviate poverty in the 
short term by paying people in rice for their work as labourers to repair roads or 
construct irrigation canals. Moreover, some NGOs pay villagers to attend meetings 
and training programmes, though this usually involves only selected villagers of 
local CBOs and NGOs. Many CC members blame these rewards for contributing to 
the difficulty that authorities experience in mobilising people to participate in 
community activities. Sometimes, when people face natural disasters, gifts are also 
delivered by the Cambodian Red Cross, NGOs and politicians.  
As outlined above, the data on the sources of funding to the 10 communes 
show that each has implemented many projects funded by the CSF, and that the 
funding is used for major projects, especially irrigation and paved roads, based on 
demands from voters. Some project activities, mostly small scale such as training 
and advocacy, are funded and/or implemented by NGOs, and most such projects 
bypass the commune councils. The other three sources of funding—political parties 
or politicians, private donors or generous people and other sources (for instance in 
Battambang there are some remittances from the Khmer diaspora)—are included in 
the statistics because many CC chiefs do not want to disclose the exact number of 
projects funded by politicians or political parties. The empirical data reveal that 
there are no independent generous people; most contributors are politicians and the 
number of projects undertaken decreases during years when there are no national or 
commune elections. 
Summary of key findings on CC members’ accountability 
Various aspects of CC members’ accountability are summarized below:  
• Elected CC members are not clear on the meaning of accountability. 
Hence, various accountability mechanisms are used by CC members: 
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being transparent, nurturing good relations with voters and behaving 
pleasantly and with humility.  
¥ Some CC members are still confused about who they should be mainly 
accountable to. However, there is an increasing awareness among them in 
this regard. Most CC members feel an obligation that, as elected 
councillors, they should be accountable to voters.  
¥ The empirical data show that CC members prefer to work with educated 
people such as schoolteachers and old respected members of the 
community.  
¥ There are no clear mechanisms by which voters can evaluate the 
performance of CC members. There are three mechanisms through which 
people can learn about the performance of CCs: public meetings, village 
chiefs and friends.  
¥ Obtaining information from the central government is centred on direct 
engagement or meetings with upper authorities (district and provincial 
level), broadcast media and attending seminars and workshops. 
¥ Sources of funding are the backbone of CC members’ accountability. The 
sources of funding currently make CC members upwardly accountable 
and encourage them to lean on individual politicians and the central 
government.  
Voters’ perceptions of CC accountability 
As outlined in chapters I and II and at the beginning of this chapter, accountability 
depends on the electorate’s belief that elected representatives are operating in the 
public interest. This section explores voters’ perceptions of commune councillors’ 
accountability. The empirical aspects which will be investigated in this section in 
particular include: CC members’ performance, information flow from CCs to 
voters, awareness of voters on sources of funding and electoral accountability. 
 
Figure 6.18: Can everyone in your village access the CC members? 
(Views of 583 voters) 
 
 
Voters recognised that CC members are accessible to everyone in the 
commune if they need assistance. Some 96 percent of voters agreed that CC 
members are accessible. Voters are thus benign about CC members, believing that 
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when they need services from them, they are able to gain access, although they are 
not sure that the services they ask for will be realised (see Chapter V).  
When voters were asked whether they thought CC members would help 
them if they sought their assistance, about 83 percent said they felt that CC 
members would. This is a very high proportion given the particular historical 
context. Only 4 percent did not believe that the CC members would help them, and 
13 percent were not sure.  
 
Figure 6.19: Do you think CCs would assist you if you go to them? 
(Views of 583 voters) 
 
 
Generally, voters pay attention to the conduct of CC members. Voters were 
asked whether the commune councillors ever come to their village: 85 percent 
agreed that they had seen CC members come to work in their villages, while 15 
percent said no. In other words, a clear majority of voters agree that the commune 
councillors come to their villages to meet with people and for various activities. 
 
Figure 6.20: Do the commune councillors ever come to your village? 
(Views of 583 voters) 
 
 
According to the in-depth interviews, voters generally feel positive about CC 
members. Most of them are confident that CC members now are more 
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approachable for everyone in the commune, hence being ready to answer. Many 
voters observed that CC members often come to meet people and try to understand 
the general situation at village level. Furthermore, CC members are trying to assist 
voters where needed. A villager in Battambang described: 
I think CC members now are much better than before. All commune 
councillors seem to pay more attention and be very concerned about 
community matters. They are humble and approachable by everyone in the 
community regardless of the differences of political parties. People’s 
interaction and participation with the authorities depends on the personality 
and behaviour of leaders. If leaders are soft and nice to everyone, people 
feel safe and comfortable about interacting closely (layperson, Battambang 
province, 28 April 2006). 
According to the remark above, to be accountable and make people more 
comfortable about working with CCs depends on the personality of the leaders (CC 
members). People do not judge their leaders based only on legal-rational grounds. 
CCs face a difficult task in getting people to understand the legal framework. There 
is, however, also a different aspect of the general accountability of CC members. A 
well-educated school principal expressed his view on the relationship between 
leaders and voters: 
After four years of having the elected commune council, there is still a gap 
between CC members and voters. This gap remains wide, and they are not 
well harmonised with each other. We can see this relationship like mixing oil 
and water, which are not easy to integrate. For the role and responsibility of 
CC members, they should have done better than this, providing more 
services, being transparent to everyone and the public, like water and fish. 
However, CCs are more accountable to their own political party and family 
first before being accountable to voters (school principal, Battambang 
province, 28 April 2006).  
Overall, people’s assessment of CC members’ performance seems positive. 
However, there were some complaints from villagers during the time of the 
fieldwork that people needed to pay an extra fee to the clerk or councillors when 
seeking services or assistance from them. This is a form of petty corruption. 
Sometimes councillors, it is claimed, are biased towards people from their own 
political party, friends or those with kinship ties. CC members are also too busy 
with meetings or other work with upper authorities and therefore do not pay 
attention to solving people’s problems. A respected elder in Battambang described 
this: 
I am normally curious about the work of the commune authority and people. 
There are always people complaining that clerks or CCs charge extra fees 
when they go to seek services in the commune—civil registration and other 
paper work. Sometimes when people need to sell cows or need approval 
from village chiefs, they must pay extra as well (villager, Battambang 
province, 11 November 2005). 
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People also blame local authorities (village chiefs and commune councillors) 
for being biased when it comes to delivering charity gifts. Normally, charity gifts 
are attached to, or delivered by, politicians. CC members commonly help mobilise 
people to welcome and receive gifts when there are high-ranking government 
officials visiting (mostly from the CPP because the CPP is the dominant ruling 
party). Despite working within official hours, CC members generally invite only 
people from their own political party. This creates a lot of resentment and 
frustration among villagers towards CC members and shows that the ruling party 
has been increasing its political influence by using state institutions. 
Information flows from CCs to voters 
Information flows and the freedom of people to express their ideas to commune 
councillors are important conditions for promoting accountability. Findings from 
my fieldwork show that village chiefs control information from the commune to 
the villagers (see Chapter IV) or play the key role in channelling it via meetings 
and direct announcements. Buddhist temples and laypersons also play a critical role 
in disseminating information to villagers, in particular during the meetings for 
traditional worship ceremonies. It is normal in rural society for information to be 
shared informally byword of mouth. Such information flows, via village chiefs and 
informal word of mouth, have some disadvantages such as risks of 
miscommunication and information being distorted. In every commune of this 
study, it is difficult to mobilise people to attend meetings in the commune. Usually 
people ask those who have been to the meeting for information. Frequently, 
information shared in this way becomes blurred or distorted and the source of 
rumours. Below are the results from the survey of voters’ views on information 
flows from CCs. There are different sorts of information related to different issues 
such as elections, policies from the central government, civil registration and 
services. 
About 20 percent of voters received information from the commune council 
by attending meetings in the villages, about 4 percent went to meet CC members 
directly, about 10 percent received information byword of mouth, and about 66 
percent usually obtained information via the village chief. The majority of villagers 
thus depend on the village chief for channelling information while the second most 
important means of receiving information is meetings with the CC. 
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Figure 6.21: How do you receive information from CCs? (Views of 583 voters) 
 
 
65 percent of respondents stated that the CC members were honest in 
information dissemination, 20 percent did not believe so, and 15 percent were not 
sure.  
 
Figure 6.22: Do you think that CC members are honest in terms of disseminating 
information to villagers? (Views of 583 voters) 
 
 
60 percent of voters felt that they were encouraged by local authorities to 
critique or express their ideas about the performance of CCs, 30 percent felt that 
they were not encouraged, and 10 percent were not sure.  
 
Figure 6.23: Are villagers encouraged to have opinions on the activities of CCs? 
(Views of 583 voters) 
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Approximately 43 percent of voters surveyed stated that they had been 
invited by CCs to attend meetings, while 57 percent, i.e. the majority, stated that 
they had never been invited. Villagers do not feel comfortable attending meetings 
unless they are invited. 
 
Figure 6.24: Have you ever been invited or informed to attend a meeting at the commune 
council? (Views of 583 voters) 
 
 
The interaction between CCs and voters is somewhat limited. When asked 
whether CCs have ever sought assistance or information from voters, 65 percent 
said that the CC had asked for local contributions, 8 percent that the CC had asked 
for labour, 24 percent were not sure, and 3 percent said that the CC had sought 
information. In villagers’ perceptions, CCs thus mainly engage with them when 
collecting local contributions. 
 
Figure 6.25: Has the CC ever sought assistance or information from you or other 
villagers? (Views of 583 voters) 
 
 
People’s interaction with the authorities is not genuinely active because 
attendance at meetings is by invitation. There are still mixed views about this 
among villagers given their past experiences with previous political regimes (the 
Khmer Rouge and the PRK). Meetings at that time meant listening to the 
commands of the regime leaders. Many people expressed the view that being 
invited to a meeting is good because it is a way to get information such as updates 
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on development activities and to learn new things. However, some people still have 
the feeling that an invitation by the authorities to attend a meeting is a command. 
CC members do not often go to meet villagers directly. Most of the work and 
reporting between villagers and the commune authorities is done through village 
chiefs. The activities that CC members typically do in the villages include chairing 
meetings, disseminating information, seeking information from people for the 
development plan, distributing donations, accompanying NGOs and conducting 
civil registration. Villagers are not curious about the financial resources of the 
commune as long as they get the outputs, and the norm is that ordinary people 
should not question or pose many demands on the authorities. Sometimes people’s 
lack of curiosity creates the relationship, illustrated by the saying sach min ban si 
yourk choeung pchour kor, “You have not tasted the meat but only have the bones 
attached to your neck” (If something does not concern you directly, you should 
ignore it because otherwise you might get involved with the problem). Holding 
leaders truly accountable to the people remains a long way off, according to the 
empirical findings. 
Villagers generally observed that, since the commune election, they have not 
been afraid to express their ideas in public, even on political issues. As mentioned 
earlier, most information sharing among villagers is informal. It seldom happens 
that villagers pose questions directly to their leaders (except to village chiefs, those 
with kinship ties or close friends). Political opinions are very seldom discussed in 
public or with strangers. I was trying to understand the motives and the implicit 
views behind this reluctance to express oneself in the public sphere, and almost 
everyone said that this is the norm, and a result of being shy and of people, due to 
political matters, not trusting anyone other than their kin and close friends. 
Villagers, in particular women, who have no education and limited exposure to the 
authorities, are normally very submissive to leaders. They lack self-confidence, 
feel shy in public, are afraid of being impolite to the leaders, view themselves as 
ignorant and just listen but do not interact. A woman in Siem Reap said:  
In every meeting in the village with commune councillors or other leaders, 
most people do not express or raise questions because they fear being wrong 
in public and losing face. But they always whisper with one another and 
float rumours around—sometimes this leads to conflicts (villager, Siem Reap 
province, 24 April 2006). 
A villager in Kratie province similarly said: 
People in the village are not used to talking in public meetings or 
gatherings, but rather whisper behind commune councillors’ backs. I 
personally think this is a bad habit. Another thing is the issue of non-
interference or not challenging leaders, being afraid of using the wrong 
words or of being impolite (klach khos) (villager, Kratie province, 30 
September 2006). 
Villagers agree that commune councillors and village chiefs inform them 
about meetings and, during the meetings, villagers are encouraged to express their 
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opinions and to question the authorities. However, villagers rarely stand up to 
express their views in the meetings because they are not used to this direct 
interaction with authorities, which would be contrary to habitual behaviour. A 
well-respected person who is also a layperson working in the wat described this: 
All heads of households are informed by the village chief about the meeting 
in the commune. For me, the meeting is important. I am never absent from 
the commune or the village. I get informed all the time. However, a lot of 
people do not pay attention or do not attend the meeting, so they do not 
know what is going on in the commune, and some of them confuse the 
information, leading to misunderstandings about activities in the commune. I 
think information sharing is very important for villagers and the authorities 
to understand each other (layperson, Battambang province, 3 May 2006). 
The discussion on the information flows between CCs and voters shows that 
the village chiefs are the most important in providing information, acting as 
liaisons between CCs and voters. Voters are informed about meetings and are 
encouraged to express their ideas in the meetings, but they are constrained by 
norms and habits, and by the belief that attending meetings involves just listening 
to the leaders or being informed, but not sharing views and ideas or questioning the 
leaders. This weak participation and interaction lead villagers to think that they 
have no power or ability to share information with leaders or authorities, and that 
their role is simply to listen to the command from the top. This information flow is 
a major constraint on the accountability of CC members. In rural Cambodia, it is 
rare for people to mobilise collectively to react directly against the authorities 
because people are afraid of authorities and not used to challenging them (because 
in past experience the authorities suppressed the people). However, exceptions to 
this occur when gross mismanagement is revealed. 
Voters’ awareness of the sources and amount of funding for CCs 
Accountability depends on the extent to which voters can discover the truth or the 
conduct of leaders. Although CC members are doing their best to share information 
through meetings and the village chiefs, voters have limited information, for 
instance, about the resources that CCs receive. Below are the results of the survey 
of voters concerning their knowledge and understanding of the annual CC budget. 
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Figure 6.26: Do you know the amount of funds in the commune every year? 
(Views of 583 voters) 
 
 
According to the commune/sangkat law, CCs have to inform people every 
year of the amount of the CSF that the commune receives. The results of the survey 
indicate that 90 percent of people do not know the size or the sources of funding 
for their commune (Figure 6.26). There are arguments on this issue: many CC 
members argue that they try their best to disseminate information about the sources 
of funding to people via bulletin boards, accountability boxes and meetings, but the 
message does not reach people well.  
Some villagers who are educated and curious about the performance of CCs 
resent the lack of clarity about accountability between political parties and 
commune councils. However, most people are not curious about the sources of 
funds or how CCs obtain revenue, whether from a political party or the central 
government. People’s only concern is to get the projects completed for their 
community. A villager gave these ideas on the CC’s performance: 
Accountability is directly linked to the leadership style of the elected 
representatives. There is a tricky business now among political parties. The 
ruling party is rich and trying its best to make its councillors accountable to 
constituents via different achievements by using resources from the party 
and financial resources of the commune. Obviously people do not 
understand the amount and sources of money in the commune, but they 
appreciate whatever is done by the CC. If the commune chief belongs to the 
ruling party, people might think that the money is from the political party to 
which the chief belongs (villager, Kratie province, 26 September 2005). 
This passage reveals that voters appreciate the material outputs delivered by 
CCs but do not care about the sources of the money that CCs use. Most of the 
councillors who are able to respond to a demand of citizens during election 
campaigns are those from the ruling party because the party has resources. People 
are typically not able to distinguish between the Commune/Sangkhat Fund and 
political party funding. 
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Electoral accountability: voters’ views 
Electoral accountability has the potential to establish a contract between elected 
councillors and voters. There are at least three critical aspects concerning voters’ 
perceptions of their elected councillors: Do voters believe that they can change 
their leaders through the ballot? How many political parties are represented in a 
commune council? And, can elections increase the trust of voters in their elected 
councillors? Below are the results of the survey and in-depth interviews with voters 
on these issues.  
When voters were asked whether they have the power to change the CC 
members in the next election if they do not perform well or do not serve the people, 
about 90 percent said they thought that they could vote CC members out of office 
(Figure 6.27). 
 
Figure 6.27: If commune councillors are not accountable to people or do not serve the 
people, do you have the power to change them in the next election? (Views of 583 voters) 
 
The interaction between voters and CCs takes place via political parties. 
However, voters were not sure how many political parties there were in their 
commune council; 43 percent did not know the exact number (Figure 6.28). 
 
Figure 6.28: Do you know how many political parties there are in  
the commune council? (Views of 583 voters) 
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The survey indicates that 57 percent of voters thought that the level of trust 
had improved, 32 percent thought it had not, and 11 percent were not sure. 
 
Figure 6.29: Do you think that trust in commune councillors in this village has  
improved since the commune election? (583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
According to the in-depth interviews, the understanding of electoral 
accountability is high among voters. People are largely aware that leaders can be 
voted out in the next election if they do not perform well. Decisions on what party 
to vote for depends on “gifts” from, and the performance of, each party. As 
mentioned earlier, gift sharing from politicians is very effective because people are 
still mainly driven by material needs. Also, they often do not see the link between 
vote buying by politicians and the corruption and political manipulation that 
provincial and central power-holders use to exploit resources from the community 
via rent seeking and patronage. The current system also allows the ruling party to 
use its network and power to extract more resources that can be channelled through 
the party and used to win people’s trust, which in turn further undermines the 
electoral process and state institutional norms (cf. Pak 2011). This gift sharing 
[omnoy] during elections creates a heavy burden for smaller parties since most of 
them lack resources to deliver gifts and have weak grass-roots networks. A school 
principal explained: 
People’s knowledge of elections is high, regardless of whether they are old 
or young, educated or uneducated. During election campaigns, people are well 
aware that they could get something from politicians, and they know that they 
have the power to elect their leaders. Some are even very smart, willing to take 
gifts from all political parties, but they vote for the party that they like the most 
(school principal, Battambang province, 11 May 2007). Voters believed that, 
since the election in 2002, trust between voters and CCs had improved.  
 
A villager in Battambang said: 
People do understand the importance of an election, that if the leaders are 
not performing well they will not be elected in the next election. This is 
because many people have experienced many elections since 1993. However, 
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there are two problems: people do not understand the electoral system that 
we have now and whatever the system is, is not important, but the role of the 
political party is more important so they can attract people to vote for them 
by using gifts and other influence (villager, Battambang province, 5 May 
2007). 
People appreciate the multiparty system and are glad to have many elected 
members in the commune councils. An elderly person in Kampot revealed his 
feelings:  
I do support the multiparty system that we have currently in the commune 
council, which is good and necessary for Cambodia’s development. Since 
the commune election, the coordination and teamwork between CC members 
from different political parties have been okay. However, individual CC 
members are still biased towards their own political party, which is why I 
think they give priority to their political party, then the public responsibility 
of the commune secondly (villager, Kampot province, 30 March 2006). 
The survey data and in-depth interviews with voters show that they 
appreciate having the commune elections and elected members from different 
parties. However, it seems that it is difficult for CC members to be truly 
accountable to voters since they are more dependent on and accountable to their 
political parties, and there is a mix of electoral accountability and gift-giving, 
which is hard for the villagers to be clear about. 
Summary of findings on voters’ perceptions of accountability 
At least five important factors have been identified in voters’ perceptions of the 
commune council’s accountability: 
• The general view of voters on CC accountability is positive. Most voters 
recognise that CC members now are more approachable by everyone in 
the commune. Voters seem to trust that CC members are working hard to 
help voters when they need assistance. CC members are more engaging 
and interactive with voters than previously, not only with people from 
their own political party, but with everyone in the commune. 
• Voters feel that the information from the commune councils is honest, 
and that councillors do not distort the information for their own political 
advantage. Voters recognise that CCs are working hard to encourage 
voters to express their opinions during meetings. However, the majority 
of voters think that information goes through the village chiefs and that 
voters must be invited in order to attend a meeting.  
• Despite the fact that the information flow from CCs to voters is relatively 
good and there are many meetings and attempts by CCs to channel 
information to voters, many voters are confused and do not know how 
much funding their commune council receives annually. This confusion 
about the sources and amounts of funding weakens and blurs 
159 
accountability. The role of village chiefs is critical for information from 
CCs to voters. 
• The awareness among voters of electoral accountability is very high 
because most of the voters have experienced many elections. Through 
media and electoral campaigns, voters are well aware that they have 
power, that if their leaders do not perform well, voters can vote them out 
in the next election.  
• There are still blurred lines of accountability between the commune 
“state” and political party and different levels of government. People are 
not well informed about the sources of funding, which political parties 
mostly use as a form of vote buying.  
Concluding remarks 
The accountability of commune councils in Cambodia is not easy to understand—
the context is complex, and accountability remains embryonic because of the low 
level of political education of both the elected and the electors. Although the 
ultimate degree of accountability to elected remains to be seen, the decentralisation 
reform has introduced many soft principles of accountability, such as interaction 
between voters and leaders, information sharing, people’s participation, voice of 
the people, leaders taking an interest in understanding people’s situations and 
electoral accountability.  
It is not easy to cultivate accountability in a post-conflict society such as 
Cambodia’s, because accountability of both leaders and people were historically 
used by commandist or autocratic and centralised regimes. The practice of 
accountability remains unclear because the concept is new. Currently, it seems that 
commune councillors use the term while broad practice stems from old norms and 
habits.  
Information and freedom of expression during election campaigns depend 
largely on the village chiefs, who are overwhelmingly from the same political 
party. People’s knowledge of the CCs’ sources of funding is limited, which allows 
the ruling party (CPP) to take funds from its own political party and uses for its 
own political benefit. Even though voters receive education and their awareness is 
high, their decision on what party to vote for depends on gifts from politicians, 
making them vulnerable to indirect vote buying.  
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CHAPTER VII 
FINDINGS ON DEVOLUTION OF POWER 
 
In Cambodia power rests only with the chief. The chief holds ultimate power 
and the subordinates need to listen to him. Being an ordinary villager, I have 
no choice but to listen to the leaders without posing any questions to them. 
As a Cambodian proverb says, there is room for only one tiger on a hill, and 
when big people fight among themselves, small people die “Domrei chol 
knea, ngaib sromoch sang ar” [the elephants fight, the ants die] (older 
villager, Kratie province, 23 September 2005). 
My aim in this chapter is to present the empirical findings concerning the 
devolution of power to elected commune councils within the Cambodian 
decentralisation reform. A number of questions will be investigated empirically, 
such as: How do people and leaders generally perceive power? What is the political 
power structure in Cambodian society? Who actually possesses power in relation to 
decentralisation? To what extent is power devolved to commune councils, and 
what are the different ways of exercising power by the CC members? How do CCs 
and voters perceive the devolution of power in decentralisation?  
Before presenting the empirical findings on the devolution of power, it is 
critical to highlight some fundamental domains of power and power relations in 
Cambodian political culture. Previous chapters (I, II and III) have shown that 
power is a contested and complex concept which is arguably the single most 
important organising concept in social and political theory (cf. Hay 2002). 
According to a range of studies, power relations in Cambodia are intertwined with 
patron-client and neo-patrimonial networks (Heder 2005; Pak et al. 2007; Marston 
1997; Mabbett & Chandler 1995; Luco 2003; Collins 1998; Roberts 2008) and with 
traditional relationships and values of loyalty, gratitude/obligation and hierarchy 
(Thon et al. 2010). Along with its neo-patrimonial features, power in Cambodian 
society is found within strict social hierarchies, personalised kinship patronage 
relations and informal personal relations (Chandler 2000). According to such 
customs, lines of authority and loyalty exist between individuals rather than 
between offices (Mabbett & Chandler 1995; Ledgerwood & Vijghen 2002; 
Chandler 2006), providing a challenge for any formal reform such as 
decentralisation.  
Gottesman’s study (2004) describes the moral capacities of commune and 
village officials as being less important in determining their relationships with 
villagers than the institutional setting within which they operate. He further 
describes the appointment of village and commune authorities in the 1980s as 
entrenching existing patronage systems, but also points out that these authorities 
were not particularly disciplined in following the orders of their patrons. Political 
power in Cambodia in the 1980s involved coercion and force and was centralised, 
which meant that leaders practised an authoritarian form of power and gave 
commands to and ruled their followers from above.  
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Scholars have been sceptical about the potential outcomes of the 
decentralisation reform given the reform-resistant context and the interplay 
between a new structure of power and the pre-existing patterns of political culture 
(Blunt & Turner 2005; Slocomb 2006; Un 2005; Un & Ledgerwood 2003). A study 
by Sovatha Ann (2008), Patron-Clientelism and Decentralisation, reveals that 
despite the new decentralisation, the old practices of patronage and one-party 
control still exist. However, decentralisation has changed the nature of power 
structures and patron-client relationships in that it has introduced a new discourse 
on power—one that places certain elements of control on the client’s side. A power 
structure of this sort was not possible during the socialist era of the 1980s (Ann 
2008; Kim & Öjendal 2009; Öjendal & Kim 2006). According to Ann, 
decentralised power structures fit with the Cambodian context, in which the old 
patronage practices and democratic decentralisation could interact (Ann 2008). 
Some would argue that one of the main difficulties for decentralisation in 
Cambodia is that the central government retains control and does not wish to 
devolve “too much “power to lower levels or elected bodies. For instance, Peter 
Blunt and Mark Turner contend that the government lacks a genuine desire to 
devolve power and that Cambodian political culture is not conducive to this kind of 
reform (Blunt & Turner 2005; Turner 2002). However, such a view is too harsh 
regarding the decentralisation reform, given the lack of empirical evidence. This 
chapter will explore the nature of the devolution of power to CCs.  
This chapter examines the exercise of power in the commune councils. It is 
divided into two sections. First it will explore the vocabulary of power in 
Cambodian society, as viewed by CC members and voters. How do CC members 
and voters perceive power in Cambodian local politics? This section will examine 
the contents of power, the relationship between rational and traditional power, how 
power is exercised and with whom power rests. Secondly, the chapter will examine 
empirically the devolution of power through decentralisation. We will seek to 
understand CC members’ perceptions of the devolution of power that they are part 
of. What kind and how much power are delegated to the CCs? This section also 
seeks to understand voters’ perceptions of the nature of the power exercised by 
CCs and the situation of power in commune councils. The outcome will be an 
assessment of and whether the mandate/formal power imbedded in the 
decentralisation reform is served for a functioning democratic decentralisation.  
Vocabulary of power in Cambodian society 
To understand the functioning of the devolution of power to commune councils, it 
is necessary to understand the meaning of power as defined and understood by 
people. The primary focus of this section is to discuss the meaning of the 
Cambodian term for power (om narch or rot om narch). In Cambodia, Weber’s 
(1947) “rational mandate” ground is embedded in local concepts of power.  
In Cambodian, power om narch and rot om narch are used interchangeably. 
According to the Cambodian dictionary, they means force, the ability to do 
something, bravery, the ability to do something according to one’s will, and the 
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ability to act according to the law (Cambodian dictionary 1967: 1156). Om narch is 
the content and means that individuals can use, but also applies to local authorities 
such as village chiefs and commune councillors.  
In Cambodian society, om narch is often perceived as abstract. It mostly 
revolves around individuals, and is understood as the informal and invisible power 
that an individual possesses, but is occasionally attached to institutions. Typically, 
om narch is abusive, threatening and commanding. When it comes to authority (rot 
om narch), people regard it as based on rules and institutions. Rot om narch refers 
to individuals or a group of government officials, and it can be viewed as the state.  
A synonym for authority is agnar thor, which, according to an English-
Cambodian dictionary, means institutionalised power or the power of the state (rot 
om narch)(Huffman & Im 1987). For day-to-day use, agnar thor and rot om narch 
are interchangeable and refer to village and commune leadership.  
The Cambodian terms for chief or boss are chau vay, me, pro thean and 
machhas. In informal situations, people call the commune chief lok me khum (“Mr 
Commune Chief”—the majority of CC chiefs are male) and in more formal and 
official situations such as meetings, lok pro thean krom preuk sa khum (“Mr Chief 
of a commune council”). At the local level, people use the term krom preuk sa 
khum (commune council) to refer to all the elected councillors in the commune, 
and sala khum or karyalai khum for the commune office (sala is a Pali word for a 
large room or a meeting room). The village chief is called lok me phum or me phum 
(“Mr Village Chief”) or pro thean phum (leader of the village).  
In Cambodia the term agnar thor moulthhan27 (local authority) can refer to 
the commune or village. Apart from commune chiefs, councillors and village 
chiefs, people talk about neak deuk noum moulthhan (other government 
employees) which literally translates to the person who leads and navigates the 
local/rural community or leads something or someone by the nose. Another 
Cambodian term is arng om narch, which literally means “lean on power” or “with 
power back-up” and which is frequently used for power holders and well-
connected people who abuse their power to exploit the powerless. 
The meanings above generally hold conceptions of om narch (power) and 
agnar thor (authority) in Cambodian society. They could be related to leaders’ and 
voters’ perceptions of the meaning of power. How is power understood by local 
leaders and voters? And with what groups of people does power reside?  
In the following, I will present two sections related to the term power: firstly, 
CC members’ perceptions of the term om narch and secondly, voters’ perceptions 
of the term om narch. Each section will be initiated by the quantitative data and 
followed by related qualitative discussions. At the end of each section, there will be 
a summary of key findings. At the end of the discussion of these two sections, I 
                                                
27 Note that the term moulthhan (local/rural) during the Khmer Rouge referred to local leaders or 
people who opposed urban dwellers, who were considered to be enemies of the angkar 
(organisation of the Khmer Rouge).  
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will highlight the similarities and differences of perceptions of CC members and 
voters. 
CC members’ perceptions of the term ‘power’ 
The survey of 74 commune councillors found that, to 38 percent of respondents, 
om narch primarily means the legal mandate to fulfil the legal responsibility and 
rights to manage and assist citizens; to 33 percent it means the ability to threaten, 
terrify, control and administer others; to 16 percent it means being the leader or 
being in a leadership position; to 7 percent it means the ability to make decisions; 
and to 6 percent it means courage and strength or force. It is evident, therefore, that 
the perception of om narch varies widely among councillors. To some power is 
viewed as rational and as a legal right, the ability to manage and assist people, 
naturally vested with a modern state. To others it is crude, regarded as the ability to 
threaten, terrify and control, governance pursued on a personal and illegitimate 
basis. 
 
Figure 7.1: In your view, what does the word “power” mean? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
Figure 7.2: Other than local authorities (CCs and village), who are the power holders in 
the commune? (74 CC members interviewed) 
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As illustrated in Figure 7.2, besides local authorities such as commune 
councillors, village chiefs, police and military, there are three major groups of 
people whom commune councillors perceive as power holders: well-connected 
people, rich or better-off people and political activists. About 55 percent of the CC 
members believe that power rests with well-connected people (the ones who 
through patronage networks based on kinship and friendship have affiliations with 
powerful people at provincial and national levels). About 22 percent believe power 
rests with rich or better-off people (normally local entrepreneurs who build 
connections with powerful people through rent seeking, which links economic and 
political resources). About 10 percent of CC members think that power rests with 
local political activists (people who are active in political parties), and about 9 
percent are not sure about where power rests. Furthermore, rich people usually 
have connections to powerful people in the city. In Cambodian society, rich and 
well-connected people are sometimes difficult to distinguish from each other, and 
they are usually connected to the ruling political party, which ensures reliable 
patronage protection.  
As could be assumed, the survey results indicate that, in local society in 
Cambodia, power rests with different tiers of province, district, commune and 
village authorities and elites (see Ledgerwood & Vijghen 2002). However, the 
authorities that villagers have been exposed to and interact frequently with are 
commune councillors and village officials. 
In order to cross-check with the quantitative data above, below are the 
discussions from the in-depth interviews.  
The in-depth interviews with local leaders, especially CC members, indicate 
that it is almost impossible for local leaders to exercise their full legal mandate. In 
fact, legal rationality must be pragmatically applied with traditional norms in order 
to be accepted and understood. Commune councillors from opposition parties made 
numerous complaints, saying that they did not have the decision-making power that 
is stipulated in the law. According to them, power resides only with the CC chief 
from the ruling party. For example, the first deputy chief of a commune council 
from the opposition party holds the following view: 
Having power means you can do whatever you want. No one would dare to 
complain or challenge you. Normally, power in Cambodia is not in line with 
the rule of law, but with the rule of man. As an elected commune councillor, 
I have very limited power, not what I am supposed to have, as spelled out in 
the law on decentralisation. Power rests only with the chief, with rich, well-
connected people and people with guns. During the 1980s, whoever had a 
gun was very powerful, but now things have changed a bit (CC member, 
Battambang province, 6 May 2007).  
Power, in the minds of the councillors, seems to have both positive and 
negative connotations. For example, a commune councillor said:  
In Cambodia, the notion of power is divided into positive power and 
negative power. If you exercise positive power based on the rule of law, you 
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are respected and listened to. However, power is mostly negative because 
individuals with power always abuse others—threatening and exploiting—
and no one dares to resist. As we can see nowadays, the power holders are 
rich and well-connected people who are backed up by even more powerful 
people at the top. Power rests only with groups and individuals, not with 
public institutions (CC member, Battambang province, 4 May 2007). 
Similar perceptions were expressed by a group of commune councillors:  
There are at least two kinds of power: first, personalised power, which is not 
good for the leaders—if one thinks of individual too much, this would lead to 
the abuse of power against the powerless. And secondly, public power for 
the community; this power could be shared or built for a collective 
community. This kind of power is really needed for our community (group of 
commune councillors, Battambang province, 27 April 2006). 
Another CC member in Battambang expressed a similar view: 
Power is absolute and personalised, resting with individuals and groups, but 
not with state institutions. Power holders are rich and well-connected 
people. But people who exercise power do not do so based on state 
regulations, but on personalised and informal network bases to which they 
are personally bound (samrosh samroul). To be in power, one needs to have 
patronage connections and political party affiliation, and one needs to be 
respected as well (CC member, Battambang province, 5 May 2007). 
A CC member in Siem Reap further elaborated:  
In our society, rich and well-connected people are very arrogant and abuse 
power at the expense of the poor. And the poor are envious and pessimistic 
about the rich (CC member, Siem Reap province, 23 April 2008).  
Expressing a similar understanding of the meaning of power, a group of 
commune councillors from different political parties claimed that power holders in 
Cambodia lack tolerance: 
People with power are normally the chiefs, who usually control the 
administrative power (om narch rotha bal). Power is not shared with other 
people of different groups or networks. Having power means having no 
tolerance. Power rests only with individuals. As we say in Cambodian: kbal 
neakna sak neak neung [your hair is always with your head: people are 
selfish—personalised power] (group of CC members, Kampot province, 28 
March 2006). 
CC members explained that, to achieve effective state law enforcement, 
leaders must now understand traditional values as well as having such qualities as 
tolerance, forgiveness, sharing and mutual understanding. Some people have 
different views based on their practical observations. A group of commune 
councillors including from the opposition indicated: 
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Currently, commune councillors from the ruling party use their power for 
the benefit of their political party and associates. Power is not shared with 
other elected councillors, but rests only with the chief from the ruling 
party. Currently, the ruling party can do whatever it wants. There are 
numerous proverbs in Cambodian that illustrate this view: “Your hair is 
always with your head” or “Whoever has the opportunity takes or 
eats”[neak na rok neak neung si] or the powerful person “eats the big part 
and the less powerful get the smaller part”[toch si tam toch and thom si 
tam thom] (group of CC members, Kampot province, 28 March 2006).  
As described in previous sub-chapters, in the 1980s in particular, people at 
large had a limited idea of political systems other than that under which they lived. 
This situation still prevails. Many local leaders have revealed that it is difficult to 
strike a balance between rational state law and traditional or religious beliefs. Local 
leaders are often biased towards a traditional or religious belief because through 
such a bias they can gain more legitimacy and popularity. As mentioned, local 
leaders said that they are used to traditional practices and have many kinship ties in 
the community. As a result of experiences in the turbulent past, when the function 
and effectiveness of state law was weak (and harsh), most local leaders are 
reluctant to execute strictly the rules, laws or regulations of the state because they 
do not know what will happen to them when they lose power. However, if you 
follow traditional norms, you can hope to be supported. For instance, should there 
be an emergency, only the villagers in the community would be able to assist you 
promptly since the state law is too far away.28 Hence, CC members seem to be 
trapped between traditional beliefs and rational state law because the two are 
sometimes in conflict. As a commune chief eloquently described: 
It is extremely difficult, especially when you are a leader in your own 
community. You need to strike a balance between rational state laws and 
traditional beliefs. I see that the traditional norms are also valuable because 
they teach people to have mutual tolerance, share compassion and improve 
reciprocity. However, sometimes, if I favour friends and traditional norms 
too much, it would make me act against the rule of law (youl ngneat klead 
chbarb) (commune chief, Battambang province, 5 May 2007).  
Power is not easily shared in Cambodia. As a group of CC members in 
Kampot noted: 
The power that CC chiefs possess is in administration and other important 
services. It seems that he does not share it with other elected councillors 
from different political parties. No clear responsibility is given to other 
councillors. All power rests with him. This is not democracy according to 
decentralisation because the boss always controls everything. You know 
tolerance, forgiveness and sharing are the traditional beliefs we have, but 
                                                
28 According to the interviews with many local councillors and villager chiefs, they do not trust law 
enforcement when facing problems; only friends and relatives in the same commune would be 
able to help them in an emergency. 
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they are not practised (group of CC members, Kampot province, 6 April 
2006). 
A commune council deputy chief in Battambang stressed: 
I would like to share with you that in our culture, power usually rests only 
with individuals and bosses, not with state institutions. Anyway, it is 
accepted by the people. For example, there are 11 commune council 
members from three political parties, but people just value and refer to the 
CC chief. However, I hope with electoral decentralisation they will change 
this attitude over time (commune council deputy chief, Battambang province, 
28 April 2006). 
According to a Cambodian saying, youl ngneat klead chbarb, if someone is 
tolerant with relatives or friends, he or she would act against the rule of law. This is 
reflected in leadership style. Local leaders put a lot of effort into following 
traditional norms since they see that state laws as far away from the community, 
and that to intervene based on state laws, one needs to go through a complex 
bureaucracy and patronage network, while in the local communities people still 
follow traditional and informal norms.  
Some people see traditional norms and state laws as overlapping. If the 
leaders can take advantage of both, they are able to foster their legitimate power. 
An older person who is also a commune councillor echoed this view: 
State law is normally regulated and must be obeyed. Of course, in 
Cambodia, there has been a weak tradition of law enforcement. However, 
traditional norms (tum lorb) are not much different from the rational state 
laws (tum neam or chbarb). In fact, they have been valued and practised for 
generations in this society. People are used to them, for example, to the 
mutual tolerance and reciprocity that we have in our society, especially for 
Cambodians. We have suffered from civil wars for many decades; we need 
peace and tolerance to avoid conflict (CC member, Battambang province, 5 
May 2007). 
Tum neam tum lorb is used interchangeably with tum neam (state law) and 
tum lorb (traditional norms). To be effective in leadership, leaders must be aware 
of the need for a balance between the two sources of power. This also shows that 
rational state law is difficult to enforce. 
Creating a balance between traditional norms and rational state law could 
bring just leadership and mutual tolerance to the community. A commune chief in 
Kompong Speu shared his view: 
To be a benevolent leader one must be aware of the situation in the 
community. Especially, leaders must be balanced between traditional norms 
and state laws. For example, leadership should be based on samak thor. This 
samak thor in leadership could lead to soft power (CC chief, Kompong Speu 
province, 3 April 2008). 
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It appears that ordinary people get used to suppression and the abuse of 
power by leaders, especially abuse by power holders. A female commune 
councillor in Siem Reap described this: 
Cambodians are always patient with suppression by leaders. But we hope to 
see leaders change their attitude to be more soft, humble, committed and 
tolerant. In reality, for example, we have seven elected councillors in the 
commune council, yet it seems that only the chief holds power over 
everything. But as you know, in our society and in Buddhist teachings, 
people, especially the ones with power, are always greedy and selfish. It 
comes as no surprise. Now, in this commune, the political agenda of political 
parties is always good, but individuals sometimes create problems (female 
CC member, Siem Reap province, 22 April 2006). 
A summary of the key points of CC members’ views on power (om narch) in 
Cambodian society is outlined below: 
• Om narch is viewed by CC members as having mixed meanings. Some 
CC members think that om narch has a rational association referring to 
legal rights and the ability to manage and assist people, while others think 
that it is the ability to threaten, terrify, administer and control. 
• Many CC members hold the view that, besides local authorities (CCs, 
village chiefs, police, military, public servants etc), om narch 
predominantly resides with well-connected people, rich people and 
political activists. Some CC members, especially from the opposition, 
think that power mostly resides with the chief, not with ordinary 
commune councillors. 
• CC members regard formal state power in Cambodia as being intertwined 
with traditional and Buddhist norms. To gain public support, leaders 
should exercise power based on both moral responsibility and on the legal 
rationality of state law.  
Voters’ perceptions of the term ‘power’ 
Voters seem to define om narch in a similar way to CC members. The following 
looks at voters’ perceptions of power.  
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Figure 7.3: To you, what does the word “power” mean? (583 voters interviewed) 
 
The survey found that 38 percent of voters thought that power is the ability 
to terrify, threaten and inflict violence on the poor. For about 30 percent, om narch 
is derived from networks related to money and patronage. About 20 percent 
thought that power can be gained through elections or legal rights; about 5 percent 
thought that power depends on the nature of the individual who has it; and about 7 
percent were unable to define the concept. These results (Figure 7.3) indicate that 
voters generally believe that power is negative and harsh, residing within patronage 
ties, and that leaders use their power against the poor. The overall views of power 
by voters reflect perceptions similar to those of the CC members. The difference is 
that voters see power as more negative and some CC members (38 percent) view 
power as implying legal rights. 
In local communities, om narch not only resides with individuals but also 
with different groups. For instance, power can be seen as largely residing with state 
institutions, such as commune councils, as well as with people who hold positions 
within the government, commune chiefs, councillors, village chiefs, 
police/military, various government employees and people with close connections 
to government officials. As indicated in the previous section, power is traditionally 
rooted with rich and well-connected people. These groups are mostly creditors and 
entrepreneurs or business people who own large plot of land or export/import 
businesses. Below are the survey findings concerning citizens’ views on who 
power rests with in the village. 
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Figure 7.4: From your own observation, who are the power holders in your commune? 
(583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7.4, 85 percent of respondents said that government 
officials hold power. About 12 percent said that power resides with rich people and 
only 3 percent that power resides with the educated, elders and monks. This might 
be because people do not understand the power structures beyond the local 
authorities who they normally interact with.  
Figure 7.5 reveals the responses to a similar question, but from another 
source with a larger sample of 1,240 voters (Ninh & Henke 2005). In this study, 36 
percent of respondents said that power rests with the commune chief, 24 percent 
with village chiefs, 16 percent with one of the councillors, 11 percent with rich and 
well-connected people, 13 percent with other officials. A comparison of the two 
surveys shows a similar result, namely that many people believe that the most 
important person in the commune is the chair of the commune council, while the 
second largest group of respondents believes that power resides with village chiefs. 
Below are discussed voters’ perceptions of decision-making and who holds power, 
as expressed in the in-depth interviews. 
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Figure 7.5: What group does power rest with? (TAF & CAS 2005) 
 
The issue here is to what extent the power vested with the commune councils 
is sufficient and where effective power is to be found. It is, in people’s and leaders’ 
perceptions, dispersed among different groups of people.  
The quantitative data indicate that power is often popularly viewed as harsh, 
hard, negative, absolute and personalised. This sort of power cannot be resisted, 
while a legitimate power must be rule-based. Voters largely think that power rests 
with local government officials and well-connected or rich people. 
A former commune chief in the 1980s expressed his view on the meaning of 
power in Cambodian society: 
The immediate meaning of om narch is negative. We of course say that 
power is kach [cruel and forceful]; intimidation and power cannot be 
resisted. In democracy, power can be good as [legality] om narch plov 
chbab; people with power must responsible for their role, transparent and 
accountable [responsible] for their performance (former CC chief, 
Battambang, 7 May 2007).
A respected layperson in a Buddhist wat defined power in positive terms: 
Power is the ability to perform well, with good capacity and education. To 
have power means that one must be able to perform effectively and to be a 
good role model—to be a chief you need all of this. Personally, I think that 
having power means you need to have an education—better than wealth. If 
you do not have good knowledge and skills, you are not respected and you 
cannot protect your wealth. It will disappear by your own ambition and 
ignorance (achar of wat, Battambang province, 7 May 2007). 
Some experienced villagers believe power can be divided into: formal 
power, which is the government authority (state authority); economic power; which 
is the wealth of rich people; and nepotism and cronyism within the system (former 
commune chief, Battambang province, 11 November 2005). 
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The ethnographic observations and interviews with voters showed again that 
in Cambodian society, power normally rests with the chief at every level. For 
instance, there are several councillors in the commune council, but the most 
powerful and influential person is the commune chief. As one villager described it: 
In Cambodian society, people seek assistance only from the chief. For 
example, there are many elected commune councillors working in the 
commune council, but when people talk about commune authority, they refer 
to the commune chief (chau vay or me) and not the rest of the CC members. 
This is because the chief possesses all of the decision-making power; he can 
get things done and make the final decision (villager, Battambang province, 
11 November 2005). 
Villagers commonly state that in Cambodia, powerful people normally abuse 
power. As one village couple noted: 
The problem in our society is that people with power arng om narch[abuse 
power]. These people with power, such as the rich, well-connected and 
powerful people in the government, exercise power to exploit people for 
their own sake. They can do whatever they wish, acting aggressively to the 
poor (couple, Kratie province, 21 September 2005). 
According to Cambodian beliefs, ideally leaders should practise the four 
principles taught by Buddhism, which would lead to good exercise of power: meta 
(compassion), karuna (pity and tolerance), mutita (sympathetic joy) and upikha 
(impartiality, neutrality and sincerity). A layman in a Buddhist temple explained:  
Leaders must be careful in exercising power and must be humble in order to 
be trusted. I think it is not that difficult for leaders to love the four principles 
of Buddhism, which are: meta, karuna, mutita and upikha. With these four 
principles, leaders obviously could avoid the abuse of power against the 
poor (Layman, Kratie province, 29 September 2008). 
A villager expressed his view on who power normally resides with: 
In Cambodian society, to have power is to be rich and connected with 
different powerful people at the top. Normally, only the chief holds the 
ultimate power, and the subordinates need to listen to him without making 
any objections (villager, Kratie province, 23 September 2005). 
A villager in Kratie province described the meaning of power and who held 
power in his commune:  
The word power means someone is influential who dominates others without 
much complaint [resistance]. But in our society the way that power is 
exercised is good or bad depending on the personality of individual leaders. 
Power holders in this commune are people who engage with authorities in 
the commune and village or police (villager, Kratie, 28 February 2011).  
For most Cambodians, power is imbued with the notion of Buddhism and the 
concept of karma. It is pervasive in the patronage and hierarchical terminology of 
 174 
Cambodian thinking, politics and social relations. For instance, people in power are 
thought to be more meritorious than other people.  
Power relies on the subjective perceptions of people—how people view 
themselves and their leaders. Many farmers and villagers I talked to consider 
themselves as prachea chun keu lgnong, which means that ordinary people are 
always ignorant, that they are born with bad luck (karma) for this life, so they just 
need to be patient. Meanwhile, a common perception is that leaders (mostly 
referring to urban dwellers)29 are born educated or intelligent: neak deuk noum keu 
neak chesdoeung. A woman said briefly, “It is simple being a leader; you must 
have good luck and fate from the previous life” (villager, Kratie, 23 September 
2005). Tveu bon dohl pi cheat mun is literally translated as having accumulated 
enough merits from the previous life.30 Accordingly, by Cambodian traditional and 
social norms, leaders are legitimately recognised from birth.  
Power in rural Cambodia is generated and exercised in different ways. Some 
key points of voters’ perceptions of the term power are: 
• Power is viewed by the majority of voters as negative and harsh, 
including the ability to threaten and act with violence against the poor, 
and building on networks of wealth and patronage. Only a small number 
of voters perceive power as a legal capacity that can be gained from 
elections. 
• The majority of voters think that power rests with two main groups: local 
authorities and government officials and another group of well-connected 
and rich people. 
• Power is often perceived—by voters and CC members similarly—as 
personalised, resting only with the chief, not shared, negative and with 
other harsh connotations.  
Having described CC members’ and voters’ views on the meaning of power 
and whom holds it, there are some similarities and differences. Both CC members 
and voters shared the view that power carries few positive connotations but mostly 
has negative connotations, such as the ability to threaten, inflict violence and 
intimidate. In another similarity, power is imbued with socio-political norms, 
personalised and not shared, resting mostly with the chief.  
                                                
29 During the Khmer Rougeregimerural people/leaders considered all urban dwellers as rich, 
educated and holding high positions; they became the enemies of angkar (the Khmer Rouge 
leadership) and most of them were killed. 
30 This is also related to the notion of karma, which is the centrepiece of Buddhist concepts, 
referring to the sum of one’s good and bad actions. For example, good actions in this life will 
lead to better spiritual and material existence in the next life. This is still pertinent to how people 
think of leaders, believing that leaders have good karmafrom the previous life and that people 
are poor and desperate because they have bad karmafrom the previous life. According to 
Buddhist teaching, desire or ambition and greed cause suffering. A person’s status in society is 
viewed as the result of his/her performance in the past. To improve personal status, one can 
accumulate merit by performing virtuous acts, such as contributing to Buddhist temples or being 
generous to monks and financing religious festivals. 
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While CC members and voters shared some views, there were differences on 
which group or individual’s power rests with. Commune councillors and other 
local officials who are exposed to and interact with higher authorities at the district, 
provincial and national level have a different view. For these local officials, power 
rests with well-connected and rich people (who normally have strong patronage 
backing from higher authorities) because they not comply with the rule of law put 
forward by local authorities or pay much attention to local authorities, usually 
bypassing them. In some cases, local officials and well-connected or rich people 
cooperate to enrich themselves (e.g. in natural resource-rich locales). However, in 
voters’ view, power rests with local officials or people with guns. Voters have little 
interaction with other officials beyond commune councillors, village chiefs and 
police, and their experiences with authorities in previous regimes may have been 
oppressive.    
The following sections will explain the devolution of power within 
decentralisation. Each section will start with the quantitative data on CC members’ 
and voters’ perceptions, followed by discussion of the in-depth interviews. 
Devolution of power: CC members’ perceptions 
This section presents and discusses the findings of the survey and the in-depth 
interviews with CC members on various aspects of the devolution of power to 
commune councils. Do CCs have as much power as the law stipulates? What kind 
of power do the CCs lack? The various aspects of power that CCs have and do not 
have will also be discussed. First will be presented what the survey says on the 
devolution of power.  
 
Figure 7.6: Do CCs have all the power that is stated in the laws? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
The majority of commune councillors believed that they cannot do what they 
are required to do, since power is not sufficiently devolved from relevant agencies 
and the central government. The direct question was whether CCs have the power 
that is stipulated in the decentralisation laws. 73percent of the CC members felt 
that they do not have the power they are supposed to have, and only 27 percent felt 
that they have the power the law stipulates. A majority thus felt that they are not 
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given sufficient clout, neither to carry out their tasks nor in agreement with the law. 
The possibility of a significant gap between mandated power and real power is a 
challenge for decentralisation, and is likely, if not remedied, to destabilise the 
reform in the long run. 
 
Figure 7.7: What powers do CCs lack? (74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
Another question posed to the CC members was which major discretionary 
powers they primarily lack. As illustrated in Figure 7.7, 81 percent stated that they 
do not have the power to generate local revenues, 4 percent that they lack power to 
manage enterprises, about 5 percent that they lack the power to manage natural 
resources and 10 percent that they lack judicial power, which means that they are 
unable to resolve conflicts efficiently. A large majority of CC members thus said 
that they lack what may be the key to making CCs accountable and responsive to 
local needs, namely the right to generate revenues. 
 
Figure 7.8: Do you currently have the power to generate your own revenue? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
CC Members were also asked specifically whether they have the power to 
generate revenue. Consistent with the findings just presented, 79 percent said that 
they do not and 21 percent said that they do. The reason that some CC members 
said that they have this power is that CCs are currently allowed to charge a small 
fee for civil registrations, though the fee does not really “count” for all councillors 
(see Chapter III). 
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Figure 7.9: Do CC members currently have the power to manage commune finances or 
CSF? (74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
The Commune/Sangkat Fund is allocated by the central government 
annually and mainly used for small-scale development activities. CC members 
revealed mixed views about the commune’s finances. The majority thought they 
had some power to manage the finances of the commune. Almost as many, 47 
percent, believed that they do not have the power to manage this small CSF, 
although that mandate seems to be clear in the law and the prakas. This is 
explained by the fact that CCs cannot unilaterally make decisions about the use of 
the fund, but need to go through a bidding process for small-scale infrastructure in 
which many relevant agencies are involved (during the field interviews, many 
commune councillors complained that they cannot fully manage the CSF due to 
financial regulations of the provincial treasury). As mentioned in Chapter III, the 
CSF is divided into two parts: salary and administrative costs in the commune and 
funds for the development of small infrastructure. The CCs have the right to 
manage only the administrative costs; for commune development funding, CCs do 
not have direct power of control because it has to go through a bidding process and 
several financial procedures. 
A controversial aspect is the lack of power to protect and manage natural 
resources, such as fisheries, water, land and sometimes forests. When CC members 
were asked whether they had enough power to safeguard such natural resources, 
about 32 percent said they had a great deal of power, while 46 percent said that 
they had little or very little power. The responsibility of CCs to protect and manage 
natural resources is understandably confusing because most natural resources are 
still formally controlled by line ministries in the national government. While 
commune councils have the overall mandate to protect those resources, they do not 
have the technical capacity and decision-making power to use those resources for 
the benefit of the commune or people. 
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Figure: 7.10: Do you currently have the power to safeguard natural resources? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
Figure: 7:11: Do you currently have sufficient power for service delivery? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
Service delivery is an important way in which CCs can be responsive. As 
Figure 7: 11 shows, 94 percent of councillors thought that they did have power to 
design service delivery. The problem is rather that there are not many services to 
deliver. This is a bit of confusing for CCs. CCs are engaging with all the activities 
of service delivery under their jurisdiction (this is probably why they think that 
they have power in services), but it is not clear to what extent or what kind of 
services they can deliver or what other technical responsibilities they have. For 
example, CCs do not have power to decide on health, education or agricultural 
extension, all of which are in the hands of line ministries. 
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Figure 7.12: Do you currently have the power over security in the commune? 
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
An overwhelming majority of the CC members recognised that they have the 
power to maintain security in their jurisdiction, such as by protecting people from 
robbery, gang fights, domestic violence and other crimes. Figure 7.12 illustrates 
their views on this issue. About 90 percent agreed that they have the power to 
maintain security and 10 percent did not. Security and maintaining social order are 
core responsibilities of the CCs. Currently, each commune has a limited number of 
policemen under its direct command, but often nowadays this is not enough to cope 
with the increase of crime.  
Figure 7.13: Do you currently have the power to resolve minor conflicts in the 
commune? (74 CC members interviewed)
 
 
98 percent of the CC members recognised that they have the power to 
resolve minor conflicts legally (Figure 7.13). One of the main responsibilities of 
CC members is advising and sharing ideas with different committees in the 
commune councils. CCs do not have a formal mandate to resolve conflicts, but 
they are allowed to establish an informal conflict resolution committee under their 
supervision. This committee plays an important role to resolve conflicts informally 
outside the court system. Two categories of conflict dominate in the commune: 
land conflicts and domestic violence.  
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Figure 7.14: Do you have power over administration? (74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
CCs have the power to mobilise people to attend meetings and different 
activities in the community, which 97 percent of CC members agreed that they 
have (Figure. 7.14). Commune councillors also have administrative powers such as 
to issue birth certificates, marriage licences, identification cards etc. The 
administrative power of CCs has been very critical because administration is the 
most needed by people for their day-to-day activities. This power is important 
because if people do not have a good relationship with authorities, people are not 
granted any permission documents. 
 
 
Figure 7.15: Do commune chiefs have the power to hire and fire personnel?
(74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
To be fully responsible, CC members and in particular the council chief 
needs to have the power to fire and hire personnel in the commune administration. 
60 percent of commune councillors thought that they have this power and 40 
percent thought that they do not (Figure 7.15). The reason that some CC members 
felt that they do not have this power is probably that during their time in office, 
they had never fired or hired any personnel. 
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Figure 7.16: Is power sharing among CC members from different political parties 
problematic? (74 CC members interviewed) 
 
 
Power sharing among CC members from different political parties is 
important to ensure peaceful processes of local government. When CC members 
were asked whether they thought that this was difficult, about 84 percent of 
respondents thought that power sharing was not a problem and 16 percent felt that 
it was problematic (Figure 7.16).  
A general question was asked about constraints that hinder power from being 
devolved to the CCs. As illustrated in Figure 7.17, CC members have mixed views 
on what the main constraints are. About 25 percent said that the central government 
did not yet have the political will to delegate power to the communes. About 23 
percent said that there were no constraints that they could see. About 13 percent 
said that the delivery of funding from central government to CCs was slow and 
inadequate. Fourteen percent said that the meagre rational mandate of CCs was 
difficult to exercise effectively because people with connections to powerful people 
at the top and the police and military do not listen to CCs and sometimes threaten 
them. About 10 percent said that CCs lack the capacity to articulate the laws. 
Finally, 8 percent said that they did not know.  
The quantitative data indicate that there are at least two distinct fields of 
power associated with CCs. First are the powers that CCs have sufficiently, such as 
administrative power, conflict resolution (informally), maintaining social order and 
security, engaging/supporting with service delivery with line agencies and power 
sharing among CC members. Second are the powers that have not been fully 
delegated to CCs and that remain murky, including the powers to generate local 
revenues, manage natural resources, manage the CSF and hire and fire personnel. 
In the following, I will illuminate the above two fields with the in-depth interview 
information. 
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Figure 7.17: From your own observation, what is the main constraint hindering power 
being devolved to the CCs? (74 CC members questioned) 
 
 
Some CC members, especially from the opposition party, are frustrated and 
resentful about the slow pace of devolving power. They have been waiting for 
almost a decade to see a deeper devolution, but there is still little hope for that to 
take place. A group of CC members complained: 
Comparing what is stated in the law on decentralisation and what we 
actually have on the ground in terms of power, the power of the elected 
CCs just rests on paper, but little of what was anticipated has become 
reality. The only decentralised power we have is paperwork, not the 
resources to survive independently (group of CC members, Kampot 
province, 28 March 2006).  
A group of commune councillors in Battambang from both the ruling party 
and the opposition expressed their view in particular on the devolution of power: 
The problem that we face now is lacking power to decide on particular 
issues because the decision-making power remains with provincial technical 
agencies. We are the elected commune councillors; the power we have 
through decentralisation is mostly paperwork and administration, not the 
power to generate revenues for development in the commune (group of 
commune councillors, Battamgang, 14 February 2011). 
Similarly a district deputy governor frankly described his view on 
decentralisation: 
The constraint of D&D reform is the lack of devolving power from the centre 
and line agencies. It means that decentralisation or the delegation of power 
to the sub-national level [district and commune] only works for paperwork 
but not real power to generate revenues. All of the potential revenue 
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collections are captured by provincial line agencies. For example, there are 
four markets in this district. All the revenues from the markets are taken by 
provincial line agencies. It is a real problem that CCs and districts do not 
have money to provide services to people such as sewerage and trash 
collection (deputy district governor, Battambang, 17 February 2011). 
It seems that higher agencies have not fully committed to delegating power 
to the decentralised authorities and CCs. A deputy governor in Kratie put it like 
this: 
Power should not be delegated to CCs yet, especially the power to collect 
local revenue, because it would lead to elite capture of the local economy 
and because elected commune councillors are not yet ready and equipped 
with the technical capacity for this complex field of finance (provincial 
deputy governor, Kratie province, 21 September 2005). 
This passage seems to reveal that the higher authorities are not yet ready to 
devolve power, especially the power to generate revenue. 
A commune council chief in Battambang disagreed with the above 
description:  
There was a pilot project last year to experiment with local tax collection by 
allowing CCs to collect taxes at the commune level such as transportation 
tax on motorbikes and other vehicles. The total number of vehicles that were 
taxed was about 700. However, this year, since the provincial and district 
authorities took this power back and collect the tax themselves, I have heard 
from the district that they have collected tax for only 300 vehicles in this 
commune. This shows the effectiveness of CCs, that if they were allowed to 
collect local revenue, there would be less leakage of revenue (commune 
chief, Battambang province, 10 November 2005). 
A number of talks with commune councillors, including councillors from the 
ruling party, revealed that they are well aware that their primary role as elected 
leaders is to serve the electors. A commune councillor put it: “It is difficult being a 
local leader now because we do not have the power we are supposed to have to 
serve the people” (CC member, Battambang, 5 May 2006).  
Lacking the power to generate revenue is apparently the most challenging 
factor that the CC members face because they are in the difficult situation of 
having to be responsive and accountable to voters. A commune chief in Kompong 
Speu noted: 
I think, if we had the right to collect local revenue such as taxes on different 
forms of transportation and enterprises in this commune, it would be 
beneficial in terms of development. I think that traders and people in this 
commune would be keen to pay taxes to the commune council instead of the 
provincial tax office. Another factor is, if we had the power to collect tax, no 
one could avoid paying because we know them all individually (commune 
chief, Kompong Speu province, 3 April 2006).  
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Moving to the second field, many CC members expressed the view that the 
kind of power that is most immediately needed by CCs is the power to crack down 
on criminal activities that destroy natural resources, including fisheries and forests. 
So far, these two sectors have remained bureaucratically controlled by the technical 
agencies, which put the CC in a very difficult situation when it comes to answering 
to the people. A group of CC members in Kampot noted: 
The immediate need is power and support from the central government to 
CCs to handle natural resources crimes affecting fisheries and forests, and 
land conflicts. Without the power to solve the problems, CC members are not 
trusted by voters. For example, one of the largest coastal fishing zones is in 
this commune. There are many state authorities from different powerful 
provincial and central agencies stationed here. Those agencies are not 
protecting the natural resources but come because there is potential for them 
to generate illegal money (group of CC members, Kampot province, 29 
March 2006). 
The same group of CC members also said: 
We are the elected CC members sitting here to see the problems, listening to 
the complaints from villagers. And the best we can do, after receiving the 
complaints related to various fishery crimes, is just to report to higher 
authorities. But we have no expectation of intervention from those powerful 
authorities. We feel so guilty when villagers have asked us for help and we, 
as the local leaders, can do nothing (group of CC members, Kampot 
province, 29 March 2006). 
A commune council chief in Kratie expressed her view on the power to 
manage natural resources: 
As elected commune councillors, we do not have power to command those 
line agencies, especially fishery and forestry. There is no more forest to cut, 
so it is no problem. For fishing, it is hard to crack down on crimes because 
fishery officials are taking bribes from the perpetrators. The best way, CCs 
need to help solve problems for people. What we do is try to convey 
information to higher authorities, for example dropping a letter in the 
accountability box or [using] the media (CC chief, Kratie, 27 February 
2011).  
There is improved management of natural resources because CCs and 
villagers keep asking the fishery authorities to crack down on fishing crime. A 
commune councillor in Kratie described: 
Dealing with fishery issues in this commune is getting better because all 
commune councillors and people with some technical support from NGOs 
[advocacy skills] file a lot of complaints to different district and provincial 
agencies. Fishery crime is declining (female CC member, Kratie, 28 
February 2011).  
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The remaining challenge of decentralisation is not caused by CCs lacking 
capacity and interest to carry out their responsibilities, but the lack of power to 
implement their job responsibly. A group of commune councillors in Kompong 
Speu said:  
The constraint we are facing is lack of real power to implement our job as 
the elected commune councillors. As you know, our response to people’s 
demands for different services is limited because the central government still 
controls the key sectors (group of commune councillors, Kompong Speu, 3 
April 2006). 
Administrative work takes up a lot of time in which CCs might provide 
services to people. The role of CCs in conflict resolution is important because 
domestic violence and land conflicts are frequent. However, CCs do not have a 
formal mandate to deal with conflicts. A commune councillor in Siem Reap 
described:  
Conflicts happen often in this commune. Many cases are submitted to the 
commune office, and people need councillors to get involved in solving the 
problems, but we do not have formal authority to solve the conflicts; only the 
court does. The conflicts accumulate every month, making people view CCs 
as unresponsive, and popular participation becomes less (CC member, Siem 
Reap, 23 April 2006). 
CC members see decentralisation as introducing power sharing (in the law) 
from the central to local level and within councils by having elected councillors 
from different political parties work together. A former commune chief in 
Battambang said: 
Decentralisation up till now is getting better in terms of power sharing 
among councillors from different political parties [to a certain extent from 
the national government to the local level]. Power is important for elected 
CC members to be responsible and accountable to people. I am interested to 
know about this; from time to time I go to chat with councillors to exchange 
some ideas, but they told me that they do not have power they are supposed 
to have in the law (former CC chief, Battambang, 17 April 2006). 
A similar expression came from a commune councillor from the opposition 
party in Kratie: 
The power that the commune councils have does not match the law and 
decentralisation policy of the national government. The day-to-day 
management of CCs now is okay. We have to be flexible to local situations to 
get the job done. However, the elected CC members do not clearly 
distinguish between their own political party affairs and the public (CC 
chief, Kratie, 19 June 2010). 
From the above information, one could conclude that commune councillors 
do not think that they are given the mandate that they need in order to be 
accountable and responsive to their constituencies. Most of the powers CCs 
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currently have concern planning, mobilising people for meetings, making decisions 
on minor issues, securing safety and routine administration. Meanwhile, there are 
two crucial types of power that CCs do not have: the power to generate local 
revenue and the power to protect natural resources. If, for instance, CCs were 
allowed to collect taxes, they might (in accordance with a key assumption in the 
theorising on decentralisation) be able to do that very efficiently since they know 
all the properties in the commune (for the criteria for local revenue collection, see 
Chapter V).  
Below is a summary of major aspects revealed by CC members concerning 
the devolution of power: 
¥ Besides local authorities, such as CC members, village chiefs, police and 
local government officials, people who possess power are those who are 
rich and well connected. According to CC members, these people 
normally bypass or do not pay much attention to CCs. These rich and 
well-connected people are usually loyal to the ruling party. 
¥ Many CC members feel that, as elected councillors, they are not given the 
power stated in the decentralisation law. In particular they lack the power 
to generate local revenue, judicial power and the power to protect and 
manage natural resources. CCs do have some delegated power, however, 
in areas such as administration, development, service delivery, security 
and resolution of minor conflicts. 
¥ Many councillors feel that two factors hamper the devolution of power to 
CCs: lack of political will in line agencies and ministries, and lack of 
financial resources. 
Devolution of power: voters’ perceptions 
Below are presented voters’ perceptions of devolution of power to commune 
councils. This section begins with the findings of the quantitative survey and 
follows with the in-depth interviews. 
 
Figure 7.18: Do you think that CC members have enough power to be responsive and 
accountable to voters? (583 voters interviewed) 
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The survey indicated that voters have mixed views on the devolution of 
power from the central government to commune councils. As illustrated in Figure 
7.18, about 30 percent thought that commune councils had enough power to be 
responsive and accountable to voters, 37 percent thought that they did not have 
enough power, and 33 percent did not know. By contrast, a larger citizen survey of 
962 respondents found that 16 percent said that commune council members still 
lacked the authority to carry out their job effectively (Ninh & Henke 2005).  
 
Figure 7.19: Do you think commune councillors respect ordinary people? 
(583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
My survey also found that 87 percent of voters thought that CC members 
respect ordinary people, while 9 percent thought that they do not. This suggests 
that elected CC members do not abuse their power over voters (there may be a bias 
in the material since people may be afraid to say something bad of authorities).  
 
Figure 7.20: Do CC members promote conflict resolution among villagers? 
(583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
Among voters in the survey, 55 percent thought that CC members were 
managing conflict resolution, 34 percent thought that CC members did not play this 
role, and 11 percent did not know (Figure 7.20). As noted, according to many CC 
members, they have not been delegated sufficient formal power for conflict 
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resolution. However, CCs seem to spend a lot of their time dealing with the 
conflicts that happen in the commune, for example domestic violence and land 
conflicts.  
Figure 7.21: What have the CC members done to promote community security and 
order? (583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
Voters seem confident of CC members’ performance in improving security 
and social order. As illustrated in Figure 7.21, 53 percent said that CC members 
had educated, helped resolve disputes and been honest with voters. About 21 
percent said that CC members had done nothing to promote security and order, 
while 6 percent said that CC members had initiated activities and encouraged 
people to patrol and crack down on offences. Security and social order are a 
fundamental responsibility of CCs. In many communities there are increasing 
social problems of gang fights, drug addiction, robbery and domestic violence, 
which sometimes CCs cannot cope with because of a limited number of 
policemen. 
People were asked what commune councillors should stop doing to gain 
legitimate power or to be respected by voters. 48 percent said that CC members 
should avoid nepotism, corruption and using power corruptly; 4 percent said they 
should avoid being arrogant and selfish. 48 percent did not know.  
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Figure 7.22: What should CC members stop doing to be respected by villagers?  
(583 voters interviewed) 
 
 
According to the quantitative data, many voters do not understand the power 
and mandate of CCs. Nevertheless, there are some tangible improvements of 
leadership of CCs, evident in the majority of people feeling that CCs respect 
ordinary people, make efforts to promote conflict resolution, maintain social order 
and are less abusive of power. Below we look at the voters’ views on these issues 
by referring to the in-depth interviews.  
 
The interviews indicated that villagers did not pay much attention to or have 
a genuine understanding of the extent of power held by CC members. A former 
school principal noted:  
Individual villagers mostly think that villagers do not have any role or the 
power to change or improve anything, especially the leaders. What they 
normally think of is the survival of their families. Usually, people think that 
they cannot carry or lift up the globe alone, so why care so much about the 
public or community? Some people do want to express their grievances to 
authorities, but they dare not do so because one must go through the 
hierarchy. As the Cambodian saying goes: pong mourn kom chul neung 
thmor [do not smash anegg with arock, where the authority is the rock while 
the villager is the egg] (school principal in Battambang province, 10 May 
2007).  
A villager in Kampot expressed his observation on the curiosity of people 
about the authorities: 
People in the commune do know the changing of leadership [commune 
elections] but I don’t think they really pay attention to the work of local 
authorities; they just pay attention to their day-to-day living. The only thing 
that makes them curious about authorities is something directly touching 
their interests (villager, Kampot, 30 March 2006). 
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The same person continued: 
The elected CCs’ leadership now is different from the 1980s.It was a very 
authoritarian style (preu om narch). Commune councillors at that time did 
not come to meet people or get ideas from the people. But now they have 
meetings with people from time to time and they listen more to villagers 
(villager, Kampot, 30 March 2006). 
People also compare the way that CCs exercise power with previous 
regimes, which in their view is very different. Especially, CCs now do not collect 
taxes as pre-war CCs did. An old layperson said: 
Elected CCs are not that authoritarian (preu om narch), people are not 
afraid of authorities but are not happy with the way CCs perform in terms of 
services and development. Maybe they do not have money, because I never 
see them collect tax from people. I still remember that in the 1950s-60s, 
commune authority was powerful and they collected taxes (layperson, 
Battambang, 8 May 2007).   
People see some changes in the way that power is exercised by CCs. 
Collectively, power does not rest only with the chief, but councillors are more 
committed. A layperson explained:  
Since the commune election, power does not rest only with the chief (pra 
thean) but with other councillors too. The elected councillors are more 
committed to the community, trying to bring in different benefits for people 
(layperson, Battambang, 7 May 2007).  
Some people are aware of why power is not properly devolved to CCs and 
other constraints that make them unable to exercise power properly. A political 
activist explained: 
Personally, I see that the commune council lacks devolution of power from 
the central government. Perhaps it is too early to make such an assumption 
on the evolution of local administrative reforms. However, to make CCs 
work effectively, power must be devolved to CCs according to the law. 
Another challenge for CCs is the capacity of CC members. They need to 
have sufficient capacity to articulate laws and think creatively for the sake of 
the community. For example, there are 11 CC members in this commune 
council, but only three to four are capable of doing the job. The rest are not 
(political activist, Battambang province, 9 May 2007).  
A villager in Kratie expressed his view on the role of CCs in conflict 
resolution: 
There are some conflicts in this commune. Village chiefs and CCs always try 
to reconcile the conflicts in the village or the commune, not going to court 
(villager, Kratie, 28 February 2011). 
Villagers who have some education are curious about CC members’ 
performance. However, the extent to which people actually act on their curiosity 
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depends on social norms of not liking to challenge leaders, of trusting leaders and 
of reluctance to replace leaders. It seems that ordinary people have a perceived 
obligation to respect and listen to leaders, and receive gifts from leaders in return 
(koeung kun, reciprocity, repay favours, loyalty). People also see power holding or 
leadership as natural gifts, a destiny or fate coming from merits in a previous life. 
An older layperson in a village described this:  
I think people in general do not like to challenge leaders and do not like to 
replace the leaders either. The way people think of the leaders is based on 
karma or doeung kun [reciprocity, loyalty]. They are extremely reluctant to 
break this reciprocal relationship with leaders. To be a leader, one needs to 
have good karma or good fate. To be in power, one needs to have back-up 
(layperson, Battambang province, 2 May 2006).  
The personality of leaders is critical to the way that power is exercised. 
There are a number of things that individual leaders should not do in order to be 
benevolent leaders. A school principal added: 
A good leader is needed. He or she must be very patient with all of the 
challenges and withstand all the problems that eventually occur. Leaders 
should avoid being corrupt, too greedy and arrogant. This society lacks 
face-to-face interaction, especially between authorities and the people. Good 
leadership depends on the personality of the leaders. If you are soft and nice, 
people will feel comfortable living with you. As a Cambodian phrase says: 
teuk tror chark trey kom, [cold water could lure a lot of fish] (school 
principal, Battambang province, 28 April 2006). 
As indicated by the quantitative data and the in-depth interviews, voters do 
not know the extent of CCs’ power, nor do they understand the importance of the 
separation of power. Voters do not distinguish between the power of the state 
(commune councils) and the personalised power that relates more to Cambodian 
political culture. 
There are four key aspects of voters’ views on the nature of power, in 
particular the power of the local authorities. 
• The majority of voters expressed the view that power rests predominantly 
with different local authorities, such as commune councillors, village 
chiefs, police, military and, to a certain extent, government employees. 
The remainder think that power rests with rich people. 
• Voters are confused and do not understand how much and what sort of 
power has been devolved to the commune councils. However, people 
agree that CCs are committed to the communities. 
• People recognised that the way that CCs exercise power is less 
authoritarian and changing towards being softer and more participatory 
than in previous regimes (Kim & Öjendal 2007).  
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• Voters still hold the view that, in order to gain respect, local leaders 
should not use power in a corrupt way or practice nepotism. However, the 
majority of voters cannot say what leaders should do to be benevolent.  
 
There are similarities and differences of the perceptions of power between 
CC members and voters. Both CC members and voters felt that CCs do not have 
enough power to generate revenues to be responsive to the people’s needs for 
services and infrastructure. The way that power is exercised by local authorities 
(village and commune) is more participatory and softer (less authoritarian); 
authorities are paying more attention and listening to people and working hard for 
the benefit of the community.  
There is still a gap in understanding between CCs and voters. For example, 
voters do not know the power and mandate of CCs. Voters are not curious to know 
or seek clarification from CCs about the leadership and political reforms. People do 
not pay attention to the performance of authorities unless they have personal 
problems. Lack of curiosity and understanding of the mandate of authorities limits 
demands for change from below, so leaders do not face pressure from below, 
making the reform progress slowly (trapped in a neo-patrimonial system). This gap 
in understanding of the power and responsibilities and rights of each layer of state 
institutions also exists among commune councillors and line agencies between state 
and political party affairs. 
Concluding remarks 
The empirical findings on power and its devolution to commune councils indicate 
that the concept of power is interdependent and imbued with cultural, social, 
historical and other factors. Formal power is not yet fully devolved to the elected 
CCs to the extent mentioned in the laws on decentralisation. As indicated in the 
empirical findings, this is especially true for the power to generate local revenue 
and to protect natural resources. Decentralisation has introduced patterns of power 
sharing regarding administration and development planning and responsibility. 
With decentralisation and the establishment of commune councils, as mentioned in 
the literature review above, has come political education, in particular at the local 
levels, and local leaders (CC members and village chiefs) seem to understand the 
separation between state and personalised power and between different state 
agencies. In the future, decentralisation could cultivate demands from below for 
legitimate power and enhance awareness of the social contract between the electors 
and the elected. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
Many findings and remarks about the ongoing democratic decentralisation in 
Cambodia have been presented consecutively in connection with the different 
discussions in the theoretical approaches. Three concepts—responsiveness, 
accountability and devolution of power—are used in measuring democratic 
decentralisation in Cambodia. This concluding chapter contains three separate 
parts. The first is empirically based, analytically reviewing the significance of the 
core findings in the three empirical chapters. The second is concluding, offering the 
key message of this thesis, answering its research problem. In the third part, the 
thesis concludes by outlining the possible implications for remaining issues and 
future research. 
Reviewing the findings 
When applied to the theoretical findings, the empirical results display 
connections between decentralisation and democratic consolidation and some bleak 
outlooks. Below I will discuss some of the key findings from the perceptions of 
both CC members and voters on the general emerging factors of democratic 
decentralisation.31 
Overall, the findings point to a broad agreement that there has been an 
improvement in the quality of local governance with the democratic 
decentralisation reform. Before the reform, both commune councillors and the 
people had little experience of local democratic reform. However, after having 
been directly exposed to democratic decentralisation for almost ten years, 
councillors as well as voters recognise that it has introduced a different leadership 
system and reshaped local state institutions (CCs) and brought behaviour change of 
local leaders toward a more democratic manner with an increase in participation 
and engagement between authorities and people. The change is seen as caused by 
CCs being democratically elected and now consisting of many councillors from 
different political parties, so the way that authorities exercise power is less 
crude/authoritarian than in previous regimes and people do not fear authorities 
when expressing their ideas. It is also evident that there is an increase in 
cooperation and interaction between civil society organisations or community-
based organisations and elected councils.  
The village chief remains an essential figure in local politics and in villagers’ 
everyday life as well as for democratic decentralisation as a whole. Village chiefs 
are ears and eyes for CCs, directly supervising villagers, being responsible for 
paperwork for villagers, mobilising people for development activities, raising funds 
(collecting local contributions) and serving as gatekeepers to CCs. The information 
flow from villagers to CCs has to go through the village chief. The overwhelming 
                                                
31 For a summary of the empirical findings, see the concluding sub-chapter of each empirical 
chapter. 
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majority of village chiefs are from the ruling CPP. There are many complaints that 
village chiefs are CPP political activists and accountable mostly to their party, 
which affects democratic decentralisation.  
Despite the fact that democratic decentralisation is progressing well and that 
many commune councillors are increasing their skills through learning by doing, 
there are some constraints. Age is important in the Cambodian socio-cultural 
milieu reflecting respect, hierarchy and social experiences. The majority of CC 
members in this study were more than fifty years old (see chapter IV). People of 
this age have experienced many authoritarian political regimes (with conflicting 
political ideologies during the civil war, and many CC members were in the army 
during the civil war which have a direct impact on the current democratic 
decentralisation reform, rendering it difficult for them to adapt to the new system. 
Limited education among CC members is also a factor in democratic 
decentralisation. The majority of CC members covered in this thesis received only 
primary school education (five years). Their limited education causes them 
difficulty in analysing laws and regulations from the central government.  
How has responsiveness been established under democratic decentralisation 
reform? The findings of CCs’ responsiveness to citizens’ needs suggest that there 
is a rather developed consensus of mutual understanding between councillors and 
voters. Both councillors and voters seem to recognise that since the commune 
council elections in 2002, some local development projects have been realised in 
the form of local infrastructure such as paved roads, small irrigation works, water 
sanitation, wells, schools and bridges. Councillors have sufficient understanding of 
what people need. However, demands from the people are overwhelmingly for 
material outputs, and the demands exceed the resources available to CCs. Thus, in 
terms of the speed and quantity of projects, CCs are often unable to respond to the 
direct demands from individual villagers. Besides providing material outputs to 
voters, CCs are also engaged in activities such as information dissemination, 
service delivery and civil registration. 
Given the experiences of previous regimes and the role of local authorities 
(top down commands), responsiveness is a new leadership style and responsibility 
for CCs and creates space for voters to make demands on authorities, which is a 
new possibility within Cambodian society. Leaders in previous regimes were 
accustomed to issue commands, and people were obliged to obey them. People 
used to get almost no material outputs from the authorities. In the democratic 
decentralisation reform, as we have seen in Chapter V, a degree of responsiveness 
does exist. Being elected with a clear mandate, councillors have to work hard in 
order to meet and realise voters’ demands. That elected CCs are coming under 
pressure to realise such demands is a sign that grass-roots demands are being 
brought forward and put to local leaders. Such demands push commune 
councillors, who must now be more attentive to and interactive with voters and 
more responsive and transparent. 
What are the perceptions of accountability mechanisms under the 
democratic decentralisation reform? According to the empirical findings, a certain 
  
degree of accountability of CCs to voters is emerging under the decentralisation 
process. Commune councils are trying to account for, explain and communicate the 
decisions they make. There is recognition of downward accountability, driven by 
decentralisation reform, as popularly elected councillors realise they have to be 
accountable to voters first, though the current electoral system does not allow them 
fully to be that. In a narrow sense, accountability is gradually taking hold locally. 
Democratic decentralisation has introduced the notion of electoral accountability. 
The demand for accountability from leaders emerges as people learn that they are 
the owners of power because as voters they have the right to choose their leaders 
(electoral accountability). However, this might be a long way off because there are 
still problems of gift giving to voters and pressure or threats from powerful 
political parties during elections. The electoral system, specifically the party list 
system, may be the reason for the slow pace of improvement in electoral 
accountability. Currently well-resourced political parties operate in parallel with 
the state system down to the family level (working groups for a political party). 
This kind of political control at the grassroots makes it hard for people to decide 
who they would really like to vote for. 
Sources of funding and financial dependency on the central government 
(CSF) and the ruling CPP have compromised CCs’ autonomy, making it difficult 
for them to be downwardly accountable to voters. Curiously, in many communes, 
the CPP may contribute more to local infrastructure than the state does, thus 
making CCs dependent on the CPP, which could hinder them from fulfilling their 
responsibilities as elected councillors according to decentralisation principles (cf. 
Pak 2011). This financial dependency, however, has pushed CCs to engage more 
with NGOs to attract benefits for their communes, which in turn has given NGOs 
more leverage and improved cooperation between CCs and NGOs. 
In the law, the CCs are primarily downwardly accountable to the people in 
their jurisdiction. CCs are downwardly accountable in a democratic political 
system, with its particular mechanisms determined by local contexts. The empirical 
findings in Chapter VI show that commune councils are perceived by themselves 
as unable to be fully accountable because many of the issues they are asked about 
from below are beyond their mandate; hence they cannot exert authority and 
consequently cannot be fully responsible for the outcome. 
The channelling of information and people’s participation with CCs has not 
improved much yet. Information flows from CCs to citizens mostly through village 
chiefs. Citizens’ curiosity about the conduct of authorities remains weak. People do 
not question or engage with authority if it is not necessary. People’s participation 
and interactions with CCs remain passive. Information sharing is still in the form of 
informal word of mouth and is sometimes subject to rumour and often the cause of 
miscommunication between CCs and the people. Public dialogue between leaders 
and citizens is not yet in the form of a frank open exchange with no fear of 
repression. From the empirical findings, it is obvious that fears of repression from 
the authorities are decreasing dramatically, but some elements of authoritarianism 
remain (cf. Öjendal & Kim 2011). 
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Historically, accountability has been absent among political leaders (cf. 
Chandler 1991; Mabbett & Chandler 1995) and the lack of accountability is the 
overshadowing political issue in Cambodia. It is rare in Cambodia that power 
holders are punished from below or even forced to account for their use of 
authority. Power holders do not expect to be asked, and ordinary people do not 
easily force power holders to answer for their actions. This is of course a critical 
aspect of the political culture for democratic decentralisation. According to the 
empirical findings, accountability mechanisms remain relatively blurred or 
confused. Local leaders and people may not well understand the exact mechanisms 
of accountability because accountability is relatively new for Cambodians—though 
they may have practised accountability for their day-to-day activities in a hybrid 
“traditional” way. Local leaders and people remain firmly in the straitjacket of 
party politics. The party list system and sources of funding have tied elected CCs to 
upward accountability to their own political party. Hence, we see that, via 
democratic decentralisation, accountability among CCs and voters has increased, 
altering a deep political order incrementally from below. Historical structural 
issues and weakness prevent this from blooming fully. 
How has devolution of power been working under the democratic 
decentralisation reform? Decentralisation has changed the power structure of local 
politics in Cambodia (the devolution of power discussed in Chapter VII is the 
mandate that CCs are supposed to have from the decentralisation law). Delegation 
of discretionary power from the central level to the CCs, which was rare or absent 
in Cambodia’s patrimonial system during previous regimes, has been driven by the 
decentralisation reform. Empirical information reveals the gradual delegation of 
power to the CCs to serve the central level, such as administrative powers, 
authority to deal with minor conflicts, social order, local planning and other 
services. One of the most critical improvements is power sharing among CC 
members from different political parties. From the empirical findings, most of the 
CC members feel that they do not have any problems working peacefully with CC 
members from different political parties. 
A large percentage of CC members feel that they do not have power as 
stipulated in the law. There are two types of power that CCs urgently need in order 
to be responsive and accountable to voters: power to generate local revenues 
(taxes) and power to protect and manage natural resources (fisheries, forests, land 
and water). Delegation of these two important powers has yet to happen, being held 
up by different technical institutions of the central government (this is the key 
interconnection of power with responsiveness and accountability) (cf. Heng et al. 
2011). When it comes to claiming power from the central government via 
decentralisation, CC members do not only work for the interest of their own 
political party but also demand these rights of power for the sake of their 
communities and constituents. Some CC members complained that after almost ten 
years of decentralisation reform, the real power delegated to CCs consists only of 
planning, administration and other work-related activities that do not deal with 
financial resources and sufficient CSF for local development.  
  
The perceptions of leaders and citizens on where power rests illuminate two 
critical aspects. First, the patrimonial and patronage system continues to influence 
formal state institutions, and people are unable to be independent; they must be 
connected to or lean on powerful groups or individuals. Second, power is a scarce 
and valuable commodity that normally rests with rich and well-connected people, 
and is typically vested in the hands of a few. Citizens see a great change in the 
attitude of CCs in terms of the day-to-day exercise of power in that CCs no longer 
exercise fierce power (commanding), and they put less pressure on ordinary 
people. Voters also said that power holders like the CCs should not abuse their 
power over the powerless; they should not be corrupt or resort to nepotism or 
favouritism. This is a sign that voters are starting to feel less afraid of the 
authorities, and that they deserve to have benevolent leaders. 
I have discussed empirical findings (responsiveness, accountability and 
devolution of power) and consequences in local politics driven by democratic 
decentralisation reform in Cambodia. It is beyond doubt, I argue, that the three 
critical factors of democratic decentralisation—responsiveness, accountability and 
devolution of power—are interlinked (see chapter I & II and as argued by James 
Manor 2008) and serve as the theoretical potentials of democratic decentralisation 
in post-conflict Cambodia (see diagram below). 
 
 
 
Answering the research problem: To what extent can democratic 
decentralisation reform address the process of democratisation in post-
conflict Cambodia? 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the quality of democratic decentralisation 
reform in post-conflict Cambodia. The focus is ultimately justified by the frequent 
arguments that democratic decentralisation is vital in deepening local democracy in 
a post-conflict context. This thesis tries to answer the overall research question: 
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what is the quality of democratic decentralisation reform in post-conflict 
Cambodia?  
Some critical research questions were brought up in the beginning of this 
thesis: To what extent can democratic decentralisation reform address the process 
of democratisation in post-conflict Cambodia and how can democratisation be 
consolidated in post-conflict Cambodia? Is it possible to nurture democracy in a 
hybrid and post-conflict Cambodia? Answering these questions, this thesis has 
found that democratic decentralisation does seem to have been successful for the 
reconstruction of post-conflict Cambodia, establishing a benevolent state, fostering 
the regime’s political legitimacy and consolidating peace and easing endemic fear. 
These findings support the ideas of Lederach (1997); UNDP (2007); UN-DESA 
(2007); Smith (1985); Manor (1999, 2008 & 2011); Braathen & Hellevik (2006); 
Johnson (2001); Heller (2001); Crook & Manor (1998); Ribot (2011); Grindle 
(2011) and Larson & Ribot (2005) that democratic decentralisation is a 
fundamental means for improving political accountability and democratisation 
through its political education, leadership training, political stability and regime 
legitimacy. 
Without doubt, the contents of decentralisation are critical in deepening 
democracy. From the outset, the overall assumption was that decentralisation, as 
perceived by some scholars, may contribute to enhanced local political legitimacy, 
which in turn may support democratisation and overall political reconstruction 
(Öjendal & Lilja 2009). I contend that the democratic decentralisation that has 
taken place in Cambodia so far has led to a number of achievements that have 
influenced democratisation and reconstruction of post-conflict Cambodia, 
including creating political space and reinventing local democratic institutions, 
reconnecting the central and local government, serving as democratic education for 
local leaders, changing political culture and leading to other reforms.  
Firstly, decentralisation has helped to create a pluralist political space and 
reinvent a local governance structure (local democratic institutions), especially 
setting up local multiparty councils through local elections. As the empirical 
findings tell us, political institutions of a democratic nature have been directly 
established (regular elections and relative pluralism) and have reconnected ruled 
and rulers, driven by the decentralisation reform. The elected commune councils 
have constituted a political pluralism (elected councillors mostly are from different 
political parties) and created a democratic platform for public dialogue with local 
leaders; and through this democratic decentralisation, leaders have been obliged to 
be more accountable and responsive to voters. The multiparty commune councils 
have helped to reconcile political differences by compromising differences in 
political ideologies at the grassroots for the ultimate aim of local development. 
Local political pluralism pressures the ruling party to be more accountable and 
responsible to voters by nominating popular candidates and forcing the leaders to 
change to a softer attitude. Since the majority of Cambodians still live in rural 
areas, democratic decentralisation is a crucial tool to promote democracy from 
below.  
  
Secondly, decentralisation has reconnected local government with the central 
state because local government has been legitimately given more role and 
responsibility (this is a big shift given the complex and centralised system in 
Cambodian society). Local government’s role is to serve local citizens and, to a 
certain extent, the central government has allocated financial resources to local 
government for various small infrastructure developments. The connection 
between local and central government has cultivated a loyalty from citizens 
towards local authorities, which has been a step forward because the gap between 
ruled and rulers has for a long time been wide through Cambodia’s social and 
political transitions. The connection between local and central government has also 
helped to prevent possible social strife in a fragile society by creating a more stable 
regime, which could prevent the risk of state failure. As such, decentralisation has 
played a critical role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Cambodia.   
Thirdly, democratic decentralisation has been playing a role as political 
educator, changing the attitude of rulers, who have switched from commanding and 
using fierce power to more democratic principles and following the concept that 
the ruler is not to command but to serve the people. Indeed, the previous local 
government structure, particularly the commune administration, was purposely 
created to control the people politically. In sharp contrast, under decentralisation 
reform, the local political institutions have been restructured or reinvented to 
engage deeply in particular with the ruling party, to change from within and more 
legitimately play the role of an agent of local development. For instance, since the 
inception of democratic decentralisation fear and violence have been drastically 
reduced since the inception of decentralisation (cf. Öjendal & Kim 2006).  
It is clear that subtle forms of political pressure are applied, possibly being 
more efficient than the harsh political repression of previous regimes. As the 
dominant political party, the CPP has changed towards a version of openness. The 
CPP is a long established political party, and by using its power, resources and 
massive grass-roots network, it won the overwhelming majority of votes at the first 
and second commune elections. Because of its successful electoral results, the CPP 
could comfortably use the commune elections as a political base for reforming the 
political system. Some argue that decentralisation is manipulated by the CPP to 
gain political legitimacy and consolidate power (Blunt and Turner 2005). 
Decentralisation reform is a double-edged sword. The CPP uses decentralisation to 
build its own political legitimacy at the grassroots and stay in power. However, the 
overwhelming success of the CPP in local politics also carries many burdens; the 
party should be more responsive and accountable to voters. Thus, although the CPP 
has the power to influence through its domination, democratic decentralisation is 
also serving as a means to influence the powerful CPP from within. Within the 
CPP, decentralisation has triggered intensive competition for local acclaim and 
popularity. To win the vote, the party must attract legitimate popular and qualified 
candidates to replace the old illegitimate ones. In short, decentralisation has opened 
political space and allowed a political discourse to grow gradually via political 
education.  
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Fourthly, that decentralisation has introduced soft local governance via local 
elections, reinforces the viability of democratic practices and has introduced a new 
version of the patronage system. This is in line with the argument by Ann that 
democratic decentralisation in Cambodia has changed traditional patterns of 
patron-client relationships (Ann 2008). The empirical findings of this thesis show 
that decentralisation operates alongside the traditional practice of the patronage 
system. Villagers popularly elect their leaders, and at the same time they are bound 
to their leaders by a set of exchanges of favour and protection, thus resulting in 
what has been characterised by some researchers as a “hybrid” form of democracy 
(Öjendal & Lilja 2009; Un2004). Decentralisation requires elected local leaders to 
follow different rules and regulations (formal system), but for the day-to-day 
operation of CCs with the people, an informal system is used, and the informal 
system is more popular.  
Fifthly, the expected outcome of democratic decentralisation is more 
intriguing. Decentralisation has led to other national and local reforms. Thus far, 
national level democratisation has been boosted by decentralisation, and various 
deeper reforms have followed, such as the Senate elections, district, provincial and 
municipal indirect elections (Organic Law) and the village chief selection in 
2006.Though this sub-national indirect election process (municipality, province 
and district) entrenches the hold of the CPP over Cambodian politics, all elected 
positions in Cambodia, aside from the National Assembly, are now determined by 
the commune councils. The sub-national reform has created a checked and 
balanced system between the appointed provincial and district governors and the 
elected councils, making the sub-national level more actively engaged in rural 
development and service delivery, improving unified administration and increasing 
accountability downward to the commune. 
Overall, the past decade has seen the introduction of local electoral and 
competitive politics. We have seen much progress of democratic decentralisation, 
but risks remain interwoven with it. Democratic decentralisation remains highly 
regulated from above (to a certain extent by the CPP) and embedded within a rather 
centralised and politicised administration. One of the chief challenges of 
decentralisation reform in Cambodia is the lack of discretionary power delegated 
from the central government (especially the power to generate local revenues). As 
argued by Ribot (2011), the lack of discretionary power makes elected councillors 
unable to respond to local needs and aspirations—and as a result local democracy 
is difficult to grow. Lacking the authority to collect revenues limits the possibility 
of accountability as well as the ties of reciprocity between local government and 
the people (social contract). Democratic decentralisation is still under the close 
watch or control of the ruling party through decision making of the councillors and 
control over the electoral process via vote buying—in return decentralisation is 
used for consolidating the power of the ruling party. Most Cambodians have little 
previous experience of democracy; this is combined with the limited capacity of 
leaders and poverty, results in democratic development moving slowly. 
It is an uphill battle to establish democracy in post-conflict Cambodia, and 
the country still faces a number of more daunting challenges (Un 2004; Hughes 
  
2003; cf. Öjendal & Lilja 2009). Establishing electoral democracy is the easy part, 
which was built by UNTAC. As argued in the beginning of this thesis, UNTAC did 
not establish the national and local responsive and accountable state institutions 
that are needed for the consolidation of democracy in any post-conflict country. In 
other words, given Cambodian society’s deep distrust in politics and leadership, 
lack of democratic culture and active engagement of civil society, hybrid 
system/neo-patrimonialism, poverty and weak state institutions (as discussed in 
chapters I and II), nurturing democracy is really problematic. Some writers have 
countered that it is not possible to enhance democracy in Cambodia through 
decentralisation reform given the country’s complex political orders, historical 
interruptions, unwillingness of political elites to respond to citizens’ needs, and use 
of democratic decentralisation by the ruling party as a means to consolidate power 
and build its legitimacy (Blunt & Turner 2005; Hughes & Un 2007; Hughes 2003; 
Un & Ledgerwood 2003). This argument is important, but through my findings, I 
would argue that the decentralisation reform is dynamic with several spin-off 
effects that in combination with other reforms and over time will remain a crucial 
part of Cambodia’s democratisation. Having said that, neo-patrimonial features that 
operate within a formal democratic structure mark political hybridity in Cambodia; 
the public and the personal are interwoven so that the state apparatus tends to be 
used to build personal patronage networks by non-democratic means. While there 
seems to be a hybrid system of governance emerging in the grey zone, legitimacy 
and politicians within the new institutions of liberal democracy in Cambodia lean 
on traditional discourses and, thus, the democratic system is hybridised. 
Can decentralisation consolidate democracy in post-conflict Cambodia? The 
findings and discussions of theories in this thesis point to a complex and broad 
agreement that there has been improvement in the quality of local democracy under 
decentralisation reform. Most would agree that there is overall a relatively 
successful progress of post-conflict reconstruction—though democratisation is 
intertwined with hybrid and neo-patrimonial features. I argue that, bit-by-bit, 
democratic decentralisation affects the insertion of local democracy in a number of 
ways as discussed above, and it is possible to nurture democracy by using 
decentralisation. In the end, it is an ongoing process of democratisation in post-
conflict reconstruction. The findings of the thesis tell us that Cambodia is 
beginning to leave earlier post-conflict problems behind as it shifts towards more 
normal development problems. The next step of the reform process is not clear, but 
it will depend on factors such as strong political will from leaders in the central 
government (from all the major ministries concerned), allocation of resources and 
mandates currently controlled by line ministries and a deconcentration reform of 
the Organic Law at the district and provincial level. 
Unresolved issues and areas for future research 
So far, I have presented the roles and achievements of democratic decentralisation 
in consolidating democracy in post-conflict Cambodia. It is good to reflect on the 
weaknesses and unresolved issues. Given the limited scope of the thesis, some 
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critical issues are not covered, and some unresolved issues are worth suggesting for 
further research.  
The Organic Law (Law on Administration and Management of Capital, 
Province, Municipality, District and Khan) passed in 2008, mandated that councils 
be elected at all these levels of government for the first time, as part of the 
government’s effort for a future deconcentration of functions from central 
ministries to sub-national levels. The elections held in 2009 were indirect elections 
in which the electorate comprised, not the Cambodian people, but only the 11,353 
commune councillors, who were themselves directly elected in local elections in 
2002 and 2007. The electoral system in Cambodia is a party list system, in which 
people vote for political parties, not individual representatives. The landslide 
victory of the CPP in the commune elections in 2002 and 2007 made the party also 
enjoy a landslide victory in the sub-national elections in 2009.  
The new structure of sub-national government is an indirectly elected 
council where there is space for the opposition while the government still keeps the 
board of governor which is appointed by the Ministry of the Interior (anecdotal 
evidence is that the power remains with the appointed board of governor, not the 
elected councils). The goal of the sub-national government deconcentration reform 
is to have a unified administration among all technical agencies of the government 
and have horizontal accountability of those agencies so that services are allocated 
to the communes. After three years of the process, the function of deconcentration 
has not been decided: the substance of what these councils will do has yet to be 
determined (the councillors are mostly party activists and retired officials). Another 
unresolved issue of the sub-national reform is a degree of reluctance on the part of 
various ministries to commit themselves to devolving functions and discretionary 
powers to the councils. Even though the current system does not allow the districts 
and provinces direct control over the commune, in the political party (mainly CPP) 
hierarchy of leadership, the district and province are the direct bosses of the elected 
commune councillors. The future of decentralisation reform depends on the 
structural adjustment of this deconcentration reform at the sub-national levels. 
Future research should look at the relationships between the sub-national level 
(province and district) and the elected commune councils or the interface of 
indirect and direct elections. 
The commune councillors are directly elected by people and should be 
accountable and responsive to the voters, but the current party list system does not 
allow the elected councillors to be fully accountable and responsible to their 
constituents. Given a party list system, for the day-to-day operation of CCs, there 
are at least three critical factors that local leaders need to maintain their power. 
Firstly, because the political party is the only body having all the decision making 
power, councillors must be accountable to and follow the guidelines of their own 
party. The second critical factor for councillors is their own popularity and 
commitment or showing interest in their work. The third factor, the capacity and 
education or qualifications of individual leaders, is probably the least important. To 
reach a good quality of the reform in the future, this structure and mind-set must be 
reversed. Research is needed to look deeply into the structure of leadership, 
  
especially the system in the political parties (especially the CPP) and its 
implications for the state political system. 
The core principle of democratic decentralisation in Cambodia is the 
encouragement of a culture of participation and trust between the local state and 
civil society groups. Historically, civil society groups or homegrown groups and 
popular movements are weak or non-existent. Cambodians have a very limited 
exposure to these civic groups or they would appreciate them much. In the local 
areas, there are some NGOs and CBOs operating vis-a-vis local authorities, but it 
depends on the sectors in which they are working: for example, service delivery 
and local development are normally welcome by local authorities. However, the 
areas of advocacy and human rights are strictly under the close watch of local 
authorities. The relationship between civil society groups and the local state is a 
critical topic for further research. 
This thesis has assessed democratic decentralisation in Cambodia through 
the concepts of responsiveness, accountability and devolution of power. However, 
there are many important factors of democratic decentralisation reform that have 
been left out: for instance, natural resource management, gender and local 
leadership, role of the elite in the democratic decentralisation reforms, changing 
leadership behaviour, the role of decentralisation in fighting corruption, the 
dynamics of the political system of the ruling party, their implications for state 
institutions and comparing the leadership of former Khmer Rouge and non-Khmer 
Rouge communes. These aspects are vitally important for further research.  
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SAMMANFATTNING (SUMMARY IN SWEDISH) 
 
Demokratiseringsprocessen efter konflikterna i Kambodja har varit 
problematisk. Nästan två decennier efter FN-interventionen 1993, så är 
demokratin fortfarande ytlig. Detta valideras av olika studier. Tre 
huvudfaktorer motverkar demokratiseringen: landet nutida historia av våld, 
kambodjansk politisk kultur och dess politiska regim/system, och de 
ofullständigt genomförda FN-ledda ingripandet. Erfarenheter från andra 
länder visar att det är mycket svårt att konsolidera demokratin i samhällen 
som har genomlevt konflikt på grund av interna stridigheter, svaga 
statsinstitutioner, historiska transformationer, och brist på politisk 
legitimitet. Denna avhandling argumenterar för att demokratisk 
decentralisering kan bidraga till en konsolideringen av demokrati, speciellt i 
dylika samhällen med erfarenheter av våld och krig. Väl genomförd så kan 
decentralisering konsolidera demokratin i Kambodja, åtminstone på den 
lokala nivån. 
Syftet med denna avhandling är att utreda kvaliteten på den 
demokratiska decentraliseringen i Kambodja. Detta fokus är i slutändan 
motiverat av de teoretiska argumenten för att en demokratisk 
decentralisation är central för att en fördjupad demokrati ska växa fram i ett 
samhälle efter djupa konflikter. Dess huvudsakliga forskningsproblem är: 
vilken kvalitet har den demokratiska decentraliseringsreformen sett ur ett 
perspektiv av återuppbyggnad och rekonstruering? Reformen är analyserad 
via en empirisk fokusering på tre stycken begrepp, nämligen de lokala 
myndigheternas förmåga att: svara på lokala krav (lyhördhet); ansvar för 
lokal utveckling, och hur att hantera sitt formella mandat.  
De empiriska resultaten pekar på en bred enighet att det har funnits 
distinkta förbättringar inom kvaliteten på de lokala samhällsstyrnings-
systemen under den demokratiska decentraliseringsreformen. Innan 
reformen hade både kommunfullmäktige och folket mycket lite erfarenhet 
av lokal demokrati. Efter den har de dock blivit direkt exponerade för lokala 
demokratiska processer i nu nästan 10 år; kommunalråd som väljare känner 
igen har introducerats, ett annat ledar (skaps) system har införts (vilket i sin 
tur har format de lokala statsinstitutionerna), och en beteendeförändring har 
skett hos många lokala ledare. Det senare har lett till ett mer demokratiskt 
förhållningssätt med ett ökat deltagande och engagemang från staten och 
mellan staten och folket. Förändringen ses orsakad av att kommunalråden 
har blivit demokratiskt valda och fullmäktige består av många kommunalråd 
från olika politiska partier, och det sättet myndigheterna utövar makt är 
mindre auktoritära än i landets tidigare regimer. Folk är inte längre rädda för 
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konsekvenserna när de uttrycker sina idéer. Det är också uppenbart att det 
finns en högre gard av samarbete och interaktion mellan det civila 
samhällets organisationer och de valda kommunalråden. Ett annat empiriskt 
resultat är att bychefen kvarstår som en central person i lokal politik och i 
bybornas vardagsliv, också efter den demokratiska decentraliseringen. 
Bycheferna är ‘ögon och öron’ för kommunalråden, vilka direkt övervakar 
byborna, ansvarar för pappersarbete, mobiliserar människor för 
utvecklingsaktiviteter, kapitalanskaffning och tjänar som grindvakter åt 
kommunalråden. Informations flödet från bybor till kommunalrådens byar 
går i huvudsak genom bychefen. 
De empiriska resultaten av kommunalrådens lyhördhet 
(”Responsiveness”) till medborgarnas behov indikerar att det tenderar att 
utvecklas konsensus mellan kommunalråd och röstare. Både kommunalråd 
och röstare anser att sedan kommunfullmäktigevalet 2002, har många lokala 
utvecklingsprojekt blivit realiserade i form av lokal infrastruktur, 
exempelvis belagda vägar, bevattningssystem, sanitetsåtgärder, 
brunnsborrning, skolor, och broar. Kommunalråden har tillräcklig 
förstående för vad folk behöver då de är lokalt rekryterade. Det kvarstår 
dock överväldigande materiella behov, och kraven överstiger vida de 
resurser som är tillgängliga för kommunalfullmäktige. Därmed, i termer av 
hastighet och mängd av projekt, så har kommunalråden ofta inte möjlighet 
att svara på de direkta kraven byborna ställer. Förutom att försöka bidraga 
med materiella tillgångar till röstare, så är kommunalråden också 
engagerade i aktiviteter som till exempel informationsspridning, leverans av 
kommunala tjänster och insamling av personnummer. 
Med tanke på erfarenhet av tidigare regimer och dess ”top-down” 
attityd, så är lyhördhet en ny ledarskapstil och med politiskt ansvar utövat 
av kommunalråden så skapas plats för röstare att ställa krav på 
myndigheterna, vilket är en ny möjlighet i det kambodjanska samhället. 
Ledare i tidigare regimer var vana vid att styra via kommandon, och folk var 
tvungna att lyda dem. Folk fick nästan inga materiella fördelar från 
myndigheterna i tidigare system, men i den demokratiska 
decentraliseringsreformen, som vi ser i kapitel V, har en viss, men inte 
tillfredsställande, förmåga att leverera materiella fördelar infunnit sig. När 
de är folkligt valda med ett tydligt mandat, så måste kommunalråden jobba 
hårt för att möta och realisera väljarnas krav. Att utvalda kommunalråd sätts 
under press för att realisera sådana krav är ett tecken på att gräsrots-kraven 
förs fram och på ett meningsfullt förmedlas till lokala ledare. Sådana krav 
pressar kommunfullmäktige, vilka nu måste bli mer uppmärksamma och 
interaktiva med väljarna, samt mer lyhörda och öppna. Dessa processer är i 
arbete om än inte så effektiva som man kunnat hoppas på. 
  
Enligt de empiriska resultaten, så har även ett visst mått av politiskt 
ansvar (”Accountability”) av kommunalråden gentemot sina väljare vuxit 
fram under decentraliseringsprocessen. Kommunalråden försöker nu ta 
hänsyn till och förklara och kommunicera de beslut som tas. Det finns ett 
ökande erkännande om ansvar gentemot sina väljare, då folkvalda 
kommunalråd realiserar att de måste stå till svars inför väljarna först. Dock, 
det nuvarande valsystemet tillåter dem inte att göra det fullt ut. Inte desto 
mindre så verkar ide´n med politiskt ansvar gradvis få fäste lokalt. Kraven 
på politiskt ansvar från ledarna växer när människorna lär sig att de har 
makt; makt att välja (och välja bort) sina ledare. Det här kan dock långt ifrån 
tas för givet då det fortfarande finns problem med, t.ex. ‘gåvor’ till röstare, 
och press eller hot från politiska partier innan valen. Valsystemet, speciellt 
tyngdpunkten på partiernas roll, kan vara orsaken till den ibland långsamma 
takten av förbättring inom lokal-demokratin. För närvarande så kan politiska 
partier med stora resurser fungera parallellt med det statliga systemet ända 
ner till familjenivå. Den här sortens politisk kontroll på gräsrötterna gör det 
svårt för folk att fritt bestämma vem de egentligen vill rösta på.  
Enligt lagen är kommunalråden främst ansvariga gentemot folket i 
deras egna valkretsar. Detta ansvar formas dock i en speciell lokal kontext, 
och de empiriska resultaten visar att kommunalråden upplever att de är 
oförmögna att vara fullt ansvariga då problemen i fråga ofta är utanför deras 
mandat: därmed kan de inte utöva full myndighetskontroll, och inte ta fullt 
ansvar för resultatet. 
Den empiriska informationen avslöjar också att makt har gradvis 
delegerats till kommunalråden, så som administrativa befogenheter, 
myndigheternas ansvar att hantera mindre konflikter, social utveckling, 
lokal miljö och andra kommunala tjänster. En av de mest avgörande 
förbättringarna är att det nu finns en maktdelning mellan 
kommunalrådmedlemmar från olika politiska partier. Från de empiriska 
resultaten att döma så känner de flesta av kommunalråden att de inte har 
några problem med att jobba fredligt med kommunalråd från olika politiska 
partier.  
En stor del av kommunalrådens medlemmar anser att de inte har den 
makt som de enligt lag har rätt till. Det finns två typer av befogenheter som 
kommunalråden primärt behöver för att vara ansvariga inför sina väljare i 
enlighet med lagverket: att få beskatta lokalt, samt att kunna kontrollera och 
skydda natur-resurser (som till exempel skog, fiske, land och vatten). 
Delegering av dessa två befogenheter har ännu inte genomförts, då 
processen med dessa har fastnat vid olika ministerier inom den centrala 
administrationen. När det handlar om att få makt från regeringen via 
decentralisering, arbetar kommunalrådets medlemmar inte bara för sina 
egna politiska åsikter utan också för sina väljare och dess samhällen?   
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Utan tvekan är innehållet i decentraliseringen central för en 
fördjupad demokrati. Från början var det övergripande antagandet att 
decentraliseringen, som det hävdas av vissa forskare, skulle kunna bidra till 
en förbättrad lokal politisk legitimitet, som i sin tur kan stödja 
demokratisering och en politisk rekonstruktion. Jag hävdar att den 
demokratiska decentraliseringen i Kambodja har lett till ett antal resultat 
som i sin tur har inspirerat demokratiseringen och uppbyggnaden i 
efterkrigstidens Kambodja, inkluderande att skapa ett politiskt utrymme och 
återuppfinna lokala demokratiska institutioner, att återta kontakten mellan 
den centrala och lokala regeringen i form av demokratisk utbildning för 
lokala ledare, samt att börja förändra den politiska kulturen vilket sannolikt 
kommer att leda till nya reformer.  
Således har ett antal faktorer har framkommit i den demokratiska 
decentraliseringen med betydelse för den demokratiska konsolideringen i en 
efterkrigstid i Kambodja. För det första, decentralisationen har bidragit till 
att skapa ett öppet politiskt fält och att skapa en lokal regeringsstruktur 
(lokala demokrati-institutioner), speciellt genom att upprätta flerpartisystem 
med lokala val. För det andra, decentraliseringen har skapat bättre kontakt 
mellan den lokala regeringen och centralmakten. För det tredje, en 
demokratisk decentralisering har spelat rollen som en politisk pedagog som 
har förändrat flera ledares positioner, vilka har förändrats från att använda 
kommendering och hårt maktspråk till ett mer demokratiskt förhållningssätt 
som bygger på att ledaren inte ska kommendera utan istället stödja sitt folk. 
För det fjärde, decentraliseringen har introducerat en mjukare ledning via 
lokala val men också skapat en ny version av patron-klient systemet. För det 
femte, det förväntade utfallet av demokratisk decentralisation är mer 
komplext; decentralisationen har indirekt lett till andra nationella och lokala 
reformer. Så här långt har den nationella nivån av demokratiseringen blivit 
stärkt av decentralisationen med följden att andra reformer som till exempel 
att senatvalen samt distrikt-, provins- och kommunala indirekta val har 
kommit till. 
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